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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides a critical examination of four approaches to democratic 
inclusion. These approaches are: egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, 
identity politics and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative approaches. The thesis 
presents each approach as a successively more effective way of addressing democratic 
exclusion. Each theory is measured against the demands of accommodating the claims 
of groups that have suffered some form of historical exclusion and injustice. The 
thesis explains the significance of the demands o f historical injustices in relation to 
these approaches and concludes that deliberative democracy and the politics of 
recognition require supplementation by a politics of reconciliation. Drawing on the 
idea of reconciliation from conflict resolution and international relations, the thesis 
explores the way in which democratic inclusion can be supplemented.
The politics of reconciliation is fundamentally crucial for the task of 
accommodating demands of historically excluded social groups primarily because of 
its emphasis on confronting the past, acknowledging injustices, taking responsibility 
and offering an apology for causing these injustices and embracing the concrete and 
specific experiences of historical oppression and exclusion. Briefly, the 
distinctiveness of reconciliation stems from its serious engagement with the 
specificities and particularities of real and concrete experiences o f historical 
oppression and exclusion.
The originality o f this thesis lies in providing a supplement to and therefore 
transforming the politics of recognition and deliberative democracy and their ability to 
address political problems of excluded social groups. This thesis does not aim to 
replace deliberation and recognition with new substitutes but seeks to offer a new 
interpretation of these theories and supplement them with reconciliation. Briefly, the 
thesis offers a new interpretation to familiar issues in different disciplines and the 
novel task has been to bring them together. The application o f the ethic of 
reconciliation, from International Relations and conflict resolution, to the politics of 
recognition and deliberation makes a significant contribution to the field and the 
opening of a new research agenda for normative theories o f democratic inclusion.
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SECTION I: HISTORICAL EXCLUSION AND
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
1. INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the communist bloc, the alleged end of ‘the age of ideologies’, 
the massive influx of immigration into Western democracies, the emergence of 
religious fundamentalism, and the processes o f globalisation have all contributed to 
put pressure on contemporary liberal democracies to deal more profoundly with ‘the 
fact o f pluralism’. More recently and particularly after September 11th there has been 
an alarming increase in Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, Anti-Arab sentiments and other 
forms o f discrimination and racism against minorities in Europe, the United States and 
elsewhere in the world. Lately, the public debates in France and Germany have been 
dominated by the question of whether or not young Muslim women should be allowed 
to wear the Islamic headscarf, or hijab as it is known in Arabic, in public schools. The 
disquieting increase in racism, discrimination and the formal institutional reactions to 
them do not only raise serious doubts about the effectiveness and adequacy o f certain 
policies and decisions but also question and challenge certain values, beliefs and 
principles underlying the politics in contemporary Western liberal democracies. 
Briefly, the phenomenon of cultural diversity re-imposes itself again as a very 
pressing issue for contemporary multicultural and pluralist societies. Different 
political and social theorists have tried to rethink liberalism and democracy,1 hoping 
to offer better theories o f democratic accommodation. There are many approaches in 
contemporary political theory to developing a more ‘inclusive’ idea of democratic 
citizenship, including theories o f liberal egalitarianism, theories of deliberative 
democracy, theories o f multicultural recognition and theories of agonistic democracy.
1 It should be emphasized that liberalism should not be viewed as a monolithic tradition. What I refer to 
as liberalism here is mostly the contemporary rights based liberal theory that has dominated the debates 
in the last 40 years.
2 There are several other attempts that endeavour to recast liberalism. While the thesis is aware o f the 
main attempts, it is certainly beyond its scope to provide an exhaustive discussion o f  all o f  them. Some 
of these attempts are advanced by liberal scholars that primarily focus on accommodating the demands 
of cultural groups in relation to questions o f justice and not political deliberation. See for example: Will
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The task of democratic accommodation is made even more difficult when 
there are persistent and unresolved issues of historical injustice. In the last decade 
there have been numerous developments that have considerably contributed to the 
centrality o f historical injustices in contemporary politics. Among these developments 
are the formation o f the Reparations Coordinating Committee (RCC) and the National 
Coalition o f Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA) that advocate reparations 
for African Americans on the history of slavery and its consequences, the American 
Congress offering in 1988 an apology and compensation to the survivors and relatives 
of Japanese Americans jailed in concentration camps during the Second World War, 
the Swiss government creating a $ 71 millions special compensation fund for 
Holocaust victims to compensate for holding assets of Holocaust survivors at Swiss 
banks, and the establishment o f truth and reconciliation committees in countries such 
as South Africa, Algeria, Chile, Germany, and Argentina. This thesis argues that 
persistent historical injustices give rise to a set o f special demands, such as collective 
memory o f exclusion, acknowledgement o f historical injustices, and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices, which go beyond 
the types o f democratic inclusion that are often offered by theories such as 
deliberative democracy and the politics of recognition. This set o f demands, this thesis 
claims, requires a ‘politics o f reconciliation’.
The present thesis focuses primarily on four approaches to democratic 
inclusion and their attentiveness to persistent and unresolved issues of historical 
injustice. These approaches are deliberative democracy, the politics o f recognition and 
its democratic critics (considered as two different and contradictory -  but related
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights (Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press, 1995), Politics 
in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000); David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Citizenship and 
National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford 
University Press, 1995); Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f Multiculturalism (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). Other more critical scholars, such as value pluralists, have 
suggested rethinking liberalism through raising serious doubts about the commensurabilities and 
compatibility o f values, beliefs and principles that underline the dominant versions o f liberalism, i.e., 
liberalism o f rights theory. Along these lines John Gray proposes a neo-Hobbesian form of politics and 
Chantal Mouffe suggests an agonistic form of politics that denies the possibility o f achieving pure 
consensus and emphasizes the impossibility o f eradicating power from social relations and politics. For 
more see: John Gray, Two Faces o f Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), Heresies: Against 
Progress and other Illusions (London: Granta, 2004); Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox 
(London: Verso, 2000), ‘Democracy, Power, and the “Political”’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy 
and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1996), pp. 245-256.
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approaches), and combinatory theories of democratic inclusion. The thesis critically 
examines and presents each approach as a successively more effective way of 
addressing democratic exclusion. Each theory is measured against the demands of 
accommodating the claims o f groups that have suffered some form of historical 
exclusion and injustice. The thesis demonstrates that these approaches are 
insufficiently attentive to issues o f historical injustice and concludes that they require 
supplementation by a politics of reconciliation. Since the thesis is primarily concerned 
with issues pertaining to historical exclusions and injustices suffered by social groups, 
I will provide an account o f the general character of these injustices and social groups 
before I move to briefly introduce each of the four main approaches of democratic 
inclusion examined in the thesis and ‘the politics o f reconciliation’ as a solution to 
their unsatisfactory treatment o f historical exclusions and injustices. I will finish by 
describing how the argument unfolds and the structure o f the thesis.
The focus o f this thesis is on social groups that have suffered from persistent 
historical injustices. This thesis is concerned with historical injustices that are either 
persistent or intimately linked to present inequalities and injustices. These historical 
injustices are not the product o f contingency and luck but stem primarily from 
oppressive social practices and institutions that operate over long periods o f time, 
across generations. These oppressive social practices and structures systematically 
legitimize the exclusion and oppression of social groups because their members 
possess certain features that mark them as inferiors and deviants. Moreover, these 
oppressive social practices and structures do not only function at the level o f formal 
and bureaucratic institutions but also at the informal level o f  ordinary cultural and 
social interactions. Therefore, these oppressive social practices and structures produce 
historical injustices that are concerned with material resources and goods as well as 
with cultural and symbolic ones. Historical injustices do not, however, have a single 
general character but are diverse and plural in character. This thesis is concerned with 
social groups (such as racial, national, and ethnic groups) that are defined through 
relations o f oppression and not merely associations (such as churches, universities, 
and political parties) or aggregations (such as ‘friends o f  Mozart’, and ‘drivers of 
Honda cars’). One of the main differences among these three types of categories is 
that while what brings members of associations and aggregations together is a 
common set o f attributes (such as admiration o f a specific s inger, football player or 
club, passion to a certain type of art, cuisine or brand o f  cars, or affiliation to a
9
particular political party), members o f social groups are bound by something 
additional, namely, a shared sense of identity. This notion of common identity stems 
from shared history and similarities members o f the group have in their way of life, 
experiences, social norms and cultural practices. Moreover, while associations and 
aggregations are created by independent individuals who voluntarily create them, 
social groups are what constitute individuals and shape their tastes, memories, and 
modes o f behaviours, communication and reasoning abilities.3 Membership in social 
groups is often involuntary.4
What makes a social group oppressed! Iris Marion Young offers a very useful 
definition o f oppression. According to her definition people are oppressed when, by 
virtue of their membership in a particular social group, they are vulnerable to 
exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, or violence.5 These 
five faces o f oppression can be explained as follows. Exploitation occurs when the 
product of the human capacity of labour o f a group o f people is systematically 
controlled and transferred for the benefit o f another group. While exploitation in its 
traditional Marxist interpretation referred only to class oppression, Young argues that 
exploitation is also organized along sexual and racial lines. Marginalization is a form
3 For more on the differences between social groups, associations, and aggregations see: Iris Marion 
Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 
42-48. Melissa S. Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings o f  
Liberal Representation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 15-18.
4 1 am not implying here that individuals cannot develop their own tastes and styles that differ from 
what is dominant in their group. Indeed, they are able to develop their own tastes and styles. Moreover, 
the involuntary character does not necessarily imply that individuals are entirely incapable o f rejecting 
certain aspects o f their group identity and sometimes even, though it could be emotionally and 
psychologically demanding, withdrawing from this group. Additionally, individuals do not belong only 
to one group but they are likely to simultaneously belong to several.
5 Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, pp. 48-63. Nancy Fraser proposes a similar account of 
exclusion and injustice. Yet, she proposes to analytically distinguish between two types of injustice; 
socio-economic injustice that ‘is rooted in the political-economic structure o f society’ and cultural or 
symbolic injustice that ‘is rooted in social patterns o f representation, interpretation, and 
communication’. Examples o f socio-economic injustice include: ‘exploitation (having the fruits o f  
one’s labour appropriated for the benefit o f others); economic marginalization (being confined to 
undesirable or poorly paid work or being denied access to income-generating labour altogether); and 
deprivation (being denied an adequate material standard o f living)’. Examples o f  cultural or symbolic 
injustice include: ‘cultural domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication 
that are associated with another culture and are alien and /or hostile to one’s own); nonrecognition 
(being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative 
practices o f one’s culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public 
cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions)’. Fraser acknowledges that these two types 
of injustice are intertwined yet she insists that in her account o f social theory it is important to keep 
them analytically distinct. For more on this see: Nancy Fraser, ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? 
Dilemmas o f Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age’, New Left Review, 212 (1995), pp. 68-93.
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of oppression that constitutes a group of people, such as Blacks, old people and Latin 
Americans, as useless in the wage system of labour. The economy and its market 
define the organization and hierarchy of the social division of labour. Those who are 
marked as useless by the wage system of labour are likely to be subject to material 
deprivation that severely influences their living conditions. However, marginalization 
causes harms that go beyond material distribution. These harms take the forms of 
feelings of uselessness, boredom and low self-esteem. Even when welfare policies are 
introduced to remedy the material deprivation, they are likely to produce 
marginalization because marginalized people are constructed and viewed as 
dependent people. Moreover, marginalized people feel that they lack the opportunity 
to engage in socially meaningful productive activities. Powerlessness is a form of 
oppression that stems from the social division o f labour between professionals and 
non-professionals. Non-professionals are powerless because they lack social respect 
and recognition, authority over others and avenues to develop their capacities and 
skills. Professionals receive respect and recognition for their talents, enjoy authority 
over others and have avenues to develop their skills. Cultural imperialism is 
experienced when the dominant and hegemonic group universalizes its perspectives, 
interpretations o f events and history, experiences, and cultural beliefs and practices 
and constructs them as the norm and views those who have different experiences, 
values, beliefs and perspectives as outsiders, inferiors and deviants. Therefore, the 
dominant culture assigns negative connotations, stereotypes, and prejudices to these 
groups and their identities. The negative connotations, stereotypes, and prejudices 
depict and fix these groups and their members as essentially inferiors and deviants 
that need to be civilized, controlled, denied, administrated or educated. This 
stigmatized demeaning depiction is often made socially acceptable and 
institutionalized and therefore legitimizes the exercise o f oppressive acts such as 
coercive assimilative policies. Moreover, the social recognition and 
institutionalization of the inferiority of these groups justify the exercise o f systematic 
violence that takes the shape o f harassment, humiliation, psychological fear, physical 
violence, arbitrary imprisonment, and under special circumstances leads to occupation, 
genocide or massacre, especially when the hegemony o f the dominant culture is 
challenged by these inferior groups.6
6 Occupation, genocide and massacre are not clearly mentioned in Young’s account. Yet as several
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What makes a social group historically oppressed? It is the systematic 
vulnerability to one, or more, o f the previous forms o f oppression over long periods of 
time, across generations. These prolonged and systematic forms o f oppression do not 
only strengthen the affinities between the group’s members but also generate common 
experiences and a history of oppression. The common experience and history of 
oppression do not only revolve around injury, harm, suffering and pain but also 
achievements, determination and resistance. These negative and positive aspects are 
manifested and expressed through different cultural and political practices such as art, 
music, literature, story-telling, memorials, ceremonies, collective actions and 
mobilization, demonstrations, and various forms o f struggle. While these common 
experiences and history of oppression do not create a fixed core essence for the 
groups because of the dynamic nature of the social processes that create social groups, 
they do give rise to a set of special claims and demands that go beyond the mere 
recognition o f their culture and identity. Among these claims and demands are: 
collective memoiy and history o f exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, 
and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. These 
are the types o f claims, the thesis will argue, that are insufficiently captured by 
egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, politics of recognition and its post­
structuralist critics and combinatory theories of democratic inclusion.
Exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness, refer to forms o f oppression 
that are primarily generated by the social division o f labour. The social division of 
labour determines ‘who works for whom, who does not work, and how the content of 
the work defines one institutional position relative to others.’7 While these three forms 
of oppression could generate certain types of historical injustices if they are 
systematically exercised over a long period of time, this thesis is chiefly concerned 
with the last two forms of oppression, i.e., cultural imperialism and violence. In other 
words, although oppression is likely to emerge along categories o f identity such as 
gender, disability, sexuality, age and class, the emphasis in this thesis is primarily on 
oppression that stems along categories of identity such as race, ethnicity and culture. 
The thesis, therefore, focuses primarily on social groups such as indigenous
historical examples suggest these forms o f violence are likely to be perpetrated under the pretext o f  
cultural imperialism. The examples include the treatment of the indigenous peoples o f Australia, North 
and South America, and Palestine by the colonizing settler societies.
7 Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, p. 58.
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communities, national groups and minorities, and immigrant communities. Indeed, 
members o f oppressed social groups that suffer from cultural imperialism and 
systematic violence are also likely to suffer from exploitation, marginalization, or 
powerlessness. This is not to argue that only historical oppression and injustice is 
important or urgent nor that the historical dimension is at the forefront o f all political 
struggles for inclusion, but it is to acknowledge that some forms o f oppression and 
domination cannot be characterized or addressed without taking seriously the 
historical dimension. In other words, it is the historical character of the oppression 
that creates political urgency because it is this which shapes identities in terms of 
conflict and opposition. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the historical 
dimension is plural in character and this is why I do not aim to provide a simple list of 
the relevant historically excluded groups. The historical character o f oppression 
transforms the urgency and priority of issues o f inclusion and accommodation. 
However, its nature and significance is varied in different cases. In some cases, such 
as ethno-national conflicts it might have absolute priority in deciding the terms of a 
democratic resolution. In other cases the urgency is less but the demands o f 
reconciliation might still be central to addressing the demands o f  the excluded group 
in a way that fits within other theories of democratic inclusion and practice.
The historical dimension is not only a temporal or chronological dimension as 
much oppression is long-standing. What is distinctive about historical oppression is 
that it leaves a stigma that persists even after certain kinds o f reparations are made, 
and it is the eradication of that stigma which is tied up in the identity of a group that is 
so important. What matters to some groups is not simply that they are oppressed but 
also how they came to be oppressed; for example, we can think o f enslavement, 
forcible removal from land or property, physical expulsion or the coercive denial of 
aspects o f identity such as language and religion. How a group came to occupy a 
position o f subordination matters; this is reflected, for instance, in the Quebec concern 
for linguistic justice. It is the historical fact of groups becoming colonised that matters 
to them, even if many outsiders might regard some o f  their claims as less than 
compelling. Where history really matters is with groups or nations such as African 
Americans, Jews after the holocaust and Palestinians to name but three, where certain 
historical acts of injustice, expropriation, forcible transfer, and domination are central 
to shaping those groups’ identities. In such cases the historical legacy is a very deep 
wound and one which goes to the very core of a group’s i dentity and being. It is for
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this reason that Holocaust denial is so important to Jews; it is not merely an error of 
scholarship. Similarly, it is for this reason that the legacy of slavery is so important to 
African Americans; the issue is not simply one of racial domination, but the peculiar 
character o f that domination in terms of the denial of history, identity and value 
through the institution of slavery. For Palestinians the issue o f having the 
particularities o f their oppression acknowledged as an expropriated and colonised 
people is important especially when Palestinian rights, identity and claims are denied 
by Israel and subject to the interests of Western powers and U.S. foreign policy elites. 
To fail to address these specific, albeit plural dimensions o f historical oppression, 
involves a denial of recognition and inclusion, whatever other goods such as material 
resources and rights are being offered.
Earlier I have claimed that the common experiences and history o f oppression 
gave rise to a set of special claims and demands that go beyond the mere recognition 
of culture and identity. Most importantly among these demands are collective memory 
of exclusion, acknowledgement o f historical injustices, and taking responsibility and 
offering an apology for causing these injustices. These three demands emerge and 
require special treatment because o f the significance o f the past in achieving 
democratic accommodation through unmasking and explaining historical injustices 
and their intimate connection with present inequalities. Since these three claims lie at 
the core o f ‘the politics and of reconciliation’, and because they will be used to 
measure the ability o f the four main approaches discussed in this thesis to 
accommodate historically excluded social groups, saying a few words about each one 
o f them is very important at this initial stage. According to the politics of 
reconciliation, collective memory and history of exclusion are important because they 
often serve as invaluable sources for undermining and confronting dominant views, 
stories, narratives and past and present political arrangements and practices. These 
dominant views, stories, narratives and political institutions tend to downplay or deny 
historical injustices and harms. In other words, collective memory and history of 
exclusion operate as counter narratives to the hegemonic institutionalized and often 
celebrated account of national history. The significance of these counter narratives is 
to bring to public attention voices, stories and inequalities that have been either 
silenced or denied. The national account of history either denies or downplays the 
occurrence o f past harms and portrays the dominant group as irresponsible for causing 
these harms. Several scholars have emphasized the role o f collective memory in
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challenging and countering the hegemonic national accounts o f history. Thomas 
McCarthy has pointed out that a distorted account of the history o f slavery and its 
consequences on African Americans has considerably contributed to the refusal of the 
broader white American society and its establishment to recognize the historical 
injustices o f slavery, to take responsibility for causing them and for not linking them 
to present racial exclusions.8 The Palestinians, at least until the 1960s, have invoked 
their memories o f expulsion by relying mostly on oral testimonies and story-telling in 
order to continuously counter the dominant Zionist and Israeli narratives. The 
dominant narratives of the Israeli and Zionist historiography have denied the role of 
the Jewish Zionist military groups in creating the Palestinian nakba (disaster) and 
denied the existence o f a master plan to expel and dispossess Palestinians from their 
villages and towns.9 Burke Hendrix has argued that mainstream celebrated American 
national narratives downplay or deny the historical injustices and harms o f slavery, 
racial segregation and the massive expropriation o f Native lands. While focusing on 
the land claims o f Native Americans, Hendrix has argued that memories and 
narratives of Native Americans that lend support to their land claims have challenged 
the mainstream American national narratives and demanded their revision and 
reformulation so they acknowledge the historical injustices committed against Native 
Americans.10
8 See: Thomas McCarthy, ‘ Vergangenheitsbewdltigung in the USA: On the Politics o f Memory o f  
Slavery’, Political Theory, 30:5 (2002), pp. 623-648, ‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the 
Morality and Politics o f Reparations for Slavery’, Political Theory, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772.
9 Recently revealed archives in Israel have led a few Israeli historians, referred to as the ‘new 
historians’, to recognize what Palestinians have been persistently claiming, i.e. the active role the 
Zionist movement played in organizing forceful expulsion o f Palestinians from their villages and towns. 
For more on this debate and the role o f Palestinian memory in challenging the Israeli ‘master 
narratives’ see: Joel Beinin, ‘Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits of the New Israeli History’, 
Journal o f Palestine Studies, 34:2 (2005), pp. 6-23. Norman Finkelstein, ‘Myths, Old and New’, 
Journal o f Palestine Studies, 21:1 (1991), pp. 66-89; Nur Masalha, ‘A Critique o f Benny Morris’, 
Journal o f Palestine Studies, 21:1 (1991), pp. 90-97; Benny Morris, ‘Response to Finkelstein and 
Masalha’, Journal o f Palestine Studies, 21:1 (1991), pp. 98-114.
10 Burke Hendrix argues that both groups need to revise their memories in a process o f reconciliation. 
She insists, however, that the revision has to occur mostly on the side o f those who are not Natives. For 
more on her views regarding the significance of memories in Native American land claims see: Burke 
A. Hendrix, ‘Memory in Native American Land Claims’, Political Theory, 33:6 (2005), pp. 763-785. 
For more On the role o f memory see also: Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, Lewis A. Coser 
(ed. and trans.) (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992), The Collective Memory, Francis J. Ditter, 
Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); Milton Takei, ‘Collective 
Memory as the Key to National and Ethnic Identity: The Case o f Cambodia’, Nationalism & Ethnic 
Politics, 4:3 (1998), pp. 59-78.
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Therefore, the politics o f reconciliation does not only demand uncovering 
historical wrongs and their influence on the current social and political arrangements 
but also requires acknowledging the occurrence o f these historical harms and taking 
collective responsibility for causing them. As long as these past injustices are denied 
or portrayed as accidental historical events and not as an integral part of the national 
narratives, the achievement o f democratic resolutions and accommodation remains 
difficult to attain, if at all possible, from the perspective of the historically excluded 
social groups. Hendrix has argued that unless past wrongs against Native Americans’ 
ancestors are acknowledged as an integral part o f the United States history, it will be 
very hard for Native Americans to trust the broader society and its institutions and 
identify with them.11 Thomas McCarthy has pursued a similar argument in the case of 
African Americans and the history o f slavery and segregation.12 One might argue that 
it is plausible to demand national responsibility when the nation is not composed out 
o f successive and culturally diverse waves of immigration but it is implausible to 
demand such responsibility when it is composed from successive and culturally 
diverse waves o f immigration. It is precisely because coming to terms with past 
wrongs has direct bearings on the present and the future o f the political community 
and its institutions that immigrants do share the national responsibility of causing 
historical injustices. Therefore, scholars such as Thomas McCarthy have argued that 
national responsibility is not grounded on cultural or primordial ties but on 
constitutional and political ties. McCarthy claims that all U.S. citizens, regardless of 
ancestry, i.e. natives or immigrants, inherit the burdens as well as the benefits of the 
membership.13 According to the politics of reconciliation, taking responsibility and 
offering an apology should not remain at the declarative level. It requires structural 
changes in the distribution of material resources and goods that are very likely to 
transform the living conditions of the members o f historically excluded social groups.
11 Hendrix, ‘Memory in Native American Land Claims’, p. 775.
12 Thomas McCarthy, ‘ Vergangenheitsbewdltigung in the USA: On the Politics o f Memory o f Slavery’, 
Political Theory, 30:5 (2002), pp. 635-636. The issue o f acknowledging past injustices and harms is 
also discussed in: Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), Dilemmas o f Reconciliation: Cases and 
Concepts (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003); and William J. Long and Peter 
Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution, (The MIT Press, 2003).
13 McCarthy, ‘ Vergangenheitsbewdltigung in the USA: On the Politics o f Memory o f Slavery’, p. 636, 
‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics o f Reparations for Slavery’, pp. 
757-758; Balfour, ‘Reparations After Identity Politics’, p.790; and Hendrix, ‘Memory in Native 
American Land Claims’, p.775.
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Additionally, taking responsibility and offering an apology for past injustices goes 
beyond distributive changes and entails activities such as the creation o f national 
symbols, public holiday, museums, memorials and introducing new curriculum in the 
education system to commemorate these past injustices. The task o f these activities is 
not to perpetuate guilt or victimhood. Rather, they are invaluable because of their 
social, pedagogical and educational influences. That is, they are important in helping 
citizens understand their history differently and successfully link it to the current 
distorted political, social and economic inequalities and to help members of 
stigmatized and excluded groups to reclaim, re-describe or transform their self-image 
and self-understanding.14
Let me now return to examine the adequacy o f some prominent accounts of 
democratic inclusion in contemporary political theory to accommodate historical 
exclusion and injustices. The current debate in democratic theory is primarily centred 
on the model o f deliberative democracy. This model has been proposed by thinkers 
such as Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls as an alternative model to the ‘aggregative 
model o f democracy’ that prevailed in Western democracies after the Second World 
War. In the aggregative model, democracy is viewed as an electoral competitive 
system to elect skilled political leaders who are capable of making legislative and 
administrative decisions. This model places the preferences and interests of 
individuals rather than those o f community at the core o f its concern. It views these 
preferences and interests as predetermined and fixed prior to the political process. 
According to the aggregative model, individual citizens combine efforts and create 
interest-groups, associations, parties or factions that allegedly represent and defend 
their interests and compete for power on their behalf. Citizens in this system lose their 
centrality; their role is reduced to merely voting at regular intervals for political 
parties and interest groups who bargain and take decisions on their behalf. Democracy, 
according to this aggregative understanding, is a method without a substance. In other 
words, it does not embody specific moral values or principles but it is just a
14 For more on taking responsibility and offering an apology and their material and symbolic 
consequences see: Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan K. Serrano, ‘Healing Racial Wounds? The Final 
Report o f South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ , in Roy L. Brooks (ed.), When Sorry 
Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations fo r  Human Rights (New York: New 
York University Press, 1999), pp. 492-500; McCarthy, ‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the 
Morality and Politics o f Reparations for Slavery’, pp. 765-766; Balfour, ‘Reparations After Identity 
Politics’, p. 790; and Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after 
Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).
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mechanism or institutional arrangement for competition among several interest- 
groups on political leadership.15 The imposed divorce between democratic politics and 
its moral dimension, the reduction o f democratic politics to voting, and the thin notion 
o f legitimacy that lies at the core of the aggregative model, have led several thinkers 
to recast democracy to focus on substantial moral principles and thicker notions of 
democratic legitimacy.
The shift to substantial moral principles and thicker notions o f democratic 
legitimacy coincided with the development o f the ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic 
theory during the 1990’s. This turn has added a new dimension to debates about 
democratic legitimacy. According to the deliberative turn, collective decisions are 
legitimate only when all those who are affected by them have the right to participate 
in deliberation, as free and equal persons, about their content.16 The deliberative turn 
together with the renewed concern with moral principles have given rise to several 
theories o f deliberative democracy that are primarily concerned with social justice and 
democratic legitimacy. These theories have been proposed by their advocates as 
adequate answers to the challenges facing contemporary democratic theory. Broadly 
the deliberative democracy enterprise can be mapped out into three different variants: 
Aristotelian, epistemic and egalitarian.17 The present thesis focuses primarily on the 
third variant, namely, the egalitarian. 18 The egalitarian variant o f deliberative
15 For more on the aggregative model o f democracy see: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976); David Held, Models o f  Democracy (Oxford: 
Polity Press, 1996).
16 Bernard Manin, ‘On Legitimacy and Political deliberation’, Political Theory, 15:3 (1987), pp. 338- 
368; Joshua Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.’ in Alan Hamlin and Phillip Pettit (eds.), 
The Good Polity: Normative Analysis o f the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34; Seyla 
Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model o f  Democratic Legitimacy’, in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political (Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1996).
17 Cillian McBride draws similar distinctions. See Cillian McBride, Context and Social Criticism (PhD 
Thesis, London School o f Economics and Political Science, 2001). Moreover, Ricardo Blaug makes 
interesting distinctions between different models o f democracy. For more see: Ricardo Blaug, 
‘Engineering Democracy’, Political Studies, 50:1 (2002), pp. 102-116.
18 Unlike the epistemic variant o f deliberative democracy that focuses primarily on institutional 
questions and public policy, this thesis focuses on normative questions. Moreover, both the Aristotelian 
and epistemic variants o f deliberative democracy do not suggest an appealing way to deal with the 
demands o f historically excluded social groups. For while the former views political participation as a 
superior notion o f the good, the latter carries an elitist potential. The Aristotelian variant rejects the 
model o f representative democracy and aspires to conjure up the Athenian ideal o f direct democracy 
that characterized the Greek polis and presents it as a desirable model for contemporary modem 
societies. What lies at the crux o f this Aristotelian version is the centrality o f  political participation in 
public life. In other words, according to this version o f democracy, there is a single favourite way o f
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democracy, it is often claimed, is more desirable for multicultural and pluralistic 
societies. For, among other things, it emphasizes egalitarian procedures, recognizes 
the existence of equally valuable different notions of the good, and is committed to 
individual autonomy.
Two main approaches can be identified within the egalitarian version of 
deliberative democracy, the Rawlsian and the Habermasian. Both Habermas and 
Rawls aim to reconcile liberal principles o f individual rights with the democratic 
principles o f popular sovereignty and participation while avoiding the problem of 
majoritarianism. They aspire to achieve this task by replacing the instrumental 
rationality (means-ends) of the aggregative model by a different version of rationality 
(communicative rationality) that is based on a different understanding of reason. This 
new version of rationality is grounded on unconstrained communicative action in 
Habermas’ theory and on free public reason in Rawls’. This rationality is the driving 
force o f citizens in democracy and the source o f their commitment to shared 
institutions. While Habermas views legitimacy as the key issue of a functioning
life that is superior to others, that is the life o f  a politically engaged and active citizen. Unlike liberal 
representative democracy that is primarily individualist and instrumental in the way it views agents, the 
Aristotelian participatory version attaches greater value to the communal character o f human nature. 
Benjamin Barber and Hannah Arendt are representatives o f this version o f deliberation^ See: Benjamin 
Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley, California: University o f  California Press, 1984), Hannah Arendt, 
The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958).] For Barber, political participation 
cultivates ‘civic friendship and solidarity’ and for Arendt it generates ‘reciprocal empathy and mutual 
respect.’ In addition to valid concerns o f scale, practicality and feasibility o f direct democracy in 
contemporary massive and complex societies, the claim o f privileging a single notion o f the good life, 
that o f  politically engaged citizenry, is not convincing. According to many scholars and particularly 
value pluralists there are several competing equally valuable ways of living good lives. Moreover, the 
emphasis on a collective identity raises serious doubts about the ability o f this version to effectively 
deal with diversity in general and the demands of historically excluded social groups in particular. In 
his book Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) James Fishkin has 
proposed an epistemic version o f deliberative democracy. One o f the main concerns o f this approach is 
the improvement o f the quality o f the decision-making process. Driven by fears o f populism and the 
majoritarian tyranny, Fishkin rejects the Greek ideal o f direct democracy. Moreover, he criticizes 
representative democracy for focusing purely on the agents’ preferences. Alternatively, he suggests the 
introduction o f deliberative components to the decision making process. The deliberative mechanisms, 
he argues, will generate better decisions. Fishkin suggests Deliberative Opinion Polls as a deliberative 
mechanism to primarily yield a more genuine picture o f citizens’ views and preferences. Unlike in 
deliberative bodies like Citizens’ Juries where the members are often chosen randomly to discuss 
specific political issues, deliberative opinion polls are expected to be as representative as possible and 
place a lot o f emphasis on encounters with political candidates and politicians and not only 
professionals and experts. Fishkin’s ultimate goal is to achieve outcomes that will enhance the decision 
making process for voters as well as for politicians. Fishkin’s proposal has been subject to several 
criticisms. Mainly his account has been criticized for being appealing and attractive primarily to a very 
particular type o f citizens. Put differently, despite his explicit commitment to formal equality and the 
reflective character o f his deliberative bodies, his account has been criticized for being implicitly elitist 
and favouring experts. For more on this point see Mitofsky, W. J., ‘It’s Not Deliberative and it’s Not a 
Poll’, Public Perspective, 7:1(1996), pp. 4-6.
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democracy and Rawls invokes justice as the key issue o f a well-ordered society, both 
however seek to achieve rational consensus. The aim o f this rational consensus is to 
ground the liberal institutions on a stable ground and secure their future. Rawls’ and 
Habermas’ theories have been subject to several criticisms. More specifically, their 
approaches’ demand to ‘put aside’ or ‘bracket’ our notions of the good for the sake of 
securing rational consensus while engaging in public deliberation about political 
issues, has raised several criticisms. Put differently, their demand to relegate our 
values and beliefs to the background of politics allegedly renders the content of 
politics empty. This demand to strip individuals from their identities, goals, gender, 
nationalities, sex, religions etc., leaves their theories of deliberative democracy, I will 
argue, with a thin notion o f selfhood which leads to an individualistic, de-historicized 
and impoverished notion of politics. Their accounts o f deliberative politics view 
history, culture and context as irrelevant factors to politics, namely irrelevant to 
achieve freedom, equality and social justice. It is precisely this denial, among other 
things, o f the significance o f history, culture and context to politics in general and to 
social justice in particular that makes deliberative democracy insufficiently attentive 
to historical justices and the demands o f historically excluded social groups.
Political theorists o f various creeds, such as communitarians, feminists, and 
postmodernists, have accused egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, not only 
o f casting the individual as an atomistic, rational, abstract and self-creating entity but 
also o f tending to dismiss the role of culture in politics.19 These deliberative theories,
19 For communitarian views see: Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1994), pp. 25-73, Sources o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), The Ethics o f  
Authenticity (London: Harvard University Press, 1992); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  
Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: 
Duckworth, 1981); Michael Walzer, Spheres o f Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983). Also, closely 
related to the communitarians are the views o f republican scholars that emphasize and place, among 
other things, great value on political participation, see: Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, 
Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Philip Pettit, 
Republicanism: A Theory o f  Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). For 
feminist critiques o f liberalism see for example: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f  
Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), Inclusion and Democracy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); Judith Squires, Gender in Political Theory (Malden, Mass: Polity 
Press, 1999); Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989); 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory o f  the State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1989); Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries 
o f the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Anne Phillips, The Politics o f  
Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Lucy Irigaray, To Be Two (London: Routledge, 
2000). For postmodern critiques see: Judith Butler, ‘Feminism and Postmodernism’, in Feminist 
Contentions (New York: Routledge, 1995); William Connolly, Identity/ difference: Democratic 
Negotiations o f  Political Paradox (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Chantal Mouffe,
20
it is said, underestimate the importance of cultural differences in the operation of 
politics in contemporary multicultural societies and therefore fail to properly address 
the issue o f cultural diversity. Friendly critics o f deliberative democracy, such as 
James Bohman and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, have not abandoned the 
main premises of the Rawlsian and Habermasian deliberative accounts and have 
proposed improved versions of deliberation. Liberal scholars such as Charles Larmore, 
Chandran Kukathas, and William Galston have conceded the importance of values 
and ends in politics and claimed that the liberal principles of individuality and 
autonomy are too controversial and liberalism should instead focus on tolerating and 
encouraging diversity that exists in contemporary liberal societies including groups 
and communities that deny the importance of individual autonomy.20 Other liberal 
scholars, such as Will Kymlicka, Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, have appealed to 
‘culture’ (and pointed out its importance for the individual’s socialization and the 
determination o f its horizon of opportunities without necessarily conceding individual 
autonomy) and Yael Tamir and David Miller have invoked ‘nation’ to address these 
challenges 21 These scholars, nonetheless, have remained unclear and vague about the 
meaning(,y) o f ‘culture’ and ‘nation’. John Gray has claimed that in a society where 
different ways o f life exist, political values and principles are incompatible,
Dimensions o f  Radical Democracy (London, Verso: 1992); Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massouri, forward by Fredric 
Jameson, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
20 For more see: Charles Larmore, The Morals o f  Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), especially pp. 121-174; Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’, Political Theory,
20 (1992), pp. 105-139, ‘Cultural Toleration’, in Will Kymlicka & Ian Shapiro (eds.), Ethnicity and 
Group Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1997), ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The 
Politics o f Indifference’, Political Theory, 26 (1998), pp .686-699; William Galston, ‘Pluralism and 
Social Unity’, Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 711-726, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtue, and Diversity in the 
Liberal State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ‘Value Pluralism and Political 
Liberalism’, Report from the Institute o f Philosophy and Public Policy, 16:2 (1996), ‘Moral Inquiry 
and Liberal Education in the American University’, Ethics, 110 (2000), pp. 812-822.
21 For more see: Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); 
David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Citizenship and National 
Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, (eds.), Citizenship in 
Diverse Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community 
and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  
Minority Rights (Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press, 1995); Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, Ethics in the Public 
Domain: Essays in the Morality o f  Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 155-176; 
Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National Self-Determination’, Journal o f Philosophy, 87:9 (1990), 
pp. 439-461. While all o f these scholars emphasize the importance o f membership in groups, 
communities and cultures to defend the liberal principle o f autonomy and accommodate cultural 
diversity they remain vague about the definition o f ‘culture’, ‘community’ and ‘nation’.
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incommensurable, and always conflict. Therefore, modus vivendi (which allows 
peaceful coexistence among rival values) is the only proper answer to diversity.22 
Other friends o f liberal democracy have argued that liberalism recognises ‘the fact of 
pluralism’ only at the level of ideas, opinions, preferences and beliefs. In other words, 
it acknowledges the existence of a ‘politics of ideas.’23
The thesis, however, focuses on the views of more dismissive critics of 
egalitarian liberalism. Scholars, such as Charles Taylor, have argued that egalitarian 
liberalism has adopted ‘the politics of equal dignity’ that is primarily concerned with 
universalizing equal rights and entitlements to all citizens regardless o f their 
differences.24 Egalitarian liberalism adopts a notion o f tolerance, which entails that 
groups are free to assert their identity and practice their culture through the formation 
o f associations in the private sphere and the background culture as described by Rawls. 
According to this liberal understanding the state is viewed as a neutral actor that does 
not privilege or favour any particular culture. In other words, according to the 
egalitarian liberal view the private sphere is the site o f particularism and diversity and 
the public sphere is the site of universal neutral norms and consensus. It is precisely 
this undue insistence on formal equality, sameness, neutrality, and individualism that 
turns, according to these critics, egalitarian liberalism ‘blind’ to the significance of 
identity, authenticity, and cultural differences in the operation o f politics. It is ‘the 
politics o f recognition’, these theorists insist, that offers effective solutions to the 
main problems o f egalitarian liberalism and deliberative democracy. For it proposes a 
better engagement with ontological questions about culture and subjectivity. The
22 John Gray, Two Faces o f Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). He argues that liberalism has 
two ideals o f toleration. The first is ‘the ideal o f  a rational consensus on the best way o f life’. The 
second is ‘the belief that human beings can flourish in many ways o f life’. Yet he claims that the 
second one is the most adequate for contemporary societies because it recognises different ways o f life 
as legitimate. This form o f toleration, Gray claims, is grounded in Berlin’s ‘value pluralism’. For a 
critical assessment o f Gray’s value pluralism see: William A. Galston, ‘From Value Pluralism to 
Liberal Pluralism’, in Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 48-64.
23 Anne Phillips distinguishes between the ‘politics o f ideas’ and ‘politics o f  presence’. Whilst the first 
focuses on the diversity o f ideas and preferences, the second emphasizes the importance o f caucuses 
and quotas o f presentation. She argues that a combination between these two forms o f politics is not 
only possible but also necessary for modem societies. For more see: Anne Phillips, ‘Dealing with 
Difference: A Politics o f Ideas, or a Politics o f Presence’, in Seyla, Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1996), The Politics o f Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
24 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining 
the Politics o f  Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73.
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politics o f recognition, they insist, goes beyond the traditional liberal model of 
toleration and ‘benign neglect’. Advocates of the politics o f recognition have opposed 
this liberal view because it confines groups to the private domain and fails to 
recognize publicly their distinctive identities. These advocates insist that the 
citizenship status alone is insufficient to adequately address issues of group identities 
and exclusion. While the move o f the politics of recognition to emphasize exclusion 
and the role o f context, culture and identity in politics is important to democratic 
inclusion, it will be argued that its tendency to insist on the existence of fixed essence 
o f collective identities with discrete boundaries and focus exclusively on cultural 
matters raises several suspicions and risks.
Generally we can identify two main approaches within the politics of 
recognition: the essentialist and the non-essentialist. The essentialist approach, 
advocated by scholars such as Charles Taylor, is often referred to as ‘identity politics’. 
This approach tends to view groups as fixed and given essences with discrete 
boundaries and focuses exclusively on cultural recognition. Consequently, this 
approach is suspect, among other things, o f promoting essentialism. Essentialism is 
problematic because it inhibits individual autonomy and entails risks such as closure, 
hatred, exclusion, separation and balkanization. The non-essentialist approach has 
been developed by cautious supporters o f recognition. This approach views identities 
as fluid, overlapping and hybrid; it also views recognition struggles as struggles about 
cultural matters as well as distributive ones. Cautious supporters o f recognition, such 
as Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion Young, have both criticized ‘identity politics’ and 
presented non-essentialist theories o f democratic inclusion. Nancy Fraser has 
criticized the model o f ‘identity politics’ for its promotion o f separatism, conformism, 
intolerance and essentialism (she refers to this as ‘the problem of reification’). 
Moreover, she argues that it displaces questions of redistribution by questions of 
recognition (she refers to this as ‘the problem of displacement’). To meet these 
problems, Fraser proposes what she calls the ‘status model’, a ‘non-identitarian’ form 
o f politics that seeks to recognize the fluidity of identities and combine redistribution 
and recognition in a dual theory o f social justice. Unlike scholars who claim that all 
economic maldistributions can be considered as issues o f recognition or Marxist 
theorists who claim that all issues of cultural misrecognitions are economic issues at 
origins, Fraser insists that recognition and redistribution are two distinct components 
that need to be combined in a dual theory of social justice. She proposes what she
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calls ‘perspectival dualism’ to theorize and analyze the complex relationship between 
redistribution and recognition.25 Iris Marion Young criticizes ‘identity politics’ for 
reifying identities and promoting balkanization and deliberative democracy for 
privileging particular modes o f speech and silencing others26 and for aspiring to 
‘reduce difference to unity’27 through suppressing diversity under the pretext of 
consensus, impartiality, and universal views. Consequently, Young calls for an 
emancipatory ‘politics o f difference’ that ensures ‘the effective recognition and 
representation o f the distinct voices and perspectives’ o f the excluded.28
Young presents a combinatory approach that aspires to synthesize and 
negotiate recognition and deliberation. This thesis focuses its examination on 
combinatory approaches similar to Young’s.29 Combinatory approaches are theories 
that attempt to negotiate and synthesize recognition, deliberation or dialogue. 
Ultimately, these theories aim to primarily avoid the weaknesses o f certain accounts 
of deliberative democracy and politics o f recognition and retain their strengths. They 
propose to modify the politics of recognition through offering a non-essentialist or 
‘relational’ social ontology that recognizes the fluidity and interdependence of social 
groups and to modify deliberative democracy through recognizing modes o f speech 
such as story-telling, testimonies as fully legitimate modes of speech. In this thesis I 
refer to the approaches o f Iris Marion Young, Melissa Williams, Seyla Benhabib, and 
Fred Dallmayr as combinatory theories. It will be argued that while the combinatory 
approaches are the closet to offering a form of democratic inclusion that is more 
attentive to historical injustices, their accounts remain insufficient because, among
25 For more on Fraser’s view regarding the shift to recognition, ‘status model’, ‘perspectival dualism’ 
and her debate with Axel Honneth see: Nancy Fraser, ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemma 
o f Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age’, New Left Review, 212 (1995), pp. 68-93, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, 
New Left Review, 3 (2000), pp. 107-120; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or 
Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003); Simon Thompson (review 
article), ‘Is Redistribution a Form of Recognition? Comments on the Fraser-Honneth Debate’, Critical 
Review o f  International Social and Political Philosophy, 8:1 (2005), pp. 85-102.
26 Iris Marion Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in Benhabib 
Seyla (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f the Political (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); Lynn Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’, Political Theory, 25:3 (1997), 
pp. 347-376.
27 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1990), p.97.
28 Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, p. 184.
291 used the terms ‘combinatory approaches’ and ‘integrative approaches’ interchangeably as they both 
refer to the same approaches.
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other things, they either ignore core principles of reconciliation such as collective 
responsibility and apology or when they recognize the role o f memory they insist on 
the symmetry and equality o f memory and history between the victim and the 
victimizer.
Post-structural theorists, such as Judith Butler, have strongly criticized the 
politics of recognition and suggested radical alternative forms o f politics. These 
radical forms o f politics reject the view that the subject has a fixed and authentic 
essence that shapes his or her identity and alternatively claim that the subject is itself a 
product of discursive forces. These discursive forces construct positions o f selfhood 
for individuals to occupy before they start to express themselves as individuals. While 
the views o f these radical scholars are useful to criticize the politics of recognition, 
their form o f politics does not provide a successful alternative because it endorses, 
among other things, excessively fluid and hybrid identities that are constantly engaged 
in transcending their existing cultural, political and social boundaries. This emphasis 
on undue fluidity and transformation considerably undermines an effective democratic 
accommodation because it does not seem to take seriously issues o f history, context 
and concrete experiences o f historical injustices.
Thus far, I have introduced the four main approaches of democratic inclusion 
that the thesis focuses on and briefly explained their insufficient sensitivity to 
questions o f historical injustices. Given their insufficient attentiveness to claims of 
historical injustice, the present thesis offers ‘the politics of reconciliation’ as an 
effective model for responding to such claims. The politics of reconciliation places 
significant emphasis on confronting the past, acknowledging injustices and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. The emphasis on 
these issues is important, among other things, because it helps to bring into public 
attention the specificities of the experiences of oppression and exclusion and the need 
to address them. The politics o f reconciliation that I defend in this thesis is one that 
simultaneously refuses the blindness o f deliberative democracy to history and avoids 
several main risks o f ‘identity politics’ and post-structuralism. Moreover, while the 
combinatory approaches make the most progress towards offering a form of 
democratic inclusion that is more attentive to historical injustices, their accounts 
remain insufficient because they either ignore core principles o f reconciliation such as 
responsibility and apology or when they recognize the role of memory they insist on 
the symmetry and the equality o f memory and history between the oppressed and the
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oppressor. The account o f reconciliation presented in this thesis does not fully endorse 
essentialism but recognizes the existence of authoritative traditions that allow a 
communal character o f groups. Moreover, the politics of reconciliation acknowledges 
the interdependence and overlapping o f identities, but refuses the excessive level of 
fluidity o f identities that undermines the very possibility of politics. Therefore, the 
politics o f reconciliation that is presented here occupies a mid way between 
essentialism and non-essentialism.
This account o f the politics of reconciliation departs from other accounts that 
emphasize the compatibility o f reconciliation with democracy in that that it fleshes 
out and scores a very fine balance. It does so by demanding social and cultural 
transformations that require revising cultural and social norms, practices and images 
and therefore undermine the fixation of identities found in essentialist theories of 
recognition. Furthermore, it acknowledges that these social and cultural 
transformations take time and do not occur overnight; it therefore rejects the excessive 
fluidity and transformation endorsed by post-structuralist critics o f recognition. The 
politics o f reconciliation accords a significant role for narration and story-telling that 
involve interpretations and theretofore it secures a room for contestation rather than 
homogeneity and consensus. Finally the politics of reconciliation seeks and embraces 
the solidarity o f international and local organizations and activists and therefore 
extends the struggle beyond the narrow boundaries of the particular national, ethnic, 
racial or cultural group.30 This solidarity does not only help the politics of 
reconciliation to meet the challenge of essentialism through the participations o f non- 
members in the struggle against historical injustices but also helps the politics of 
reconciliation refute the charges raised against it as inhibiting dialogue and mutual 
understanding because it allegedly supports monopoly on suffering and views the 
oppressed as epistemically privileged in understanding their own condition. In other 
words, seeking and embracing local and international solidarity disproves the claims 
of those who accuse the politics of reconciliation as supporting the view that 
experiences o f oppression give rise to specific perspectives and feelings that are fully 
transparent and accessible only to the oppressed and cannot be shared and understood 
by those who do not live these experiences o f oppression.
30 Martha Biondi stresses the importance o f a transnational and national solidarity with the African 
Americans’ reparations movement. See her article: ‘The Rise o f Reparatipns Movement’, Radical 
History Review, 87 (2003), p. 15.
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My intention in this thesis is five-fold. First, I seek to demonstrate that 
existing core egalitarian versions o f deliberative democracy, i.e., Rawls’, Habermas’, 
and Gutmann and Thompson’s, fail to present a satisfactory form of politics that 
effectively addresses the demands of historically excluded social groups in 
historically divided and pluralistic societies. Second, to show the insufficient 
attentiveness of identity politics and its post-structuralist critics to appropriately 
accommodate the demands of these historically excluded social groups. Third, to 
demonstrate that accounts of democratic accommodation proposed by integrative 
theories, that combine recognition, deliberation or dialogue, are not sufficient to deal 
with the demands of historically excluded social groups because they do not fully 
address core issues that lie at the basis of these demands. Most importantly among 
these issues are: collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement o f historical 
injustices and harms, taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these 
injustices and harms. Fourth, I argue that it is the notion of reconciliation that 
encompasses these core issues. Finally, to claim that deliberation and recognition, 
understood in a certain way, are not rival or competitive concepts to reconciliation but 
are complementary ones. Now I move to describe how the arguments unfold in the 
chapters to follow.
Chapter 2 explores three main theories of deliberative democracy.31 More 
specifically, it sets out to describe Rawls’, Haberms’ and Gutmann and Thompson’s
31 It should be emphasized that these three theories o f deliberative democracy do not provide an 
exhaustive list o f the egalitarian theories o f deliberative democracy. Yet, the two main theories o f 
egalitarian deliberative democracy are Rawls’ and Habermas’. There are several attempts that draw on 
the work o f Rawls and Habermas to develop deliberative theories o f democracy that are not discussed 
in this thesis primarily because o f concerns o f scope and also because o f the weaknesses o f these 
theories. Among these attempts are the theories o f John Dryzek and James Bohman. John Dryzek 
develops a discursive theory o f democracy that is supposedly distinct from other theories. He argues 
that his theory o f discursive democracy is ‘pluralistic in embracing the necessity to communicate across 
difference without erasing difference, reflexive in its questioning orientation to established traditions 
(including the tradition o f deliberative democracy itself), transnational in its capacity to extend across 
state boundaries into settings where there is no constitutional framework, ecological in terms o f  
openness to communication with non-human nature, and dynamic in its openness to ever-changing 
constraints upon and opportunities for democratisation’. Though his theory seems to be attractive, I do 
not discuss it in the thesis because, among other things, o f its eclectic character and the over- 
exaggerated harmony that is implicitly assumed among its different components (pluralistic, reflexive, 
transnational, ecological, and dynamic). John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, 
Critics, Contestations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). James Bohman draws on Habermas’ 
and Rawls’ ideas and develops his own version o f deliberative democracy. He argues that the main 
problem o f Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories is their assumption about the existence o f an impartial and 
neutral standpoint leading to universally accepted reasons and norms. They are both, he claims, 
committed to unrealistic assumptions concerning public deliberation. Bohman recognizes the influence 
o f structural inequalities and ideology on inhibiting public deliberation. He insists on two conditions 
that any moral compromise should meet in order to be considered as fair. The first is ‘if  they take
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approaches to deliberation as the standard approach to the politics o f accommodation 
in pluralist societies.32 It goes on to offer a critique of their adequacy to accommodate 
the claims o f historically excluded social groups. The chapter argues that these 
deliberative theories are wanting. More specifically, it argues that these theories, 
rather than and despite their subtle and substantial differences, are insufficiently 
attentive to claims o f historical exclusion and injustice. Rawls’ notions of politics and 
public reason, it will be argued, give rise to several problems that make the task of 
accommodating historical injustices very difficult. Most importantly among these 
problems are: cultural imperialism, denying the role of history and memory in politics, 
privileging elitist rational forms o f communication, and excessive legalism. Gutmann 
and Thompson’s theory o f deliberative democracy, it will be claimed, suffers from 
several problems that undermine its ability to effectively accommodate claims of 
historical exclusion. Most importantly among these problems are: ignoring the role of
deliberative inequalities into account’ and the second is ‘if  they promote the ongoing participation of  
all groups in a common deliberative political community. He considers the assimilation o f deliberative 
democracy into liberal constitutionalism as a sign o f maturity o f the debate o f  deliberative democracy. 
He argues that the formidable challenges to deliberative democracy are pluralization, globalisation and 
social differentiation. These challenges necessitate the emergence o f a new mode o f publicity that 
‘preserves the democratic virtues o f the older universalistic interpretation and increases its problem­
solving power.’ While Bohman’s theory aspires to propose a more adequate version o f deliberative 
democracy than the Rawlsian and Habermasian by being more sensitive to cultural pluralism and 
concrete real politics, his theory suffers from some serious deficiencies. Firstly, Bohman is unable to 
provide support for either one o f the two standards o f fair moral compromises. Secondly, it seems that 
for Bohman the maturity o f the debate in the field means giving up more and more radical discursive 
democracy components and adopting more typical liberal and procedural elements. Finally, Bohman 
celebrates globalisation and cosmopolitan public sphere without indicating who benefits from them, the 
globalisers or the globalised. For more on James Bohman ‘s version o f deliberative democracy see: 
James Bohman, Public Deliberation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); ‘The Coming Age o f  
Deliberative Democracy’, The Journal o f Political Philosophy, 6:4 (1998), pp. 400-425; ‘Citizenship 
and Norms o f Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies’, Political Theory, 27:2 (1999), 
pp. 176-202 ; ‘Distorted Communication: Formal Pragmatics as a Critical Theory’, in L. Hahn (ed.) 
Perspectives on Habermas (Indianapolis: Open Court, 2000).
32 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14:3 
(1985), pp. 223-251, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), ‘The Idea of 
Public Reason Revisited’, The University o f Chicago Law Review, 64:3 (1997), pp. 765-807, A Theory 
o f Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Jurgen Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in 
Constitutional States’, European Journal o f Philosophy, 1:2 (1993), pp. 128-155, ‘Three Normative 
Models o f Democracy’, Constellations, 1:1 (1994), pp. 1-10, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions 
to a Discourse Theory o f Law and Democracy trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1996), On the Pragmatics o f Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory o f  Communicative 
Action trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2001), ‘Constitutional Democracy: A 
Paradoxical Union o f Contradictory Principles?’, Political Theory, 29:6 (2001), pp. 766-781, 
‘Religious Tolerance- The Peacemaking o f Cultural Rights’, Philosophy, 79 (2004), pp. 5-18; Amy 
Gutmman, and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), ‘Why Deliberative Democracy is Different’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 17:1 (2000), 
pp. 161-180, ‘The Moral Foundations o f Truth Commissions’, in Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis 
Thompson (eds.) Truth V. Justice: The Morality o f Truth Commissions (Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), pp. 22-23.
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identities in generating political conflicts, postulating the mutual acceptance prior to 
the process o f reconciliation, and the operation of the idea of reasonableness as a 
mechanism o f exclusion. Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy, it will be 
argued, is inadequate primarily because it relies on excessive proceduralism and 
legalism, favours rational and disembodied modes of speech, brackets power relations 
from moral reasoning and determining ‘reasonableness’, and gives primacy to the 
state as the ultimate frame for political authority and therefore fails to capture the 
claims o f historically excluded social groups that undermine the notion o f statehood 
by their demand to separate or secede.
The inadequacies o f Rawls’, Habermas’, and Gutmann and Thompson’ 
theories o f deliberative democracy to effectively deal with demands of historically 
excluded social groups, stem primarily from their failure to engage seriously with 
context, cultural embeddedness, identity, and concrete experiences o f exclusion and 
oppression. Consequently, this failure has led to a turn away from simple deliberation 
to a ‘politics o f recognition’ that is based on a thicker notion of social ontology. In 
chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 I turn to focus on questions of social ontology that are 
undervalued by deliberative democracy and seem to underlie the claims of historically 
excluded social groups. The key ontological components that will be discussed are 
self, culture, representation, and intercultural dialogue. The turn to a different social 
ontology than the one that underlies deliberative democracy is what is offered by ‘the 
politics o f recognition’ and ‘integrative theories’.
Chapter 3 explores Rawls’ atomistic and Habermas’ intersubjective notions of 
the self.33 Relying chiefly on communitarian criticisms, the chapter argues that Rawls’ 
and Habermas’ notions o f selfhood both underplay, among other things, the
33 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), A Theory o f Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and The Limits o f Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jurgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: 
Philosophical Essay (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), On the Pragmatics o f  Social Interaction: 
Preliminary Studies in the Theory o f  Communicative Action, trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Mass: 
The MIT Press, 2001); Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), pp. 157-159, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), Sources o f the Self: The Making o f the Modern Identity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Axel Honneth, ‘Recognition I: Invisibility: On the 
Epistemology o f ‘Recognition” , Aristotelian Society Supp (75), (2001), pp. 111-126. (Trans. Maeve 
Cooke and Jeff Seitzer), The Struggle fo r  Recognition: The Moral Grammar o f  Social Conflicts 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), The Fragmented World o f the Social (ed.) Charles W. Wright (Albany 
NY: State University o f New York Press, 1995); Judith Butler, ‘Contingent Foundations’, in Feminist 
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, Nancy Fraser 
(New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 35-57. Introduction by Linda Nicholson.
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significance o f culture, context and history in the process o f identity formation for the 
sake o f determining the governing principles and procedures o f social justice and 
legitimacy. In other words, they both tend to view culture and history as insignificant 
to politics, namely insignificant to achieve freedom, equality and social justice. The 
chapter goes on to argue that it is precisely this denial of the significance o f history 
and culture to identity and politics which makes their theories insufficiently attentive 
to claims o f historical injustices raised by historically excluded social groups. The 
communitarian critique has significantly contributed to the rise of a particular form of 
the politics o f recognition, namely ‘identity politics’, which emphasizes 
embeddedness, situatedness, cultural distinctiveness and difference.
Chapter 4 focuses on ‘identity politics’ and its weaknesses. More precisely, it 
discusses Charles Taylor’s ‘politics of recognition’ and Judith Butler’s criticisms of 
identity politics.34 Taylor has challenged the atomism and blindness to cultural 
differences that underlie dominant contemporary accounts of liberalism.35 He has 
proposed ‘the politics of recognition’ as an alternative form to a difference-blind
34 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), Sources 
o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), The Ethics o f Authenticity (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1994), pp. 25-73; James Tully (ed.), Philosophy in An Age o f  Pluralism: The Philosophy o f Charles 
Taylor in Question (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Horton, ‘Charles Taylor: 
Selfhood, Community and Democracy’, in April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (eds.), Liberal Democracy 
and Its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 155-174; Joel Anderson, ‘The Personal Lives o f  
Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor’s Value Theory’, Constellations, 
3:1 (1996), pp. 17-38; Michael Kenny, ‘Liberalism and the Politics o f Recognition’ in The Politics o f  
Identity: Liberal Political Theory and the Dilemmas o f  Difference (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004), pp. 
148-168; Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f  Multiculturalism (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, New Left Review, 3 
(2000), pp. 107-120; Jacob T. Levy, The Multiculturalism o f Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000); Linda Nicholson, ‘To Be or Not To Be: Charles Taylor and The Politic o f Recognition’, 
Constellations, 3:1 (1996), pp. 1-16; Maeve Cooke, ‘Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, 
and the Politics o f Recognition’, Political Theory, 25:2 (1997), pp. 258-288; Paul Saurette, (review 
essay), ‘Questioning Political Theory: Charles Taylor’s Contrarianism’, Political Theory, 32:5 (2004), 
pp. 723-733; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion o f Identity (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), pp. 16-25, ‘Contingent Foundations’, in Feminist Contentions: a philosophical 
exchange, (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 33-57; Seyla Benhabib, ‘Subjectivity, Historiography, 
and Politics’ in Feminist Contentions (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 108-111.
35 For more on Taylor’s views see: Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979); Sources o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), The 
Ethics o f  Authenticity (London: Harvard University Press, 1992), ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, in Amy 
Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73.
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liberalism. Taylor grounds his account of politics on a dialogical notion of selfhood 
that accords significant roles to identity, culture and difference. The chapter argues 
that while Taylor’s demand to give due recognition to excluded and oppressed social 
groups is an important progress that goes beyond the liberal notion of tolerance that 
underlies Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories, his notion o f recognition seems to rely on 
an essentialist conception of culture which poses serious challenges to his account of 
democratic accommodation. Moreover, it argues that while Butler’s views pose some 
significant challenges to identity politics by revealing the oppositional logic that lies 
at its core and the important role power relations play in identity formation, her post­
structuralist model of identity is not persuasive because, among other things, it 
postulates an experimental and hybrid self that is expected to continuously transcend 
and transform its limits and boundaries. This agonistic self looks like the liberal self, 
at least, in being detached from cultural and political context.
Chapter 5 explores the ontological issue of representation which is viewed as 
one o f the core components of democratic accommodation. The chapter argues that 
the diverse notions of representation employed by proponents o f identity politics, 
post-modern critics of identity politics, and integrative theorists are insufficiently 
attentive to demands o f historically excluded social groups. More specifically, the 
chapter argues that proponents o f identity politics have primarily relied on a 
descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation when they demand the representation 
o f excluded social groups. This descriptive Aristotelian notion, it will be argued, is 
problematic because it leads to the promotion of essentialism, fixation, closure, 
balkanization, and homogeneity. To free identity and politics from the ‘chains’ of 
essentialism, fixation and homogeneity, post-modern theorists such as Deleuze and 
Guattari have developed a non-essentialist and hybrid notion of representation. The 
chapter claims that Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of representation is unpersuasive 
because while they try to avoid the risks o f essentialism, closure, hierarchy and 
homogeneity, they celebrate excessive hybridity and fluidity that undermine the very
36 The term ‘the politics o f recognition’ appears in Taylor famous piece: ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, 
in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73. It should be noted here, however, that in the literature 
‘the politics o f recognition’ is often distinguished from ‘identity politics’ because the first is a more 
inclusive category than the second. Identity politics tend not to address political and social exclusion 
rooted in class and economy for instance. In this thesis I consider Taylor’s theory mostly as ‘identity 
politics’ because o f its principal emphasis on cultural recognition.
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possibility of politics and identity. Moreover, they do not provide guidance on how to 
transfer their views into concrete and practical mechanisms o f representation. Finally, 
the dispute between those who view group representation as a positive tool to achieve 
inclusion and those who view it as a negative instrument that essentialises identities 
and reproduces existing hierarchies, has given rise to integrative approaches that aim 
to combine components from both sides and offer more elaborated notions of 
representation. The chapter goes on to argue that the modified and integrative notions 
o f representation proposed by scholars such as Iris Marion Young and Melissa 
Williams are attractive but incomplete. It argues that while their notions of 
representation are more appealing than the hitherto discussed ones because o f their 
attempt to take social inequalities, experiences of exclusion, history and memory 
seriously and combine procedural as well as substantive political principles, they 
remain insufficient. For while Young’s account unwillingly comes too close to the 
liberal interest-group pluralism and rests on two conflictual and mutually exclusive 
commitments and the issue of impartiality that she consistently dismisses, Williams’ 
forward oriented account fails to fully recognize the role o f past wrongs and the 
significance o f asymmetries in taking responsibilities on causing these past wrongs.37
Chapter 6 focuses on the integrative approaches o f Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla 
Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. It goes on to argue that they have not been entirely 
successful in fulfilling their promise to propose effective accounts o f democratic 
inclusion that are capable of fully accommodating demands o f historically excluded 
social groups. More precisely, the chapter examines the revised notions of 
intercultural dialogue and deliberation enthusiastically proposed by Bhikhu Parekh,
37 Judith Squires, Gender in Political Theory (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 1999); Dorothea Olkowski, 
Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin o f Representation (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999); Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Nomadology.T he War Machine (New York: Semiotex(e), 1994); Nathan 
Widder, Genealogies o f  Difference (Urbana, III.: University o f Illinois Press, 2002); Jacques Derrida, 
‘Sending: On Representation’, trans. Peter Dews and Mary Dews, Social Research, 49 (1982), pp. 294- 
326; Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Justice 
and the Politic o f Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), ‘Activist Challenges 
to Deliberative Democracy’, Political Theory, 29:5 (2001), pp. 670-690; Anne Phillips, The Politics o f  
Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), ‘Dealing with Difference: A Politics o f Ideas, or a 
Politics o f Presence’, in Seyla, Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries 
o f the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Melissa S. Williams, Voice, Trust 
and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings o f Liberal Representation, (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1998); Hanna F. Pitkin, The C onceptof Representation (Berkeley: London 
University o f California Press, 1972); David Plotke, ‘Representation is Democracy’, Constellations, 
4:1 (1997), pp. 19-34; Bernard Manin, The Principles o f Representative Government (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. It argues that while each of these three accounts 
has several different merits, each fails to fully accommodate claims of historical 
exclusion. It will be argued that the failure of these accounts stems, among other 
things, from ignoring the significance o f collective memory of exclusion (clearly not 
in the case o f Dallmayr and to a lesser extent in the case o f Benhabib), 
acknowledgment o f historical injustices and harms and taking responsibility and 
offering an apology for causing these historical injustices and harms.38
Up to now, the discussion has focused on the inadequacies of egalitarian 
theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics 
and integrative approaches to accommodate appropriately demands of historical 
exclusion and oppression. Their inadequacies stem primarily, but not exclusively, 
from overlooking the significance o f crucial issues that reside at the basis of the 
claims of historically excluded social groups. These crucial issues include: collective 
memory o f exclusion, acknowledgment of historical injustices, and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for causing these historical injustices. 
Consequently, there is a need for a proper ‘candidate’ that is capable o f capturing 
these crucial issues and thus accommodating appropriately demands of historically 
excluded social groups.
Chapter 7 introduces the notion of reconciliation that is often discussed in 
International Relations and conflict resolution literatures. It goes on to argue that it is 
‘the politics o f reconciliation’ that promises an effective accommodation to the 
demands o f historically excluded social groups. More precisely, it argues that the 
politics of reconciliation successfully encompasses the three overlooked issues which
38 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), ‘Epistemology o f Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to 
Jean-Francois Lyotard’ in Feminism/ Postmodernism edited by Linda J. Nicholson (New York; 
London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 105-130; Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural 
Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Fred R. Dallmayr, Beyond 
Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounters (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 
1996), Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 
Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices (Palgrave, 2001), ‘A Gadamerian Perspective 
on Civilizational Dialogue’, Global Dialogue, 3:1 (2001), pp. 64-75; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and 
Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975); Hans-Herbert Kogler, The Power o f  Dialogue: Critical 
Hermeneutic after Gadamer and Foucault (trans.) Paul Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1996); Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer (eds.), Dialogue and Deconstruction: The 
Gadamer-Derrida Encounter (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1989); Simone Dentih, 
Bakhtinian Thought: An Introductory Reader (London ; New York : Routledge, 1995); Tzvetan 
Todorov, The Conquest o f America: The Question o f The Other trans. by Richard Howard (New York: 
Harper& Row, 1984); Charles Taylor, ‘Understanding and Ethnocentricity’ in Philosophy and Human 
Sciences (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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lie at the core o f demands of historical exclusion and offers appealing answers to 
several accusations that are raised against it. The politics o f reconciliation, it will be 
argued, proposes an effective accommodation to demands o f historically excluded 
social groups because its main principles and characteristics enable serious 
engagement with the specificities o f experiences of historical exclusion and 
oppression.39 More specifically, this chapter suggests a fourfold argument. First, it 
demonstrates that the politics o f reconciliation captures more adequately the issues of 
collective memory o f exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. Second, the 
politics o f reconciliation, it will propose, offers convincing answers to several charges, 
such as essentialism and consensus, which are often levelled against it. Third, 
reconciliation needs not be viewed as an alternative concept to deliberation and 
recognition but as a supplement to them. Fourth, the principles of reconciliation, it 
will be shown, are applicable to milder as well as to mortal conflicts although their 
relevance is more urgent in the latter type.
The thesis concludes that the ‘politics of reconciliation’ is indispensable to 
effectively tackle the demands of historically excluded social groups. However, in 
dealing with demands o f historically excluded social groups, reconciliation is not and 
should not be viewed as a conclusive exhaustive concept. Rather, it is a supplement to 
recognition and deliberative politics. The politics of reconciliation is not exclusively a 
state-focused one and it does not favour only one single moral feature. It recognizes 
the significance o f other complex-pressing objectives and values relevant to politics. 
The politics o f reconciliation, therefore, is not an ultimate universal recipe with static
39 Paul Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South 
Africa’, Australian Journalo f  Politics and History, 49:2 (2003), pp. 182-196; Andrew Schaap, ‘Guilty 
Subjects and Political Responsibility: Arendt, Jaspers and the Resonance o f  the ‘German Question’ in 
Politics o f Reconciliation’, Political Studies, 49:4 (2001), pp. 749-766, ‘Agonism in Divided Societies’, 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, 32:2 (2006), pp. 255-277; Roy L. Brooks (ed.), When Sorry Isn’t 
Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations fo r Human Rights (New York: New York 
University Press, 1999); Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), Dilemmas o f Reconciliation: 
Cases and Concepts (Wtaerloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003); William J. Long and 
Peter Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution, (The MIT Press, 
2003); Thomas McCarthy, ‘ Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in the USA: On the Politics o f Memory o f  
Slavery’, Political Theory, 30:5 (2002), pp. 623-648, ‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the 
Morality and Politics o f Reparations for Slavery’, Political Theory, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772; Burke A. 
Hendrix, ‘Memory in Native American Land Claims’, Political Theory, 33:6 (2005), pp. 763-785; 
Emilios A. Christodoulidis, “ Truth and Reconciliation’ as Risks’ Social and Legal Studies, 9:2 (2000), 
pp. 188-190; John Bomeman, ‘Reconciliation after Ethnic Cleansing: Listening, Retribution, 
Affiliation’, Public Culture, 14:2 (2002), pp. 281-304; Daan Bronkhorst, Truth Commissions and 
Transitional Justice: A Short Guide fo r  Users (Amnesty International Dutch Section, 2003).
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ingredients for resolving conflicts in pluralistic societies; rather, it provides guidelines 
that are likely to take different forms and orders in different contexts.
The thesis is original because it analyses and demonstrates the insufficient 
adequacies o f egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its 
post-structuralist critics, and some integrative approaches to accommodate the claims 
o f social groups that have suffered some form of historical exclusion and injustice. 
By introducing the concept of reconciliation, the thesis proposes a supplement to the 
deliberative democracy and the politics o f recognition. In other words, the originality 
lies in providing a supplement to and therefore transforming deliberative democracy 
and the politics of recognition and their ability to address political problems of 
historically excluded social groups. This thesis, however, does not aim to replace 
deliberation and recognition with new substitutes but aspires to offer a new 
interpretation of these theories and supplement them with a politics o f reconciliation. 
Briefly, the thesis offers a new interpretation of familiar issues in different disciplines 
and the novel task has been to bring them together. The application of the ethic of 
reconciliation, from International Relations and conflict resolution, to democratic 
theory makes a significant contribution to the field and the opening of a new research 
agenda for normative theories of democratic accommodation in historically divided 
and pluralistic societies.
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2. THEORIES OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
This chapter focuses on the adequacy of three main egalitarian theories of 
deliberative democracy to accommodate the demands o f social groups that have 
suffered some form o f historical exclusion. Deliberative democracy has emerged as an 
alternative model to the ‘aggregative model o f democracy’ that prevailed in Western 
societies after the Second World War.1 The aggregative model views democracy as a 
set o f mechanisms and institutional arrangements that regulate competition for 
political leadership among interest groups. According to the aggregative model, 
democracy does not embody specific moral values or principles but it is just a system 
that facilitates competition on political leadership. Citizens are organized in 
associations, aggregations, parties and other forms o f interest groups that compete 
over political power. These interest groups are supposed to pursue the interests of 
their members. The reduction of politics to aggregation o f interests, the divorce 
between democracy and substantial moral principles and growing concerns about
1 Thinkers such as Benjamin Barber, Richard Dagger and Michael Sandel have developed other models 
o f democracy, such as participatory (strong) and republican democracy, as alternatives to liberal 
democracy. This chapter does not, however, address these models o f democracy. Nonetheless, these 
thinkers underscore and specify a number o f civic obligations. The principal among them is the claim 
that participation in public affairs fights individualism and ultimately enhances mutual understanding, 
solidarity and common good politics. Some of them are even willing to coerce it through mandatory 
voting for example. Yet, these models o f democracy do not seem to be compelling or seriously deal 
with pluralism. For their inclusive concept o f citizenship and their over-exaggerated emphasis on 
commonality can easily endanger individual freedom and autonomy. Moreover, at the foundation o f  
their politics lies the thrust to sameness and unity. For more about these models o f democracy see: 
Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics fo r  a New Age(B erkeley, California: 
University o f  California Press, 1984); Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and 
Republican Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); David Held, Models o f Democracy 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1996). William E. Connolly and Chantal Mouffe have developed more 
radical/agonistic models o f  democracy. While these models provide, among other things, unusual 
insights about the constitution o f identity, subjectivity and the boundaries o f the political, their 
overemphasis on the undecidability o f democratic politics as a constitutive condition can easily lead to 
paralysis and under special circumstances even license chaos. For more about these thinkers’ accounts 
o f democracy and their weaknesses see: William E. Connolly, identity/ difference: Democratic 
Negotiations o f Political Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Chantal Mouffe, 
‘Democracy, Power, and the “Political”’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 245- 
256, Dimensions o f Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 1992), The Democratic Paradox (London: 
Verso, 2000); Arash Abizadeh, ‘Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged 
Incoherence o f Global Solidarity’, American Political Science Review, 99:1 (2005), pp. 45-60; and 
Mark Devenney, Ethics and Politics in Contemporary Theory: Between Critical Theory and Post- 
Marxism (London: Routledge, 2004).
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questions of political legitimacy, cultural pluralism and social justice have led 
thinkers such as Rawls and Habermas to offer alternative theories of democracy that 
take seriously these challenges and concerns. This chapter sets out to describe the 
Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches to deliberation as the standard approach to the 
politics o f accommodation in pluralist societies.2 Both approaches are fundamentally 
concerned with spelling out the conditions under which collective political decisions 
should be regarded as legitimate expressions of the collective will of the people. More 
specifically, they both develop a political theory grounded in deliberation that seeks to 
combine liberal and democratic principles while avoiding the problem of 
majoritarianism. They aspire to achieve this task by replacing the instrumental 
rationality (means-ends) o f the aggregative model by a different version of rationality 
(communicative rationality) that is based on a different understanding of reason. This 
new version o f rationality is grounded on unconstrained communicative action in 
Habermas’ theory and on free public reason in Rawls’. The deliberative process, they 
claim, must be governed by a set o f basic principles that guarantee fair procedures that 
yield legitimate collective decisions. Legitimate collective decisions are the outcome 
o f a procedure o f free and reasoned deliberation among morally and politically equal 
individuals. While Habermas views legitimacy as the key issue o f a functioning 
democracy and Rawls invokes justice as the key issue of a well-ordered society, both 
however seek to achieve rational consensus. The aim of this rational consensus is to 
ground the liberal institutions on a stable ground and secure their future.
Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories are the main two egalitarian theories o f 
deliberative democracy. Several scholars have relied on their views to develop 
modified versions o f deliberative democracy. From these modified versions I will 
particularly focus on Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson’s version of deliberative 
democracy because of their claim that their theory provides the most adequate 
framework to justify and assess the work of truth commissions and address historical 
injustice. The chapter offers a critique o f the adequacy o f these three theories to 
accommodate the claims and self-understanding of historically excluded social groups
2 I consider Rawls’ liberal egalitarian theory o f deliberative democracy and Habermas’ theory o f  
deliberative democracy to be two dimensions o f the same project. For both theories are dominantly 
governed by liberal principles and values. Notice what Habermas says about Rawls’ theory o f political 
liberalism: ‘I admire this project, share its intentions, and regard its essential results as correct, the 
dissent I express here will remain within the bounds o f a familial dispute’. Jurgen Habermas, 
‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use o f Reason,’ The Journal o f Philosophy, 92:3 (1995), p. 110.
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in complex plural societies. The chapter argues that these three approaches fail to 
sufficiently address issues of historical injustices. The chapter is divided into three 
parts. The first part deals with Rawls’ theory. Gutmann and Thompson’s theory is the 
focus of the second part. The final part is devoted to Habermas’ accounts o f discursive 
democracy. I shall now turn to the first part.
Part I
Rawlsian deliberative democracy
Liberal egalitarianism places individual’s rights and interests at the heart of its 
political order. According to the liberal view, the main concern o f the individual is to 
pursue her private interest within the limits drawn by law. Therefore, the citizen is 
conceived as a bearer o f negative civil and political rights and certain positive rights 
to welfare.3 As a bearer of these rights, she enjoys protection against government 
intervention as well as protection from other citizens. Consequently, liberal politics is 
primarily about compromise and the aggregation o f predetermined interests under the 
auspices o f a neutral constitution. The fear that self-interested individuals turn public 
power into private advantage then necessitates a set of neutral constitutional rights to 
protect individuals against government and against each other.
Recently some political theorists have argued for a strong and genuine linkage 
between a constitutional liberal version of democracy and deliberative democracy.4 
Yet, a few thinkers are also suspicious o f this connection. They are suspicious because 
according to them deliberative democracy by definition is open to preference change 
and provides protection against manipulation and power within political interaction, 
while liberal democracy by definition deals only with reconciliation and aggregation
3 It should be clear that citizens not only have rights but also duties such as respecting the law and 
paying taxes. Yet I assume that such duties are implied in the rights the citizens are entitled to. For 
more on this view see the chapter on community in Adam Swift, Political Philosophy: A Beginners ’ 
Guide fo r  Students and Politicians (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
4 John Dryzek points out three arguments in which deliberative democracy can be assimilated into 
liberalism. First, deliberative principles justify liberal rights. Second, liberal constitutions promote 
deliberation. Third, constitution making is itself a deliberative process. For more see: John Dryzek, 
Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 11-14.
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o f preferences defined prior to political interaction.5 Therefore, they conclude that any 
attempt to assimilate deliberative democracy into liberalism is problematic and will be 
unsuccessful. However, most of the thinkers discussed in this chapter not only see the 
marriage between liberalism and deliberative democracy as possible but also desirable.
Rawls: public reason and constitutional democracy
The linkage between liberalism and deliberative democracy has been strongly 
advocated by John Rawls. He claims that there are three fundamental elements that 
constitute deliberative democracy, ‘public reason’, ‘a framework o f constitutional 
democratic institutions that specifies the setting for deliberative legislative body’, and 
‘knowledge and desire on the part of citizens generally to follow public reason and to 
realise its details in their political conduct’, which in turn requires ‘public occasions 
o f orderly and serious discussion of fundamental questions and issues o f public 
policy.’6 He argues that his idea o f ‘a well-ordered constitutional democracy’ should 
be ‘understood also as deliberative democracy.’7
According to him, public reason is a set o f commitments that individuals must 
adopt before they enter the public arena, not what they will be encouraged to discover 
once they are there. Deliberation is a personal reflection that individuals make on their 
own. Therefore, a solitary thinker can reason publicly. He implies that all individuals 
will reason in the same way, and must ultimately reach the same conclusions. 
Rawlsian public reason is singular and produces rational consensus. Deliberation 
guided by public reason, he argues, should only be about constitutional affairs and 
what he calls ‘matters of basic justice’. As he puts it:
In a democratic society public reason is the reason o f equal citizens 
who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power
5 This argument is a contested one. More about this distinction can be found in: David Miller, 
‘Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice’, Political Studies, 40: special issue (1992), pp. 54-67.
6 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, The University o f  Chicago Law Review, 64:3 
(1997), p. 772.
7 Rawls, ‘The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited’ , pp. 771-772.
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over one another in enacting laws and in amending the constitution.
The first point is that the limits imposed by public reason do not apply 
it to all political questions but only to those involving what we may 
call “constitutional essentials” and questions o f basic justice...8
Basic justice refers to equality o f opportunity and the fair distribution o f material 
goods.9 These questions o f basic justice and constitutional essentials have to be 
discussed only in what he calls the ‘public political forum’. This forum is constituted 
from three parts, the discourse o f judges and their decisions, the discourse of 
government officials, and finally, the discourse of candidates for public office and 
their campaign managers.10 This forum is viewed as a neutral platform where citizens 
are expected to reach rational consensus on basic universal principles that should 
guide and govern solutions and decisions regarding matters of public interest, i.e., 
justice and constitutional affairs. Moreover, these principles are viewed as neutral 
towards different and conflicting notions of the good life.
The idea o f public reason, Rawls insists, does not apply to what he calls the 
‘background culture’ or to media o f any kind. This culture, he maintains, comprises 
universities, churches, and all kinds o f associations. It is not guided by one central 
idea o f public reason but by diverse forms o f non-public reason. However, he states 
that political liberalism favours arguments and discussions about common good in the 
background culture as well. Briefly, public reason, according to Rawls, operates in the 
public sphere and non-public reasons operate in the ‘background culture’ or civil 
society. Consequently, in his view, the public sphere ‘is not located in civil society but 
in the state and its organizations, including first and foremost the legal sphere and its 
institutions'u Public reason, in Rawls’ theory, is viewed as a site where citizens are 
expected to be detached from their concrete situations and circumstances and use 
universal forms o f rationality and reasoning to deliberate on fundamental matters of 
justice. Rawls draws a very rigid distinction between the public and private sphere.
8 Rawls, Political Liberalism  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 214.
9 John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 14.
10 Rawls, ‘The Idea o f  Public Reason Revisited’, p. 767.
11 Benhabib, ‘Deliberative Rationality and Models o f Democratic Legitimacy’, pp. 36-37.
40
While the former is governed by public reason that requires rational consensus and 
unity, the latter is governed by non-public reason that allows diversity and pluralism. 
Rawls goes on to argue that individuals are endowed with two identities, public and 
non-public, that they possess in different spheres. While public identity views the 
individual as a ‘citizen’ that is constituted by rights of political participation and 
communication (‘liberties of the ancients’), the non-public identity views the 
individual as a ‘person’ that is protected by basic liberal rights (‘liberties of the 
modems’; subjective liberties such as liberty of belief and conscience, the protection 
o f life, personal liberty and property).12 In Rawls’ theory the basic liberties that 
protect individuals in the private realm have priority over the political democratic 
liberties. The democratic liberties are viewed as an instrument that serves the 
preservation of the basic subjective liberties. Rawls maintains that the distinction 
between the public and the private realms enables us to achieve a just political society 
and base the liberal institutions on a stable ground and to secure their future. This aim 
is attained through the insulation o f the public political sphere form controversial 
ontological issues of the good life that might inflame and enhance disagreements. 
These controversial ontological issues are ruled out by the ‘veil o f ignorance’ and 
relegated to the ‘background culture’. Briefly, Rawls’ theory consistently restricts 
information, selectively chooses the conditions of the framework of his theory, and 
strategically avoids fundamental relevant controversial questions so it achieves a 
coherent, freestanding and self-contained theory of a just society. This theory 
constitutes a framework from within which citizens assess existing institutions and 
policies.
Shortcomings and weaknesses in Rawls ’ account
In this section I will examine the ability of Rawls’ notion o f politics and public 
reason to democratically accommodate the claims of groups that have suffered some 
form o f historical exclusion and injustice. I will argue that Rawls’ notions o f politics 
and public reason give rise to several problems that make the task of accommodating 
historical injustices very difficult. Most importantly among these problems are:
12 For more on reconciling the ‘liberties o f the ancients’ and the ‘liberties o f the modems’ see Jurgen 
Habermas, ‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use o f Reason,’ Journal o f  Philosophy, 92:3 (1995), p. 
127.
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cultural imperialism, denying the role o f history and memory in politics, privileging 
elitist rational forms of communication, and excessive legalism.
The first problem is cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism is experienced 
when the dominant and hegemonic group universalises its perspectives, 
interpretations of events and history, experiences, and cultural beliefs and practices 
and constructs them as the norm and views those who have different experiences, 
values, beliefs and perspectives as outsiders, inferiors and deviants. Several scholars 
have argued that the impartial liberal principles of justice advocated by Rawls reflect 
the values, beliefs, perspectives and experiences o f the hegemonic group. Rawls’ 
liberal egalitarianism universalises the liberal perspectives, experiences, forms of 
speech, and other social and cultural practices and presents them as impartial 
universal norms that others are expected to follow and conform to. It is here that the 
risk of cultural imperialism emerges. Iris Marion Young has supported this charge by 
arguing that the impartial universal citizen that is postulated in liberal theories such as 
Rawls’s theory is a bearer of a very particular identity- that is, white, male, middle- 
class, heterosexual and able-bodied.13
The second problem is the role o f history and memory in addressing questions 
o f social justice. Rawls’ demand to strip individuals from their identities, goals, 
history, gender, nationalities, sex, religions etc., behind the ‘veil o f ignorance’ to 
achieve rational consensus on principles o f social justice poses a problem for 
historically excluded social groups. It is precisely this demand o f liberal 
egalitarianism that views history and context as irrelevant to deliberation on matters 
o f justice that makes historically excluded social groups very suspicious of the 
formalism and legalism of the liberal egalitarianism. These groups view their history 
and memory as intimately linked to political deliberation about the historical 
injustices that they have been suffering from. History and memory play an important 
role in challenging the national narrative and revealing and bringing to public 
attention the causes and roots of historical injustices and their link to current distorted 
social and political structures and arrangements.
The third problem is concerned with favouring exclusively rational and elitist 
forms of communication. As it has been indicated in the introduction of the thesis, 
historically excluded social groups use several modes of communication and speech
13 Young, ‘The Ideal o f Impartiality and the Civic Public’, pp. 96-121.
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including story-telling, testimonies and oral history to construct their narratives and 
challenge the national hegemonic narrative. The difficulty here emerges because 
Rawls’ notion of public reason explicitly favours rational and argumentative modes of 
speech. According to Iris Marion Young, Rawls’ normative public reason privileges 
certain kinds o f speech; ‘assertive and confrontational’, ‘formal and general’, 
‘dispassionate and disembodied,’14 and excludes others such as rhetoric, testimony, 
and greeting. Similarly, Seyla Benhabib argues that Rawls’ public reason misses 
‘contestatory, rhetorical, affective, impassioned elements o f public discourse’.15 Since 
public reason systemically excludes forms of communications such as rhetoric, 
initiation, greeting, and storytelling, Lynn Sanders argues that public reason 
represents the interests and the speech culture of the powerful.16 In other words, it 
encourages the reproduction of existing hierarchies.17 Therefore, public reason ignores
14 Iris Marion Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in Seyla 
Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f the Political (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-35.
15 Benhabib, ‘Deliberative Rationality and Models o f Democratic Legitimacy’, p. 37.
16 Lynn Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’, Political Theory, 25:3 (1997), pp. 347-376.
17 David Miller defends deliberative democracy and rejects the charges that have been posed against it 
by Young and Sanders. He denies their charge that deliberation favours elitist forms o f communication 
and rejects their suggested alternatives (such as rhetoric, testimony and greeting) to rational and formal 
argumentation. Miller argues that Rawls’ (and Joshua Cohen’s) ‘criterion o f reciprocity’; deliberators 
must put forwards reasons that they believe all other will accept in public reason, renders deliberation 
to be a very restrictive process. He proposes a new formulation where it is not necessarily that 
everybody has to accept the other person’s reason but rather a majority o f co-deliberators. This alleged 
requirement, Miller argues, ‘will itself serve as a filter that eliminates certain arguments in the course 
o f debate without disqualifying them a priori.’ Miller argues that the claim that deliberative democracy 
privileges dispassionate forms o f communication at the expense o f emotional ones is based on the false 
dichotomy between reason and desire. He asserts that both reason and emotions are involved in a 
deliberative process. Yet, one may argue that it is inaccurate to claim that Young maintains this 
dichotomy because she precisely argues against this kind o f dichotomy. She contends that ‘The norms 
o f deliberation, finally, privilege speech that is dispassionate and disembodied. They tend to 
presuppose an opposition between mind and body, reason and emotion. They tend falsely to identify 
objectivity with calm and absence o f emotional expression.’ Miller misrepresents Young’s view. For 
Miller says that ‘According to Young and Sanders, what disadvantaged groups need is not deliberation 
at all, but other forms o f political interaction in which their distinct perspectives and distinct concerns 
can emerge more clearly.’ However, Young not only does not flatly reject argument as a form o f  
communication, but she also considers it as an essential form o f deliberation. She states that ‘While 
argument is a necessary element in such efforts to discuss with and persuade one another about 
political issues, argument is not the only mode o f political communication, and argument can be 
expressed in a plurality o f ways, interspersed with or alongside other communicative forms.’ For more 
see: David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000); Rawls, ‘The Idea o f  
Public Reason Revisited’; Joshua Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.’ in Alan Hamlin 
and Phillip Pettit (eds.) The Good Polity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Iris Marion Young, 
‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy 
and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1996); Avner De- Shalit, ‘Deliberative Democracy: Guarantee for Justice or Preventing Injustice?’, in
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the voices and interests of historically excluded social groups and minorities and is
detached from their concrete experiences of suffering, misrecognition and
  „ 18oppression.
Another problem that shows the difficulties Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism faces 
concerning the accommodation of demands of historical exclusion is excessive 
legalism. Rawls’ concept of public reason confines deliberation to be only on issues 
that deal with constitutional affairs and questions of basic justice. Rawls’ notion of 
politics is primarily legalistic and anti political. Rawls believes that the representative 
institutions and the legal systems are the primary sites for political deliberation. As a 
result, the Supreme Court, and not the anonymous public, is very often the principal 
exemplar o f the exercise of public reason. John Gray claims that:
The basic liberties and the distribution of social goods are matters of 
justice, and in political liberalism what justice demands is a matter not 
for political decision but for legal adjudication. The central institution 
o f Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ is not a deliberative assembly such as 
a parliament. It is a court o f  law. All fundamental issues are removed 
from political deliberation in order to be adjudicated by a Supreme 
Court. The self-description of Rawlsian doctrine as political liberalism 
is supremely ironic. In fact, Rawls’s doctrine is a species of anti­
political legal ism.19
This excessively legalistic form of politics is problematic from the perspective of 
historically excluded social groups because of their distrust in constitutional and legal 
mechanisms as ultimate means to remedy historical inequalities and exclusion. This 
lack o f trust stems from the claim that the existing legal system is based primarily on 
the norms and values o f the dominant group and therefore actively contributes to 
sustaining and reproducing inequalities.
Daniel Bell & Avner De-Shalit (eds.), Forms o f Justice (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2003).
18 The dominant group usually tends to combine some motivations, images, and motifs o f the 
dominated group in its discourse/ forms o f communication to enhance its control. For more about this 
idea see: Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject (London: Verso, 1999).
19 John Gray, Two Faces o f Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2000), p. 16. (emphasis added).
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Rawls argues that the public sphere is the realm of rational consensus and the 
private sphere is the realm of diversity. Achieving rational consensus, Rawls insists, 
is important to ground the liberal institutions on a stable foundation and to guarantee 
their future. To avoid insecurity and instability in public life, consensus upon the 
content o f public reason has to be reached once and for all. This content includes 
substantive principles o f justice and procedures for making public reason possible. 
According to Rawls, behind the ‘veil o f ignorance’ all individuals appeal to 
reasonable standards and generalizable rational arguments and reach the same 
conclusion about the principles o f justice adequate for a fair well-ordered society. 
Achieving pure rational consensus is based on viewing power and value pluralism as 
external forces that can be bracketed from deliberation on moral and political matters. 
Historically excluded social groups view these claims as problematic and naive. The 
consensus on allegedly neutral principles of justice is problematic because it 
necessarily involves power. It involves power because these principles tend to reflect 
the values, experiences and perspectives of the powerful.20 Advocates o f the demands 
o f historically excluded social groups insist on the importance of engaging in political 
democratic struggles and oppositional activities, such as street marches, sit-ins, 
leaflets, and boycotts, to challenge the institutions and policies that are grounded on 
alleged neutrality and consensus 21
Moreover, many feminists have rejected Rawls’ rigid distinction between the 
public and private realms and his insistence on impartiality and consensus.22 Though
20 Chantal Mouffe views power as a lasting, ineradicable and constitutive dimension o f social relations, 
politics and identities. This persistent conflictual and antagonistic dimension o f social relations and 
politics is what makes pure consensus (overlapping or other forms) impossibility. The ineradicability o f  
the antagonistic dimension o f social relations and politics stems from the pluralism of values in human 
life. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000).
21 Iris Marion Young, ‘Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy’, Political Theory, 29:5 (2001), 
pp. 670-690.
22 Some feminists argue that the Western tradition has been dominated by ‘phallocentric’ theories. For 
example Lacan’s psychoanalysis theory is accused o f being such a theory. For it recognises only the 
desires and preferences o f men and neglects (or presents as an enigma) the desire o f women. The 
‘Third Term’, or the ‘Other’, in Lacan’s theory is the phallus. According to Lacan, the signifier is 
inevitable for the constitution o f  meaning and the categories o f masculine and feminine. Yet this 
signifier, some feminists, argue cannot be neutral because it is derived from the man’s world of 
imagination. Additionally, it is problematic because it recognizes only two categories and therefore 
ignores the legitimacy of homosexuality. For more on Lacan’s account o f identity formation, see: Luce 
Irigalray, To Be Two, (New York: Routledge, 2000) and Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose, Female 
Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne, (New York and London: Panthon Books and 
W.W. Norton & Co.c, 1982).
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Rawls is one of a few political theorists o f justice who accords a great significance to 
the family as a primary important source for moral development, his theory of justice, 
according to several feminists, belongs to a deceiving and problematic tradition of 
gender neutral theories.23 The family according to Rawls is a fundamental institution 
that enables the acquirement and development of sense o f justice. This acquired 
sense o f justice plays a critical role in his theory of justice. According to Susan 
Moller Okin, the claim of Rawls’ theory about the moral significance of developing a 
sense o f justice is problematic because it relies on the unexplained assumption that 
the institution of the family is just.24 For the problem with the assumed justice in 
Rawls’ theory is that it ignores the existing gendered-family institutions and practices 
that certainly do not operate or distribute resources, benefits, access and social roles 
according to the principles of justice he arrives at. Conversely, these structures and 
practices are clearly unjust in the sense that men and women do not enjoy the same 
social roles, benefits, powers, and access to recourses and opportunities. Worse than 
that, Okin claims that Rawls’ view, in latter writings where he suggests that ‘families 
are “private institutions” to which it is not appropriate to apply standards o f justice,’ 
renders his theory problematic. For if the family is a primary source for the 
development o f the moral capacity of justice, then it must be just itself. Okin claims 
that the family needs not be treated as an institution of the private domestic sphere but 
as a political institution that the principles of justice must apply to.
Rawls admits that a ‘well-ordered society’, based on justice as fairness, 
affirmed by all members is impossible in a society in which ‘the fact of reasonable 
pluralism’ is a chief characteristic.26 In his latter writings, especially in Political 
Liberalism, Rawls concedes several criticisms. In Political Liberalism he 
acknowledges a plurality o f reasonable comprehensive doctrines.27 Moreover, he
23 Susan Moller Okin accuses, theorists such as Ronald Dowrkin, Bruce Ackerman and Robert Nozick 
to be worse than Rawls because they pay less attention to justice in the family in their theories. Their 
theories are mistakenly presented as gender neutral that ignore the differences in histories, social roles, 
power, and access to recourses and opportunities between the sexes.
24 Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 22.
25 Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, p. 22.
26 Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, p. 807.
27‘Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system o f social 
cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms o f cooperation o f  
political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost o f their own interests in
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argues that in political liberalism ‘the content of public reason is given by a family of 
political conceptions o f justice, and not by a single one.’28 In other words, political 
liberalism acknowledges that the content of public reason is not definitive and defined 
once and for all. Rather it is dynamic, reflexive, and contains different political 
conceptions o f justice. For citizens, he maintains, act from ‘irreconcilable yet 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines’29 and therefore public reason should not always 
lead to consensus.
However, citizens who hold these comprehensive doctrines endorse, through 
an ‘overlapping consensus’, common reasonable political principles. Every 
comprehensive doctrine, from its own point o f view, endorses these alleged political 
principles. These principles ultimately stipulate ‘the basic rights, liberties, and 
opportunities o f citizens in society’s basic structure.’30 Rawls maintains that they are 
both ‘liberal and self-standing’ (their content is based on liberal morality).31 He alerts 
us not to confuse his overlapping consensus with a simple modus vivendi based on 
mere procedures.32 ‘Overlapping consensus,’ he insists, is much deeper than mere 
modus vivendi in the sense that it is, despite all the different reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, based on a core liberal morality. This kind o f politics, 
offered by Rawls, discriminates against groups with strong communal character that 
do not adopt necessarily liberal moral values or outlook. Consequently, this kind of 
politics, which is exclusively based on liberal values, is less tolerant than it often 
claims to be. For it clearly favours a very particular set of principles, i.e., liberal 
principles. This is particularly true in cases o f historically excluded social groups 
where their similarities and their constant vulnerability to certain forms of oppression
particular situations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms’, this he calls the criterion o f  
reciprocity. Rawls, ‘The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited’, p. 770.
28 Rawls, ‘The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited’ , p. 773.
29 Rawls, ‘The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited’ , p. 807.
30 Rawls, ‘The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited’ , p. 807.
31 Rawls, ‘The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited’ , p. 807.
32 Moreover, Rawls asserts that overlapping consensus differs from constitutional consensus too. While 
constitutional consensus guarantees basic liberties and rights and establishes democratic procedures, it 
is not grounded in a certain political conception o f justice. Consequently, the content o f these rights and 
liberty are always contested and this leads to instability in the public life. The content o f these liberties 
and rights, in Rawls’ theory, is fixed irreversibly by the overlapping consensus that is based on a liberal 
moral outlook.
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and exclusion generate strong affinities among their members and a sense o f common 
collective identity.33 While these groups could value liberal principles o f individual 
liberties, in several cases they tend not to accord to them the priority Rawls assigns to 
them. They value other communal values and principles.
To sum up, I have argued, hitherto, that Rawls’ notions o f public reason and 
politics give rise to several problems that make the task o f accommodating historical 
injustices considerably difficult. However, more problems can be identified in Rawls’ 
theory which hinders its attentiveness to demands o f historical injustice. Some o f 
these problems are linked to the thin liberal notion of social ontology that underlies 
his theory and will be thoroughly discussed in the next chapter.
Part II
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson: ‘economy o f  moral disagreement’ and 
democracy
The previous part has demonstrated the inadequacies of Rawls’ egalitarian 
deliberative democracy to sufficiently tackle demands o f historically excluded social 
groups. This part examines Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson’s theory of 
deliberative democracy. Gutmann and Thompson argue that their theory of 
deliberative democracy provides the best framework to justify and assess the work of 
truth commissions that try to address historical injustice. Moreover, they are presented 
here as a bridge between the Rawls’ and Habermas’ approaches because they attempt 
to combine Rawlsian and Habermasian principles in their theories. Despite Gutmann 
and Thompson’s claim about the appropriateness of their theory to address issues of 
historical injustice, it will be argued that their theory does not offer an adequate 
treatment to effectively accommodate the demands of historically excluded social 
groups in divided and pluralistic societies.
Gutmann and Thompson argue in Democracy and Disagreement that liberal 
principles can be derived from deliberative democracy. Unlike Rawls, they bring 
moral disagreements, such as abortion, preferential hiring and health care, from the 
background culture and private sphere to the heart of public life. They claim that
33 For more on affinities and a sense o f shred identity see: Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, 
pp. 44-45.
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Rawls ‘avoids confronting the apparent indeterminacy of many moral conflicts that 
arise in contemporary politics’ by confining them to the private sphere. Therefore, 
they insist that he ‘stops short of arguing that a well-ordered democracy requires 
extensive deliberation to resolve moral disagreements.’34 Consequently, they urge for 
the abandonment of the dichotomy between ‘the political’ and ‘the moral’. They argue 
that political conflicts often reflect deep moral disagreements. Any satisfactory theory 
o f democracy, they insist, must provide a way of dealing with these moral 
disagreements.
However, they draw upon Rawls’ concept o f public reason and therefore they 
also believe that a set of ideals and conditions are required for political decisions to 
constitute a legitimate expression of the collective will of the people. They point out 
three foundational conditions of deliberative democracy to deal with moral 
disagreements. These three conditions are: reciprocity, or ‘the capacity to seek fair 
terms o f social cooperation for their own sake’; publicity; and accountability, to 
constituents and other citizens, to citizens of other political systems, and to future 
generations.35 Besides these three conditions they point out three additional 
substantive principles that rule the content of public reason. These three principles are 
‘basic liberties’, ‘basic opportunity’, and ‘fair opportunity.’36 These conditions and 
principles are related to each other and therefore always interact among themselves.
Gutmann and Thompson insist that the principle o f reciprocity is a more 
adequate basis for democratic politics than the principles of impartiality or 
prudence.37 According to the principle o f prudence the best way o f dealing with moral
34 Amy Gutmman, and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), pp. 35,37.
35 Gutmman and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 8.
36 Gutmman and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 229.
37 They endeavour to demarcate deliberative democracy from other conventional theories o f democracy 
such as procedural democracy and constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy, they insist, is 
different from other theories o f democracy in that it is a ‘second-order theory’. It is a second order 
theory because it leaves room for continuing moral conflict that first-order theories seek to eliminate. 
Additionally, it avoids the difficulties o f procedural theories by explicitly acknowledging the 
substantive conflicts underlying procedures. The principles o f  deliberative democracy are, they insist, 
distinctive in two significant respects: they are morally and politically provisional. They are morally 
provisional in the sense that they are subject to change through further moral argument. They are 
politically provisional in the sense that they are subject to change through further political argument. 
This self-correcting capacity enhances moral progress in deliberative democracy. For more on this see: 
Amy Gutmman and Dennis Thompson, ‘Why Deliberative Democracy is Different’, Social Philosophy 
and Policy, 17:1 (2000), pp. 161-180, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 26-51.
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disagreements is through various forms of bargaining among self-interested citizens. 
Therefore, in the bargaining process, citizens are strategically motivated by their 
particular interests. The reasons prudential citizens invoke to justify the result 
(decision, policy, or law) of the bargaining process is that in the given circumstances 
the result is mutually advantageous. Reciprocity requires more than the narrow 
interest-based reasons. It requires the appeal to general moral reasons so that similarly 
situated citizens can recognize them as acceptable. According to the impartiality 
principle when citizens decide on public policies and laws they should appeal to 
universal general moral reasons that transcend their particular partial perspectives and 
notions of the good. Reciprocity is not as demanding as impartiality because it does 
not require the altruism impartiality demands. In other words, it does not require 
citizens to suppress their partial perspectives. Instead reciprocity demands the 
articulation o f particular perspectives and claims in general principles so that other 
similarly situated citizens can reasonably accept them.38
Unlike Rawls and Habermas who seek rational consensus, Gutmann and 
Thompson do not think that deliberation around moral issues should produce 
consensus or a unified public will, but an accommodation o f rival moral convictions. 
This kind of accommodation, called in their terms ‘economy o f moral disagreement’39, 
is driven by the principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity requires that citizens should be 
prepared to ‘appeal to reasons that are shared or could come to be shared’ by their 
fellow citizens to justify their interests and views.40 The ultimate aim o f the ‘economy 
of moral disagreement’ is to achieve moral agreements when it is possible and mutual 
respect and a modus vivendi when citizens morally disagree 41 They argue that it is
38 Gutmman and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 7 and pp. 52-63.
39 Gutmman and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 3.
40 Gutmman and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 14.
41 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, (2000), pp. 16-17. Modus vivendi, in its simple 
definition, means peaceful coexistence between different and rival views or values. John Gray 
promotes a political system that is based on modus vivendi as well. Yet, his approach seems to be quite 
different from Gutmann and Thompson’s because they still seem to favour one certain conception of 
justice. Gray claims that modus vivendi is a political not moral project that asserts that the test o f
legitimacy o f any regime is not its consistency in pursuing one particular, or even a set, value such as
justice, but its ability to mediate and reach compromises among conflicting, incompatible and 
incommensurable values. Gray reformulates Hobbes’ conception o f the politics in pluralistic terms and 
concludes that ‘The end o f politics is not the mere absence o f war, but a modus vivendi among goods 
and evils. Like a Hobbesian peace, this can never be achieved once and for all’. John Gray, Two Faces 
o f Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2000), p. 133.
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precisely this economy o f moral disagreement, with the principle o f reciprocity at its 
core, what makes their notion o f deliberative democracy an adequate framework to 
address historical injustice. More precisely, they claim that their notion of deliberative 
democracy is the ‘most promising perspective’ to justify and assess the work o f truth 
commissions.42 For deliberative democracy is primarily designed to deal with ongoing 
moral conflicts.43
Gutmann and Thompson identify three common justifications of truth 
commissions: realist, compassionate and historicist. They claim that these three 
justifications are incomplete. Alternatively, they propose the principle of democratic 
reciprocity which lies at the core o f their notion of deliberative democracy as a more 
appropriate basis to justify and assess the work of truth commissions. For the 
principle of democratic reciprocity requires citizens, who are committed to fair terms 
o f social cooperation and hold reasonable views, to seek an economy of moral 
disagreement. This economy o f moral disagreement aims to accommodate moral 
conflicts while recognizing that certain moral conflicts are irresolvable and therefore 
reasonable disagreements should be allowed. The realist approach provides a 
prudential justification according to which the truth commission is viewed as a result 
o f strategic negotiations between conflicting parties who seek to achieve political 
stability by putting an end to a violent conflict. The difficulty with this justification, 
according to Gutmann and Thompson, is that it is inappropriate from a democratic 
perspective because it views moral considerations as irrelevant and it does not provide 
convincing reasons why citizens should be prepared to scarify seeking justice for 
achieving political stability especially that stable regimes can be excessively 
oppressive.44 The compassionate justification seeks ‘restorative justice’ that is based 
on the idea of forgiveness. To achieve restorative justice, the victimizers should 
recognize the harm they have caused and express remorse and the victims should 
grant them forgiveness. The difficulty with this justification is that it relies on a
specific interpretation o f a theological, Christian, value that is not shared by all
42 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, ‘The Moral Foundations o f Truth Commissions’, in Robert I. 
Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (eds.) Truth V. Justice: The Morality o f  Truth Commissions (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 22-23.
43 Gutmann and Thompson, ‘The Moral Foundations o f Truth Commissions’ , p. 35.
44 Gutmann and Thompson, ‘The Moral Foundations o f Truth Commissions’ , p. 23, pp. 26-29.
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Christians. This claim becomes even more challenging if the society is pluralistic and 
has several comprehensive doctrines.45 The historicist justification views the task of 
truth commissions as discovering the historical truth about past facts and wrongs. 
Finding historical truth is indispensable for creating a common ground for future 
social and political cooperation. The problem o f this justification is that it views 
historical truth as constant and fixed entity that can be revealed without being 
influenced by the social and cultural contexts in which it has been revealed. In other 
words, the difficulty is in the claim that historical truth has a single and final
46interpretation.
Restating the dilemma but not escaping it
In this section I want to point out three main problems in Gutmann and 
Thompson’s theory of democracy that undermine its appropriateness to deal 
sufficiently with demands of historically excluded social groups. Firstly, Gutmann 
and Thompson postulate the egalitarian principle o f reciprocity (and accountability 
and publicity) as a precondition for deliberation. They argue that democratic 
reciprocity is a precondition for embarking on deliberation (including deliberation on 
historical injustice, truth commissions). The problem with this claim is that it 
theoretically presupposes what the process of reconciliation seeks to achieve.47 Put 
differently, they assume that political adversaries in divided societies mutually accept 
and respect each other prior to the process of reconciliation. This mutual acceptance is 
precisely what political adversaries lack and what a process of reconciliation aspires 
to realise. John Dryzek argues that ‘mutual acceptance of reasonableness is precisely 
what is lacking in divided societies’.48
Secondly, mutual respect and acceptance of the principle o f democratic 
reciprocity is based on the idea of ‘reasonableness’. Citizens are required to appeal to
45 Gutmann and Thompson, ‘The Moral Foundations o f Truth Commissions’ , pp. 29-33.
46 Gutmann and Thompson, ‘The Moral Foundations o f Truth Commissions’ , pp. 33-35.
47 Margaret Kohn argues that these principles must not be assumed theoretically but fought for. For
more see her article: ‘Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique o f Deliberative
Democracy’ Constellations, 7:3 (2000), pp. 408-429.
48 John Dryzek, ‘Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and 
Analgesia’ (Canberra: SPT, RSSS, ANU., 2003), p. 2.
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general principles o f public reason to justify the reasonableness of their preferences 
and views to their fellow citizens. In other words, citizens should articulate their 
claims in reasonable terms so that their fellow citizens might reasonably accept them. 
The trouble with the idea o f reasonableness is that it might exclude certain claims that 
seemingly appear unreasonable or hard to express in reasonable terms. Since the 
process o f reasoning takes place within a concrete cultural and social context, the 
criteria that determine what is reasonable are likely to reflect the values and norms of 
the hegemonic groups and not the excluded and marginalized ones. Therefore, Stanley 
Fish concludes that unlike Gutmann and Thompson who view the test of 
reasonableness as purely moral, exclusion from deliberation is political action that 
involves power. The idea of ‘reasonableness’, Fish argues, operates as a ‘device of 
exclusion’.49 Moreover, scholars such as Iris Marion Young and Lynn Sander have 
argued that the political modes o f speech that are associated with the requirement of 
reasonableness are often the speech modes o f the hegemonic groups. Political modes 
o f speech such as testimony, rhetoric and narrative that are used by excluded and 
oppressed social groups are often viewed as unreasonable.50
Finally, Gutmann and Thompson, like other deliberative democrats such as 
Rawls and Habermas, tend to view political conflicts as primarily stemming from 
disagreements between particular preferences and interests. They downplay the role of 
identities in generating political conflicts. As we have indicated in the introduction of 
the thesis the main feature which distinguishes a social group from an association or 
an aggregation is identity. This sense o f identity tends to be stronger among 
historically excluded social groups. Several historically excluded social groups 
demand the recognition and respect of their unique identities and not only the interests 
and preferences o f their individual members. The problem with focusing exclusively 
on the interests o f sporadic individuals is that it de-politicises social struggles and
49 Stanley Fish, ‘Mutual Respect as a Device o f Exclusion’, in Stephen Macedo (ed.), Deliberative 
Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 88- 
102.
50 Iris Marion Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in Seyla 
Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-35; Lynn Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’, Political Theory, 
25:3(1997), pp. 347-376.
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likely to prevent collective action.51 Moreover, ‘privatising’ exclusion and oppression 
leads to the risk of viewing inequalities as merely individual cases rather than 
structural ones that are legitimised by social, political and cultural norms and practices.
Briefly, ignoring the role of identities in generating political conflicts, 
postulating the mutual acceptance prior to the process o f reconciliation, and the 
operation of the idea o f reasonableness as mechanism of exclusion, all pose serious 
problems to the ability of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory o f deliberative democracy 
to effectively accommodate claims of historical exclusion.
To sum up, thus far it has been argued that Rawls’s and Gutmann and 
Thompson’s theories propose theories of deliberation that are inappropriate to 
accommodate sufficiently demands of historically excluded social groups. Rawls’ and 
Gutmann and Thompson’s theories of deliberative democracy are not the only major 
theories o f deliberation. Several other scholars have proposed different theories of 
deliberative democracy that are supposedly more attentive to claims o f historical 
exclusion. Most importantly among these theories is Habermas’ ‘discursive theory’. 
The next part o f this chapter will be devoted to explore and analyze the adequacy of 
Habermas’ theory o f deliberative democracy to accommodate demands of historical 
exclusion.
Part III
The Habermasian model
This part is divided into three sections. The first and the second sections trace 
Habermas’ early position and the recent changes in it. The third section critically 
assesses Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy and demonstrates its 
inadequacies to accommodate effectively demands of historically excluded social 
groups. These inadequacies, it will be argued, stem chiefly from excessive 
proceduralism and legalism, favouring rational and disembodied modes o f speech, 
bracketing power relations from moral reasoning and determining ‘reasonableness’,
51 Axel Honneth raises similar charge against Habermas’ notion o f deliberative democracy as running 
the risk o f privatizing the ‘class-specific consciousness o f  injustice’. This will be discussed in the 
chapter 3. Honneth, ‘Moral Consciousness and Class Domination: Some Problems in the Analysis o f  
Hidden Morality’, in Honneth, Axel, The Fragmented World o f the Social, (Albany NY: State 
University o f New York Press, 1995), pp. 212-215.
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and finally giving primacy to the state as the ultimate frame for political authority and 
therefore failing to capture the claims of historically excluded social groups which 
undermine the notion o f statehood by their demand to separate or secede.
Habermas saving the Enlightenment
Habermas follows Max Weber and expresses his fears about the modem age 
as essentially an age o f rationalization. The principal problem that characterises 
modernity, he argues, is the universalization of instrumental rationality that has 
converted political and social questions into technical ones. Intensive processes of 
scientization, bureaucratisation, and commercialisation have significantly influenced 
democratic politics and reduced it to be primarily about the aggregation o f pre­
determined interests. The process of stripping democratic politics from any sense of 
morality has stimulated Habermas to offer a different version o f democracy, a version 
of democracy that is based on a different understanding of rationality. This different 
understanding of rationality is to be found in unconstrained communicative action. 
Habermas distinguishes between two forms o f rationality, instrumental and 
communicative. Instrumental rationality is ‘the capacity to devise, select and effect 
good means to’ the achievement of clear and consistent ends.52 By contrast, 
communicative action is oriented towards mutual understanding between individuals 
rather than success in attaining predefined individual interests. Unlike Rawls and 
other liberals, Habermas argues that communicative action can transform individuals 
and their interests and therefore make them more tolerable and attentive to the 
interests of others. Communicative rationality, according to Habermas, ‘is found to 
the degree that communicative action is free from coercion, deception and, self- 
deception, strategizing, and manipulation,’53
This communicative and intersubjective understanding o f rationality, 
Habermas insists, paves the way for a secure combination between liberal principles 
of individual rights and republican democratic principles of popular sovereignty and 
participation. This marriage of principles leads to the creation o f a distinct theory of 
deliberative democracy, namely ‘discourse theory’, which is based on a notion of an
52 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, p. 22.
53 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, p. 22.
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ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making. Habermas distinguishes his 
theory o f democracy from communitarian, republican and liberal theories of 
democracy. It differs, he insists, from the communitarian theories by rejecting the 
need for any pre-existing ethically integrated community and associated tradition that 
enforces the content o f deliberation. Also, it is distinct from republican theories ‘in its 
denial o f any undifferentiated popular sovereignty’.54 Unlike many liberal theories 
that conceive politics in terms o f reconciliation and aggregation o f individual private 
interests, discourse theory emphasizes the need for a common good politics that leads 
to solidarity. Moreover, discourse theory does not assign primacy to rights for the sole 
sake o f their bearers- but rather for guaranteeing a space for deliberation.55 Whereas 
the primary venue for deliberation, for liberal deliberative democrats, is the state and 
its legal system, for Habermas the public sphere is the main site for political 
interaction. Political associations and social movements, that often confront the state 
and its institutions, inhabit the public sphere.
Habermas views legitimacy as the key issue o f a functioning democracy. A 
functioning democracy requires rational consensus. The aim o f this rational consensus 
is to ground the liberal institutions on a stable ground and to secure their future. To 
achieve this consensus, Habermas distinguishes between morality and ethics and 
prioritizes the former over the latter. While moral norms are universal and detached 
from context, ethical values are particular and context specific. As he puts it ‘the 
universalization principle acts like a knife that makes razor-sharp cuts between 
evaluative statements and strictly normative ones, between the good and the just.’56 
He argues that moral deliberation is a tool for discovering universal normative 
validity claims. However, normative validity is the result o f an intersubjective 
dialogue and not an individual’s monological reason. Conversely, ethical deliberation 
deals with substantive questions o f the good life in a particular context. Briefly, ethics 
is viewed as the realm o f diversity and conflict and morality as the realm of rational 
consensus and unity.
54 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, p. 26; Habermas, ‘Three Normative Models o f  
Democracy \  Constellations, 1:1 (1994), pp. 1-10.
55 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, p. 26.
56 Jurgen Habermas, ‘Discourse Ethics’, in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Actions Christian 
Lenhardt, and Shierry Weber Nicholson (trans.),(C ambridge, MA.: MIT Press:1990), p. 104.
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Habermas argues that in the ideal speech situation, all speakers implicitly raise 
and accept the following validity claims: ‘the truth o f the propositional content, 
comprehensibility o f utterances, the truthfulness or authenticity o f the speaking 
subject, and appropriateness given the existing context.’57 Under these conditions, 
actual interactions will lead to consensus formation. Consensus is inherent in the 
premises of ‘normal’ communication. Habermas claims that ‘consensus is possible 
because of the “already operative potential for rationality contained in the everyday 
practice o f communication”.’ This claim, he insists, ‘is based on the assumption that 
under ideal conditions, language is fully transparent.’58 Habermas values rational 
argument more than other forms of communication. He considers manipulating, lying, 
misleading, and deceiving as distorted forms o f communication.
Despite his efforts to emphasize the dialogical aspect of politics and 
subjectivity formation, his theory has been under continuous criticism primarily due 
to its excessive procedural character, its rigid distinction between morality and ethics, 
the endorsement o f universal abstract moral principles, and its unserious engagement 
with cultural pluralism.59 Recently, Habermas has made some changes in his theory to 
relax the distinction between morality and ethics and to ground universal principles in 
an historical, hermeneutic project o f self-understanding through constitutions. 
Through these changes he hoped to offer a more sensitive approach to the issue of 
cultural pluralism and real politics. The following section will trace and explore these 
changes.
The new face o f  Habermas: calming the distinction between morality and ethics
In his recent writings (such as Between Facts and Norms and The Inclusion o f  
the Other) Habermas claims that his theory is sensitive to the real-world politics and
57 Margaret Kohn, ‘Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique o f Deliberative Democracy’ 
Constellations, 7:3 (2000), p. 409.
58 Kohn, ‘Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique o f Deliberative Democracy’, p. 410.
59 Some o f these criticisms are discussed in the work o f Chantal Mouffe and Iris Marion Young. For 
more see: Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000); Iris Marion Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), ‘Communication and the Other: 
Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the 
Boundaries o f the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-35.
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plurality of modem societies. He argues that scholars, such as Charles Taylor, who 
claim that an individualistic theory o f rights cannot do justice to struggles of 
recognition, are mistaken because of their interpretation o f the modem individualistic 
system o f rights.60 More precisely, they are mistaken because o f their narrow 
understanding o f the conception of autonomy. Autonomy for them is conceived only 
as a private autonomy; the freedom of each individual to pursue her own conception 
of the good life. Private autonomy is primarily concerned with securing subjective 
individual rights. Autonomy for Habermas, however, is more than private autonomy. 
Autonomy is ‘a multidimensional conception.’61 It is, he maintains, composed of 
private and civic/public autonomy. Public autonomy, according to him, refers to the 
citizens’ capacity to participate in processes of democratic will and opinion formation. 
In other words, public autonomy refers to the democratic rights o f popular sovereignty 
and participation. These two components of autonomy, i.e. private and public, are 
internally related and ‘mutually presuppose each other’.62 Citizens, Habermas adds, 
cannot attain:
equal liberties unless they themselves, by jointly exercising their 
autonomy as citizens, arrive at a clear understanding of the legitimate 
interests and standards involved and reach agreement on those aspects 
and criteria according to which equal things should be treated equally 
and unequal things unequally.63
Habermas’ main reason to indicate the interdependency between private and 
public autonomy is to show how the ‘rule of law’ and the ‘general will’ of people are 
interrelated and equally important. Consequently, unlike republicans who present the
60 Habermas refers primarily to the charges that Charles Taylor raises against liberalism. For Taylor’s 
views see: Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics o f Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73, 
Sources o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), The Ethics o f Authenticity 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1992).
61 Maeve Cooke, ‘Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics o f Recognition’, 
Political Theory, 25:2 (1997), p. 272.
62 Habermas, ‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use o f Reason,’ The Journal o f  Philosophy, 92:3 
(1995), p. 130.
63 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States’, European Journal o f Philosophy, 1:2 
(1993), p. 131.
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‘rule of law’ and ‘popular sovereignty’ as incompatible/ competing sources of 
legitimacy and therefore necessarily lead to two different forms of regimes or liberals 
who accord priority to subjective individual rights over political rights o f democratic 
participation, Habermas concludes that constitutionalism and democracy are not only 
interrelated but also compatible.64 Put in his terms, ‘The interdependence of 
constitutionalism and democracy comes to light in this complementary relationship 
between private and civic autonomy: each side is fed by resources it has from the 
other.’65 Taking this intrinsic relation between the rule of law and constitutionalism 
seriously, Habermas insists, leads to the conclusion that the alleged individualistic 
system o f rights is not blind to differences. For it protects cultural differences by 
insisting that the integrity of citizens cannot be guaranteed, from a normative point of 
view, without simultaneously safeguarding its intersubjective culturally specific 
context of life ‘in which he or she was socialised and in which they formed their 
identity.’66 The realization of this system o f rights, he emphasizes, is hard and 
necessitates ‘political struggle’ and ‘social movements.’67
Against the charge that the discursive democratic process is trapped in a 
circular self-creation, Habermas argues that the alleged tension between the rule of 
law and democracy is resolved once democratic-constitution is conceived as an 
historical, dynamic, continuous and fallible project of hermeneutic self exploration 
that has a clear founding point in time. Additionally, Habermas presumes that this 
process is a hermeneutic and ‘self-correcting learning process.’68 As he puts it:
the interpretation of constitutional history as a learning process is 
predicted on the nontrivial assumption that later generations will start 
with the same standards as did the founders. Whoever bases her
64 For more how Habermas’ views regarding the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism 
are distinct from liberal, particularly Rawls’s approach, and republican approaches see: Habermas, 
‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use o f  Reason,’ The Journal o f Philosophy, 92:3 (1995), 
particularly pp. 126-131, ‘Three Normative Models o f Democracy’, Constellations, 1:1 (1994), pp. 1- 
10.
65 Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union o f Contradictory Principles?’, Political 
Theory, 29:6 (2001), p. 780.
66 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States’, p. 141.
67 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States’, p. 132.
68 Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union o f Contradictory Principles?’, p. 774.
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judgement today on the normative expectation of complete inclusion 
and mutual recognition, as well as on the expectation of equal 
opportunities for utilizing equal rights, must assume that she can find 
these standards by reasonably appropriating the constitution and its 
history o f interpretation.69
The recognition o f differences, implied in Habermas’ reading o f the 
individualistic system of rights, raises the issue o f the impartiality o f legal norms, 
namely, the neutrality of law. Unlike his earlier position where he presents a clear cut 
between ethics and morality, he introduces a more complicated account of interaction 
between morality and ethics. Whilst moral norms regulate the interaction between 
subjects in general regardless of the concrete specific context, ‘legal norms refer to 
the network o f interactions in a given specific society.’70 Legal norms, applied in a 
given defined society, need to take into account society’s political goals when it 
regulates normative rules for modes o f behaviour. Therefore, he claims that ‘every 
legal system is also the expression o f a particular lifeform and not merely a reflection 
o f the universalist features of basic rights.’71 However, Habermas insists that the 
diverse interpretations, grounded in a specific historical context, o f constitutional 
principles and rights ‘always revolve around the best interpretation of the same basic 
rights and principles.’72 He implies that there is one set of principles and rights that is 
universal and transcendental. These principles are decided once and for all.
Additionally, unlike his earlier position (where the only forms of 
communication that were accepted are those that deal with universal validity claims) 
he claims that ethical discourses, alongside moral discourses, pragmatic discourses 
and negotiation processes, are involved in public discussions around legislative 
matters. He argues that ‘the simple fact is that in addition to moral considerations,
69 Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union o f Contradictory Principles?’, p. 775.
70 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States’, p. 138.
71 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States’, p. 138. (original emphasis).
72 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States’, p. 144. (original emphasis).
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pragmatic deliberations and the results o f fair negotiations, ethical reasons also play a 
role in the deliberation and justifications in support o f legislative decisions.’73
Recently, Habermas is more concerned with how informal public opinion 
formation in the public sphere can influence the state’s policies. Viewing the state as 
the ultimate frame for political activities and public opinion formation, he talks about 
transforming the ‘communicative power’ produced in the public sphere into 
‘administrative power’ o f the state’s system. Unlike his earlier position where he 
emphasizes the centrality o f deliberation, Habermas accords a central role to elections, 
legislation, and lawful administrative implementation of policy as well. He contends 
that ‘Informal public opinion formation generates “influence”; influence is 
transformed into “communicative power” through the channels of political elections; 
and communicative power is again transformed into “administrative power” through 
legislation.’74
Thus far, I have tried to identify some important changes that Habermas has 
made to his theory hoping to offer a more sensitive approach to the issue of cultural 
pluralism and exclusion. Habermas has keenly tried to reformulate his earlier 
universal ideal of discursive democracy so that it becomes more sensitive to diversity 
and pluralism. In order to do so, he primarily feels pressure to relieve the tension in 
his sharp distinction between morality and ethics through introducing his ideal of the 
constitutional state and ethical deliberation. In the following section I will examine 
the appropriateness of Habermas’ modified version o f deliberative democracy to 
democratically accommodate demands o f historical exclusion and injustice.
What is problematic in Habermas ' account?
In this section I argue that despite the amendments Habermas has introduced 
to his theory, it is still trapped in several problems that render it inadequate to 
satisfactorily deal with the demands o f historically excluded social groups in 
contemporary divided societies. I will point out and discuss some important problems.
73 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States’, pp. 138-139. Maeve Cooke counts 
three developments in Habermas’ recent writings that relax the distinction between morality and ethics. 
First, ‘his introduction o f a category o f ethical discourses (ii), the insistence on such discourses as an 
important strand o f politics, (iii) the acknowledgment o f the ethical shaping o f the constitutional state’. 
See: Maeve Cooke, ‘Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics o f Recognition’, 
Political Theory, 25:2 (1997), pp. 275-277.
74 Habermas, ‘Three Normative Models o f Democracy’, p. 8.
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First, despite Habermas’s endorsement o f ethical discourses as a legitimate strand of 
politics, his theory favours particular and exclusive forms o f political communication. 
According to Iris Marion Young, Habermas’ discursive model of democracy favours 
rational, disembodied, formal and dispassionate modes of speech and excludes others 
such as rhetoric, initiation, storytelling, testimony, and greeting.75 The trouble with 
favouring ‘rational argument’ as the ultimate mode of political speech is that it is 
often the elites who possess ‘the linguistic and analytic skills conventionally defined 
as rational.’76 Historically excluded social groups also use passionate and less formal 
modes o f political speech such as testimony, oral history, and narrative to express 
their experiences o f oppression and articulate their political claims. Consequently, it is 
not implausible to argue that rational modes of political speech tend to represent the 
interests and the speech culture o f the powerful and ignore the voices and interests o f 
the excluded groups and minorities.77
Second, Habermas’ deliberative democracy strongly strives to achieve rational 
consensus on the procedures that should govern politics. Habermas’ achieves this 
rational consensus through the distinction that he draws between morality and ethics. 
While morality is the sphere of consensus and universalism, ethics is the sphere of 
diversity and particularism. Despite Habermas’ attempts to relax the dichotomy 
between ethics and morality, he still views the ideal speech situation as the basis for 
an intersubjective and rational consensus. The ideal speech situation, Habermas 
maintains, operates as a regulative ideal which sets the conditions o f actual interaction 
and determines what counts as reasonable procedure or principle. The problem with 
Habermas’ theory is that it overemphasizes the emancipatory force o f discourse and 
attainability of moral consensus, while it neglects the structures and regimes of power 
that underlie consensus formation and discourse. He presumes that in an ideal speech 
situation power can be bracketed. This understanding of discourse is problematic 
because it assumes that language is neutral and transparent and power is something
75 Iris Marion Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in Seyla 
Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-135.
76 Kohn, ‘Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique o f Deliberative Democracy’, pp. 411- 
412.
77 Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’, Political Theory, 25:3 (1997), pp. 347-376.
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accidental and external that can be eliminated.78 Determining the moral conditions of 
actual deliberation and reasonableness does not take place in a vacuum but by 
individuals who are positioned in a concrete particular social and cultural context. 
These individuals have ethical evaluative principles that have direct bearing on their 
moral reasoning and deliberation.79 In divided societies it is often the dominant group 
that determines what counts as reasonable and it is precisely based on this notion of 
reasonableness that other groups are excluded and defined as unreasonable and 
inferior. Consequently, for historically excluded social groups accepting the theory’s 
assumptions about the neutrality and transparency of communication and discourse 
means concealing and denying the exclusions and hierarchies that legitimise their 
oppression and depiction as inferior or unreasonable.
Third, while Habermas seemingly provides a defensible account addressing 
the struggles of recognition through the appeal to a multidimensional and 
intersubjective conception o f individual autonomy in a constitutional state, his theory 
seems to be insensitive to struggles for recognition that do not necessarily assign the 
significance he does to the ideal o f autonomy. As we have indicated earlier in the 
introduction o f the thesis what distinguishes social groups from mere aggregations or 
associations is the existence of a sense of collective identity. Several historically 
excluded social groups give considerable importance to their collective identity in 
their demands for recognition. Maeve Cooke argues that Habermas’:
view of the modem constitutional state permits equal political 
recognition only in the case o f those groups who accept its underlying 
commitment to the ideal o f individual autonomy [....]The modem state, 
as conceived by Habermas, is thus inevitably exclusionary o f certain
78 Scholars such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu view power relations as constitutive o f  
discourse and therefore refuse to view language as power-free, transparent and neutral. For more on 
their views see: Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison, Alan Sheridan 
(trans.) (New York: Vitange Books, 1979), ‘Afterword by Michel Foucault: The Subject and Power’, in 
Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 
(Harvester and Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 208-226; Pierre Bourdieu, In Other 
Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
79 Chantal Mouffe rejects Habermas’ claim that procedures could be neutral and lack any substantial 
principles. According to her, procedures cannot be separable from concrete forms o f life that 
necessarily assign ethical dimension to these procedures. Moreover, she argues that pure consensus is 
impossible because power is a lasting, ineradicable, and constitutive dimension o f social relations, 
politics and identities. The ineradicability o f the antagonistic dimension o f social relations and politics 
stems from the pluralism of values in human life. For more see: Chantal Mouffe, ‘For An Agonistic 
Model o f Democracy’, The Democratic Paradox (London, Verso: 2000).
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forms of ethical difference -  its ability to accommodate demands for 
recognition o f specific identity is limited.80
Briefly, Habermas’ theory explicitly favours liberal individualistic values and clearly 
prioritizes political recognition for groups that put the ideal o f individual autonomy at 
the centre of their struggle.
Fourth, despite Habermas’ attempt, in his early writings, to differentiate his 
discourse theory from liberal theories o f democracy, in his recent writings he ends up 
adopting a traditional liberal belief: ‘that law-making constitutes the only rightful 
mechanism for transforming public opinion into administrative decision.’ 81 He 
dropped his commitment to the centrality of deliberation and the power o f civil 
society in generating political and social change, in favour of legislative liberal 
procedures. This excessive proceduralism and legalism of Habermas’ theory tend to 
tame political and social struggles by subjecting them to the legal domain and its chief 
representative the Supreme Court (In the case o f Germany the Constitutional Court). 
Therefore, this process of legalisation of political and social struggles prevents 
potential alternative means o f political and social change. Habermas’ discursive 
theory is too legalistic and strives to institutionalise and co-opt opposition instead of 
facilitating ‘enclaves o f resistance’ or oppositional bodies that are indispensable for 
achieving substantial changes in the existing political and legal arrangements. 
Historically excluded social groups are particularly suspicious o f this strategy of co­
opting.82 Their suspicion stems from the claim that in certain cases where inequalities 
are persistent and rooted in social and political norms and practices, accepting 
deliberation under the existing circumstances means agreeing to the present political 
institutional arrangements. These present political institutional arrangements have 
implicit and explicit agendas, priorities and biases that serve the interest o f the 
powerful. Historically excluded social groups often demand transforming these 
institutional arrangements rather than joining them in their current format.
Finally, in Between Facts and Norms Habermas appears as a statist in the 
sense that his approach is primarily a state-focused approach. Habermas’
80 Cooke, ‘Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics o f Recognition’ , p. 279.
81 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, pp. 24-25.
82 For more on the strategy o f co-opting see: Iris Marion Young, ‘Activist Challenges to Deliberative 
Democracy’, Political Theory, 29:5 (2001), pp. 670-690.
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constitutional state or ‘proceduralist concept of democracy’ advocated in Between 
Facts and Norms implicitly favours a particular type of state, namely Weberian type 
of state, where the state is the primary frame for political, legal authority and 
deliberation. Despite Habermas’ explicit support o f a European constitution, in his 
writings after Between Facts and Norms on the possibility of creating a cosmopolitan 
democracy he remains suspicious o f the attainability o f a global civic solidarity. 
Therefore, he keeps according a fundamental role to the constitutional modem state 
and its institutions.83 Habermas claims, however, that due to several changes in the 
world, such as globalization, economic forces, and the influx of immigration, the 
nation-state has been transformed. While Habermas recognizes and endorses the 
importance of this transformation to a changing world, he rejects the idea of 
abolishing the nation-state because he is doubtful about the formation o f solidarity 
beyond national boundaries. 84 This Habermasian state-focused approach is 
problematic when it comes to certain types of historical injustices. More specifically, 
his approach fails to appropriately address the nature of some deep cultural and 
political divisions in modem pluralist states, particularly where the notion o f 
‘statehood’ and ‘polity’ are themselves contested. In other words, while Habermas’s 
theory, clearly in his book Between Facts and Norms, presupposes the state as the 
ultimate framework for politics, his theory fails to deal with the demands of 
historically excluded social groups particularly those who demand separation or 
secession.
In summary, it has been argued that Habermas’ model o f deliberative 
democracy suffers from several weaknesses that render it inadequate to sufficiently 
deal with demands of historically excluded social groups. Most importantly among 
these weaknesses are: excessive proceduralism and legalism, favouring rational and 
disembodied modes o f speech, bracketing power relations from moral reasoning and 
determining ‘reasonableness’, and finally giving primacy to the state as the ultimate 
frame for political authority and therefore failing to capture the claims of historically
83 For more see: Jurgen Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ in Between Facts and Norms, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 491-515.
84 Jurgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future o f Sovereignty and 
Citizenship’, in The Inclusion o f  the Other (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2001), 3rd Edition, p. 
127.
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excluded social groups which undermine the notion of statehood by their demand to 
separate or secede.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the adequacy of Rawls’, Gutmann and Thompson’s 
and Habermas’ theories o f deliberative democracy to sufficiently accommodate 
claims of historically excluded social groups in divided societies. The chapter has 
found these deliberative theories wanting. In other words, it has argued that these 
theories, rather than and despite their subtle and substantial differences, are 
insufficiently attentive to claims o f historical exclusion and injustice. Rawls’ notions 
o f politics and public reason, it has been argued, give rise to several problems that 
make the task o f accommodating historical injustices very difficult. Most importantly 
among these problems are: cultural imperialism, denying the role of history and 
memory in politics, privileging elitist rational forms of communication, and excessive 
legalism. Gutmann and Thompson’s theory o f deliberative democracy suffers from 
several problems that undermine its ability to effectively accommodate claims of 
historical exclusion. Most importantly among these problems are: ignoring the role of 
identities in generating political conflicts, postulating the mutual acceptance prior to 
the process o f reconciliation, and the operation o f the idea of reasonableness as 
mechanism of exclusion. Habermas’ theory o f deliberative democracy is inadequate 
primarily because it: relies on excessive proceduralism and legalism, favours rational 
and disembodied modes of speech, brackets power relations from moral reasoning and 
determining ‘reasonableness’, and gives primacy to the state as the ultimate frame for 
political authority and therefore fails to capture the claims o f historically excluded 
social groups which undermine the notion of statehood by their demand to separate or 
secede.
Several political and social theorists have identified another set o f problems 
that demonstrates the insufficient attentiveness o f these egalitarian theories of 
deliberative democracy to accommodate the demands of oppressed social groups. 
Most importantly among these problems is the failure to seriously engage with 
cultural pluralism, situatedness, embeddedness, and concrete experiences of exclusion 
and marginalization. Many o f these theorists have argued that these problems stem
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primarily from the thin, ahistorical, and individualistic notion o f social ontology that 
underlies the egalitarian theories of deliberation. These problems have lead to a turn 
away from simple deliberation towards a ‘politics of recognition’. The politics of 
recognition, supposedly, is built upon a more adequate, thicker, notion of social 
ontology. This social ontology takes seriously issues such as context, culture, identity 
etc. Therefore, recognition is proposed to transform the approach found in the liberal 
egalitarian theories o f deliberative democracy by relying on a thicker notion of social 
ontology.
In the next four chapters I will explore some of the basic features o f the turn 
towards a different notion o f social ontology and its impact on debates surrounding 
‘the politics o f recognition’, as well as ‘integrative approaches’ to democratic 
inclusion before developing my own response to their inadequacies and the need to 
supplement them with a ‘politics of reconciliation’. The social ontological questions 
that will be examined in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 revolve around four core components: 
self, culture, representation, and intercultural dialogue. These four constitutive 
ontological elements are core issues in the debates surrounding ‘the politics of 
recognition’ and ‘integrative theories’.85 More specifically, the four chapters o f social 
ontology will primarily focus on the views of: a particular version of recognition; i.e., 
‘identity politics’, the post-modern critics of recognition, and cautious supporters of 
recognition who present integrative theories that aim to avoid the risks o f ‘identity 
politics’ and weaknesses o f deliberative democracy through combining deliberation 
and/ or dialogue with recognition. Chapters 3 and 4 will be mostly devoted to 
discussing the communitarian critique of the notions o f selfhood underlying the 
theories o f Rawls and Habermas, the rise o f a particular version o f the politics of 
recognition, i.e., ‘identity politics’ and the dangers of this ‘identity politics’. Chapters 
5 and 6 form a separate section which will primarily examine the adequacy of 
integrative approaches to accommodate historical injustice.
851 am not implying here that these four elements o f social ontology represent an exhaustive list o f the 
core issues surrounding the politics o f recognition and integrative approaches to democratic inclusion. 
Yet, their selection is not random for they are discussed in the literature quite extensively. Moreover, it 
should be emphasized that the politics o f recognition is a blanket term that hosts a wide range o f views 
and the focus o f the thesis will be primarily on Charles Taylor’s theory o f recognition.
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SECTION II: THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND 
ITS CRITICS
3. SELFHOOD AND THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE OF
LIBERALISM
This chapter focuses on a central ontological issue in debates around 
recognition and identity, namely the self. More precisely, the chapter explores two 
models o f selfhood: the atomistic model of Rawls and the intersubjective model of 
Habermas, and examines which o f these two models take seriously the role of context, 
culture and history in politics. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part 
scrutinizes Rawls’ notion o f the self as it was presented in his early and latter writings 
and the second part explores the Habermasian intersubjective notion of the self. In 
assessing Rawls’ and Habermas’ accounts I will rely mostly on the communitarian 
critique o f liberalism. The communitarian critique o f liberalism is important here 
because it has considerably contributed to the rise and development o f the politics of 
recognition.1
The problem with Rawls’ and Habermas’ notions of selfhood, it will be argued, 
is that they both underplay, among other things, the significance o f culture, context 
and history in the process of identity formation for the sake of determining the 
governing principles and procedures o f social justice and legitimacy. In other words, 
they both tend to view culture and history as insignificant to politics, namely 
insignificant to achieve freedom, equality and social justice. The chapter goes on to 
argue that it is precisely this denial of the significance o f history and culture to 
identity and politics which makes these theories insufficiently attentive to claims of 
historical injustice and exclusion raised by historically excluded social groups. This 
denial of the importance of culture, history and identity has given rise to a politics of
1 For more on the development o f the communitarian critique o f liberalism into a specific form o f the 
politics o f recognition see: Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 336-337.
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recognition which emphasizes embeddedness, situatedness and cultural 
distinctiveness and difference.
P a r ti
Liberal theory and the se lf
This part o f the chapter examines Rawls’ notion o f the self. Despite Rawls’ 
claim to renounce the reliance on a Kantian account of selfhood and to avoid its 
metaphysical premises, this part demonstrates that Rawls, in A Theory o f  Justice as 
well as in Political Liberalism, still depends upon some metaphysical premises of 
selfhood. These metaphysical premises render his account of selfhood problematic 
because they significantly underestimate the importance o f culture, context, and 
history in shaping and sustaining one’s identity. According to Rawls’ the chief aim of 
‘reasonable deliberation’ among equal and free citizens is to achieve fair political 
cooperation based on their strategic interests and without referring to their particular 
identities, loyalties, and conditions. Put another way, stripping the subjects from their 
ends and attachments in political deliberation and relegating them to the private 
domain is the condition for achieving consensus (or overlapping consensus) on 
principles of justice. According to this view, consensus on the basic structure of 
society is achieved when these particularistic identities and convictions are 
transcended and avoided. In other words, this improvised notion of selfhood views 
culture, identity and history as irrelevant factors to politics, namely irrelevant to 
achieve freedom, equality and social justice. It is precisely this denial of the 
significance of history, culture and identity to politics in general and to social justice 
in particular that makes Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism insufficiently attentive to 
historical justices and the demands of historically excluded social groups. Rawls has 
conceded some criticisms and his views have developed over the time. I will first
2 John Rawls argues that ‘If we look at the presentation o f justice as fairness and note how it is set up, 
and note the ideas and conceptions it uses, no particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature o f  
persons, distinctive and opposed to other metaphysical doctrines, appears among its premises, or seems 
required by its argument. I f  metaphysical propositions are involved, perhaps they are so general that 
they would not distinguish between the metaphysical views-Cartesian, Leibnizian, or Kantian; realist, 
idealist, or materialist-with which philosophy has traditionally been concerned'. John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), footnote 31, p. 29 section 1.5 (emphasis 
added).
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examine his notion o f selfhood as presented in A Theory o f  Justice and then trace the 
amendments he has introduced to it in his latter writings, primarily Political 
Liberalism.
Rawls ’ moral psychology
Rawls argues that he does not rely on the Kantian metaphysical notion of 
selfhood that dominated liberal theory. Kant’s notion of the self rests on two 
presuppositions. The first is that the person is capable of knowing itself through 
introspection. It reflects on its inner nature by taking itself as an object of experience 
and discovers itself as the bearer of desires and preferences. In other words, the 
subject is transparent to itself. However, this is not enough to gain a full self- 
knowledge. For all one sees while reflecting is the chaos of perceptions that does not 
have any sense or meaning. A further presupposition is, indeed, required to fully 
achieve self-understanding. This presupposition is the ‘subject’. This subject precedes 
any experience and gives sense to our diverse views in one single unified 
consciousness. This subject is capable o f acting freely, independently of the laws of 
nature, according to laws it imposes on itself. The subject’s free will is the first cause. 
It is not an effect of a mere cause or an instrument for achieving an end but rather is 
autonomous and precedes any end. The subject, here, is not an empirical being but a 
transcendental notion. This notion of the self is the condition for understanding the 
subject as autonomous and free person.
Rawls criticizes this Kantian conception of the self. Kant’s moral outlook, he 
contends, is not compelling enough to form a basis for a theory of justice. It is obscure 
and relies excessively on idealistic metaphysical assumptions that postulate the 
subject as a radically transcendental and disembodied being ignoring the actual 
human situation. Rawls, however, does not reject the ideal entirely but claims that it 
needs reformulation. Rawls writes that:
Kant’s view is marked by a number of deep dualisms, in particular, the 
dualism between the necessary and the contingent, form and content, 
reason and desire, and noumena and phenomena. To abandon these 
dualisms as he understood them is, for many, to abandon what is
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distinctive in his theory. I believe otherwise. His moral conception has 
a characteristic structure that is more clearly discernible when these
dualisms are not taken in the sense he gave them but recast and their
moral force reformulated within the scope of an empirical theory.3
Rawls redeployment of Kant’s moral conception is demonstrated in the idea of 
the ‘original position’ and its ‘veil o f ignorance’. In the original position, Rawls
maintains, individuals are ‘mutually disinterested’ - in the sense that ‘they are not
willing to have their interests sacrificed to the others.’4 They choose the principles of 
justice when they are ignorant o f their social conditions (status, gender, wealth, 
ethnicity, strength) and notions o f the good.5 This guarantees ‘that no one is 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice o f principles by the outcome o f natural 
chance or the contingency of social circumstances.’6However, unlike Kant who 
argues that individuals work out their principles o f justice in a purely noumenal 
kingdom, Rawls argues that individuals operate in a phenomenal space that takes into 
account common non-contingent humanistic characteristics that all human beings 
share as free and equal rational beings. This Rawls attains by presenting the individual 
as a ‘subject o f possession’. The subject of possession is capable o f distancing itself 
from its ends and attachments without being disembodied. This argument is based on 
the distinction between ‘me’ and ‘mine’. When I possess a desire it means its mine 
but it does not mean it is me. If I lose this desire I stay the same person. This account, 
however, assumes a certain kind o f transparency, self-knowledge and ability of 
reflection.
In short, Rawls’ aim in the original position is to rule out contingencies that 
might discriminate between persons but simultaneously prove that his theory of
3 John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 226-227.
4 Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 112.
5 Rawls concludes that individuals will specify, given the condition o f the original position, two 
principles o f justice. The first principle is: ‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system o f liberty for all. The second 
principle is: ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the 
greatest benefit o f the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principles, and (b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions o f fair equality o f opportunity.’ Rawls, A Theory o f  
Justice, p. 266.
6 Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 11.
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justice takes into account factual aspects about individuals and their human 
circumstances. The original position, Rawls maintains, ‘is meant to incorporate 
widely shared and yet weak conditions’7about the background intuitions o f justice. 
Human beings, Rawls stresses, share the desire to have certain primary goods. To 
desire certain primary goods is very rational and fits the nature of human life. Put 
differently, ‘The preference for primary goods is derived, then, from only the most 
general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life.’ 8 These 
circumstances o f justice (objective and subjective), Rawls emphasizes, are 
indispensable for the emergence o f the virtue o f justice.
Michael Sandel demonstrates that Rawls’ attempt in A Theory o f  Justice to 
avoid Kant’s transcendental, metaphysical premises by deriving principles of justice 
from a hypothetical situation - the original position - has not been successful. For to 
attain the distinguished, glorious status of justice as ‘the first virtue of social 
institutions’ and its two principles9, persons must always keep a certain distance from 
their aims, attachments and the human conditions. Consequently, in the final analysis 
his ‘deontological arguments’10 about the primacy of justice inevitably lead to what 
his theory allegedly tries to avoid, namely a transcendental and disembodied 
conception of the self.
Other communitarians such as Charles Taylor have argued that Rawls’ notion 
of the self is propertyless and empty.11 For the individual, according to liberals, is free 
and self-determining only if it is capable of detaching itself from its social roles, 
commitments and desires to employ reason to judge different goods, aims and plans. 
Consequently, the subject is postulated without character, purpose and content. Sandel 
insists that to postulate a person where aims and attachments are never related to its 
identity, ‘is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person
7 Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 111.
8 Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 223.
9 Footnote 5 points out the two principles o f justice.
10 Deontological liberalism is a theory that chiefly deals with justice and emphasizes its precedence and 
superiority over other moral and political ideals. According to this view the subject precedes its ends 
and the right is prior to the good. The justification o f the priority o f the right over the good is 
independent. It is independent in the sense that it does not rely on any particular notion o f the good. For 
more about deontological liberalism see: Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 2-7.
11 Charles Taylor has forcefully advocated this point in his book: Hegel and Modern Society, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 157-159.
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wholly without character, without moral depth.’12 The self, communitarians claim, 
does not exercise its self-determination through detaching itself from its social context 
but only within that context. The self, they maintain, does not precede its ends but is 
rather constituted by them. Furthermore, the self is situated and embedded in cultural 
and social practices based on shared values and beliefs. The existing common values 
serve as ‘authoritative horizons’ that provide society’s members with ends and goals. 
The self, therefore, is partly formed by goals that it does not choose but becomes 
aware of. Discovering these goals, communitarians underscore, means being engaged 
in a process of self-understanding.
Taylor insists that the difference-blind liberalism o f Rawls, and other liberal 
thinkers such as Dowrkin, relies on the idea o f atomism. According to Taylor, 
atomism mistakenly postulates the individual as a self-creating moral entity which his 
or her rights precede particular notions of the good life. He argues that rights and a 
conception of justice cannot exit prior and independently o f particular notions of the 
good. He claims that:
The basic error o f atomism in all o f its forms is that it fails to take
account of the degree to which the free individual with his own goals
and aspirations, whose just rewards it is trying to protect, is himself
only possible within a certain kind of civilization; that it took a long
development o f certain institutions and practices, o f the rule o f law, of
rules of equal respect, o f habits of common deliberation, of common
association, o f cultural development, and so on, to produce the modem 
11individual.
Some liberals have argued that communitarians have misinterpreted the liberal 
claim to prioritize the self over its ends and liberty rights over the good. These liberals 
insist that prioritising the self over its ends means that all o f its ends and convictions 
are subject to scrutiny and examination. Additionally, they argue that prioritising 
liberty rights over the good is not for its own sake but as an indispensable condition
12 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, p. 179.
13 Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 309.
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that allows their promotion. Freedom of choice, Will Kymlicka argues, ‘is not 
pursued for its own sake, but as a precondition for pursuing those projects [projects 
about the good life] that are valued for their own sake.’ 14 However, some 
communitarians such as Sandel acknowledge that the subject is not a receptive and 
passive agent, but active. It is capable of re-examining its constitutive goals, 
excluding some and adding new ones. The question, nonetheless, is why the proper 
conditions for individuals to conduct these critical and reflective assessments of the 
‘authoritative horizons’ o f their social values should not be guaranteed. This is 
precisely what liberty rights, in liberalism, secure.
Consequently, one may argue that the anthropological notion of the subject 
that communitarians advocate does not necessarily contradict the normative status 
liberals accord to legally protected rights derived from the principle of self 
determination. In the final analysis these protected rights provide the appropriate 
situation for individuals to pursue their notions of the good and examine them 
critically. If  communitarians pose a serious challenge, however, to liberalism it is 
through focusing on the principle o f self-realisation and not the principle of self- 
determination. Self-realisation is about the individual’s ability to independently plan 
and freely pursue its life, knowing her desires and preferences, without any 
constraints. This principle is based on at least two unattainable premises, namely self- 
transparency and the ability to solitarily constitute meaning. Nonetheless, before 
moving to address this challenge we should examine the changes Rawls has 
introduced to his theory, in his latter writings, following the communitarian critique. 
These changes, some scholars have argued, represent an attempt to ‘contextualise’ his 
theory o f justice.
Political not metaphysical: Rawls ’ reply to communitarians
In his writings after A Theory o f  Justice Rawls appears to be more sensitive to 
some communitarian criticisms. He admits that his principles o f justice are not 
universally valid. They apply in all societies that are characterized by the ‘fact of
14 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 222.
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reasonable pluralism’, i.e. mostly modem Western democracies.15 A pluralism of 
irreconcilable yet ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’, Rawls admits, characterizes 
modem Western democracies. Consequently, the endorsement of the principles o f 
justice is not conducted from an Archimedean abstracted point of equilibrium any 
more but within different particular comprehensive reasonable doctrines. This 
endorsement takes the form of an ‘overlapping consensus’; each group endorses the 
principles o f justice within itself by appealing to different values, beliefs and notions 
of the self. However, a certain notion o f the self, Rawls maintains, is still required to 
determine our civil rights and duties. This notion of the self, nonetheless, is not an 
overarching notion that detects and governs human being’s actions and thoughts in all 
domains of life. Rather it is limited to the political domain.16
Rawls insists that his political notion of the self is a normative notion that 
stems from a political conception o f justice. His view of the self, he insists, is based 
on a moral psychology that is philosophical and not psychological. Put another way, it 
is different from accounts o f the person introduced by social theory and natural 
psychology by, exclusively, relying on a normative scheme of ideals and principles, 
derived from a political conception o f justice, and not from empirical and historical 
evidence. The moral psychology o f the person that is ‘drawn from the political 
conception o f justice as fairness’, he argues, ‘is not a psychology originating in the 
science of human nature but rather a scheme o f concepts and principles for expressing 
a certain political conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship.’17 What Rawls 
has in mind here is a division of labour among the different disciplines.
Reasoning along these lines leads Rawls to the conclusion that the political 
conception o f the self exclusively deals with the ‘public institutional identity’ of the 
citizen and not necessarily with its ‘private non-institutional identity’. According to 
the political conception o f justice all citizens, including communitarian groups, must 
value the principle of autonomy that enables them to form, revise and assess their
15 Here I refer to writings such as: ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 14:3 (1985), pp. 223-51, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), ’The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited’, The University o f  Chicago Law Review, 64:3 (1997), pp. 
765-807.
16 This restriction in applicability is what distinguishes political liberalism and its political notion o f the 
self from a comprehensive liberalism that takes autonomy and rational reflection to be applicable to 
person’s actions and thoughts in all domains.
17 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 86- 87.
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notions o f the good in public life in order to determine their civil rights and duties. In 
private life, however, citizens should not necessarily apply this notion of autonomy.
One o f the ways that citizens are considered to be free,18 Rawls maintains, is 
when they possess the moral power o f forming a notion o f the good.19 This 
conception o f the good does not challenge persons’ ‘public or institutional identity’. 
For free persons can always adjust, modify and change their conceptions o f the good. 
In other words, in a constitutional democracy of equal and free citizens, persons’ 
public identity, concerning questions of political justice, is not jeopardized when their 
conceptions o f the good change. For in public life they must detach themselves from 
their particular allegiances and convictions. Non-institutional identity, nevertheless, 
is related to the citizens’ attachments and goals. These goals and commitments 
‘specify moral identity and give shape to a person’s way o f life, what one sees oneself 
as doing and trying to accomplish in social world.’20 This sharp dualism of the 
possibility of being a communitarian in private life and the inevitability to be liberal 
in public life, Rawls maintains, is a characteristic o f modem Western democratic 
societies ‘marked by reasonable pluralism.’21
Rawls seems to make certain concessions to communitarians. Acknowledging 
the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ impels him to limit the applicability of his theory to 
modem Western democracies.22 This contextualist move implies that Rawls seems to 
recognise to a certain degree the importance of community and notions o f the good in 
citizens’ identity. Nevertheless, there are several points that demonstrate that Rawls’s 
thin notion of political personhood is still captured by metaphysical elements that
18 Rawls points out two other ways in which citizens conceive themselves to be free. The first way is 
that they conceive themselves ‘as self-authenticating sources o f valid claims.’ They view themselves as 
having rights ‘to make claims on their institutions’ in order to pursue their conceptions o f the good. 
Persons consider these claims to be o f autonomous weight regardless if  they stem from commitments 
determined by a political conception o f justice and o f their duties to their own societies. The second 
way in which citizens are considered free is that they can be held responsible upon their own aims. 
They are thought to be able to revise and amend their goals. These goals can be promoted not 
according to the persons’ desires and needs but according to ‘the means that they can reasonably 
acquire in return for what they can reasonably expect to contribute.’ Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 34
19 Rawls argues that persons are free ‘in virtue o f their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense o f  
justice and for a conception o f the good) and the powers o f reason (of judgment, thought, and inference 
connected with these powers)’. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 19.
20 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 31.
21 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xxiii.
22 For a critical examination o f Rawls’ move to contextualise his theory see: Chantal Mouffe, ‘Rawls: 
Political Philosophy without Politics’, The Return o f the Political (London, Verso: 1993), pp. 41-59.
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push towards an atomistic and abstract notion of selfhood. This abstract notion of 
selfhood poses several problems to his theory. According to several critics, Rawls’ 
notion of selfhood is implausible. Rawls maintains that individuals are capable of 
self-realization through pursuing and organizing their lives totally free from restraints. 
This kind o f autonomy allows individuals to lead their own plans o f the good life as 
unique and irreplaceable individuals while taking into account their preferences and 
needs. Two abilities are implied by this notion of autonomy. The first is the ability to 
be transparent to oneself by being fully conscious of what one needs and the second is 
the ability to attribute meaning to ones own actions and behaviours. The very 
possibility of these two faculties is challenged by the modem critique of language and 
libidinal forces. Two different intellectual perspectives; the philosophy of language 
and psychoanalysis, Axel Honneth argues, have challenged the classical notion o f an 
autonomous and self-determining person. The assumption o f full transparency o f the 
person’s action, in the sense that she controls all o f her actions and behaviours has 
been questioned by Freud’s theories about libidinal forces and the unconscious. 
Moreover, the claim that a solitary individual is capable o f constituting meaning has 
been questioned by thinkers such as Wittgenstein and Saussure. Both o f these thinkers, 
in different ways, argue that constituting meaning depends on a pre-given system of 
linguistic meanings, and therefore the individual cannot be completely autonomous in 
the sense of being a self-creating entity and in a total command of itself.23
While the issues o f transparency and meaning constitution do undermine the 
plausibility o f Rawls’ notion o f selfhood, I want to primarily focus on three main 
points that stem from Rawls’ notion o f selfhood and pose a serious challenge to the 
ability of his theory to adequately accommodate demands o f historically excluded 
social groups. I will turn to explore these three main points.24
First, Rawls’ requirement to detach yourself from your beliefs, culture, history, 
and convictions in public deliberation on justice and liberties and adhere to them in 
private, seems to rest on the same Kantian dualism that Rawls purportedly wanted to 
avoid. As the communitarian critique of liberalism has shown, culture, history and
23 Axel Honneth, ‘Decentred Autonomy: The Subject After the Fall’, The Fragmented World o f the 
Social, (Albany NY: State University o f New York Press, 1995), p. 262.
24 In part I o f the previous chapter I have critically assessed Rawls’ theory o f deliberative democracy. 
There I have identified several problems in his account regarding historical injustice. Some o f these 
problems are intimately linked to his notion o f selfhood. To avoid repetition, I do not discuss these 
points again here.
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context play a constitutive role in shaping the individual’s character and conception o f 
the good and directly influence his or her deliberation on public matters. Taylor and 
Sandel have argued that individuals do not act solipsistically in a vacuum but they are 
embedded in a concrete context and culture. The relevance o f culture, history and 
identity is particularly important in cases of historical justices because social groups 
who suffer from these historical injustices are chiefly oppressed because o f their 
depiction as inferior groups who possess less valuable cultures, values, identities, and 
beliefs.
Second, Rawls insists on a thin notion of selfhood because it serves his 
ultimate aim, namely achieving consensus on political arrangements that place at their 
core justice and individual liberties. These political arrangements primarily focus on 
the distribution of material goods and individual rights and downplay the significance 
of symbolic goods and collective rights. Several historically excluded social groups 
do not demand only material rectifications but they also demand the creation of 
museums, memorials, and national days to commemorate their oppression and protect 
their language, cultural heritage, and in certain cases their right to national self- 
determination. The insistence on symbolic activities and good such as 
commemoration need not be viewed as a way of intensifying feelings of victimhood 
but as an important way o f acknowledging the harm that has been committed. 
Moreover, these symbolic activities and goods have pedagogical purposes for the 
current and future generations. That is, they serve as educational resources that expose 
the public to often ignored parts of the history o f the nation.
The issue o f education leads to another problem. One might ask who 
guarantees that the liberal political arrangements achieved, limit their purpose to 
achieve justice and secure public liberties. In the final analysis, liberal institutions do 
not only safeguard the formal legal liberty rights but also form educational 
mechanisms, such as the education system, that provide the knowledge and conditions 
for their actualisation. This is likely to conflict with excluded social groups who do 
not necessarily accord the same level of priority and significance liberals accord to 
individualistic rights and who raise profound challenges to the dominant national 
narrative and the content of the curriculum. Briefly, Rawls’ theory fails to explain the 
roots o f certain social conflicts because in many cases attempts to achieve equality of 
material goods and secure individual rights have not put an end to social struggles.
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To sum up, it has been argued that despite Rawls’ denial, his atomistic model 
o f subjectivity formation still rests on Kantian metaphysical abstract assumptions. 
According to the atomistic notion, the individual is capable o f creating its identity 
solely in isolation from others. The human being is independently capable of 
maintaining its identity, relying on its own power, through referring to itself, without 
the help or the mediation o f others. In order to do this the individual refers to itself as 
an object o f reflection. This model is based on the assumption that the human mind is 
capable of picturing and reflecting reality. I have argued, however, that this atomistic 
model o f selfhood is neither compelling nor suitable to seriously accommodate the 
demands o f historically excluded social groups.
The decline o f the transcendental notion of reason that the atomistic model 
rests on, the rise of empirically and historically grounded notions of reason, the 
linguistic tu rn 25 that challenges the existence o f metanarratives and bestows 
significance on discursive and signifying processes, and the discoveries of ‘libidinal 
forces’ in psychoanalysis, all have put the liberal atomistic model of selfhood under 
pressure primarily because o f its metaphysical assumptions about the subject’s total 
independence, self-creation and self-transparency. These pragmatic changes and turns 
in the intellectual movement in modem Western culture have given rise to several 
theories that emphasize the intersubjective and dialogical character o f the self. By 
relying on an intersubjective notion o f selfhood these theories allegedly propose an 
effective account o f democratic accommodation. In the following part I will discuss 
and explore Habermas’ notion of intersubjective selfhood. I will primarily rely on 
Axel Honneth’s views to assess Habermas’ account of accommodation. The next part 
concludes that there is a need to go beyond Habermasian theory in the direction of 
recognition in order to effectively accommodate demands of historical injustice.
25 The linguistic turn has been considered as one of the most fundamental paradigmatic shifts in 
modem philosophy. Habermas argues that ‘Whereas linguistic signs had previously been taken as 
instruments and accessories o f mental representation, the intermediate domain o f symbolic meanings 
now takes on a dignity o f its own. The relation o f language to the world or o f a proposition to a state o f  
affairs takes the place o f the relation between subject and object. World-constitutive accomplishments 
are transferred from transcendental subjectivity to grammatical structures.’ Jurgen Habermas, 
Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essay (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992) p. 7.and pp. 44-48.
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Part II
The intersubjective account o f  selfhood
Habermas proposes a post-metaphysical intersubjective account o f selfhood 
which he argues is more appealing than the atomistic notion because o f its recognition 
of the inevitability of the ‘other’ for the constitution of the self. The key to Habermas’ 
projects lies in rethinking Hegel’s philosophy o f ‘intersubjective recognition’ and 
Mead’s ‘theory o f socialization’. Before moving to examine the adequacies of 
Habermas’ account, I shall first shed the light on the basic assumptions o f Hegel’s 
notion of intersubjective recognition and Mead’s theory of socialization. Hegel’s and 
Mead’s ideas have also informed theories of recognition advocated by scholars such 
as Charles Taylor. Taylor’s theory of recognition will be examined in the next chapter.
H egel’s account o f  the se lf
For Hegel the formation of individual consciousness is a process of 
subjectivity formation. This process, however, is part of an overarching process of 
spirit’s formation that is driven by dialectical movements that combine 
simultaneously oppositions and their reconciliation. It is reciprocal, mutual, 
communicative and dialogical. It is based on the existence of the ‘other’. One gains 
her or his identity, Hegel insists, through recognizing and being recognized by another 
self-conscious subject. Consequently, the other is inevitable in this process of 
individualization. Put in other terms, ‘Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, 
and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being 
acknowledged.’26 If  we take intersubjective recognition and not the dialectical relation 
o f master and slave to be at the ground of Hegel’s conception o f recognition 
(Anerkennung) then his ideas might be compatible with democratic politics.27 For in
26 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 109.
27 There is a stiff debate among different scholars whether Hegel’s main theme is recognition or not. 
Jurgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, for example, argue that intersubjective recognition was Hegel’s 
main concern only in his early writings, only in the Jena period. Others such as Robert Williams 
(.Hegel’s Ethics o f  Recognition, (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1997) contend that in the 
final analysis intersubjective recognition between equals and not dialectical relations o f master and
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the former mode o f recognition the self and the other are equals whereas in the second 
they are not. Avishai Margalit argues that ‘Hegel’s primordial struggle is a struggle 
between non-equals, as the terms ‘master’ and ‘slave’ already suggest- unequal in 
power and unequal in prestige.’ Misrecognizing someone’s identity means distorting 
its relation to itself. In other words, denial of recognition involves devaluation and 
demeaning that has to be restored.
Hegel’s model, however, has come under attack, among other things, for being 
based on metaphysical German Idealist premises that hardly fit into post-metaphysical 
contemporary thought. In addition, Hegel’s notion o f negativity seems to be trapped 
in determinism and totalization. For Hegel insists that negativity, which is the 
generating power o f the dialectical process, can reach a final reconciliation. 
Reconciling differences and oppositions, is manifested in reaching the universal 
Absolute, the One, the Spirit. This totalising system, however, not only relegates, 
inconsistently, all oppositions to the ‘principle o f singularity’ but also promotes 
closure and totalitarianism.29Consequently, several scholars have argued that the 
adoption o f this Hegelian model o f identification, by proponents o f identity politics 
poses several problems such as reification, balkanisation and displacement; shifting 
the focus from distribution of wealth to issues of identity.30 These problems will be 
extensively discussed in the next chapter.
Habermas took Hegel’s insights about intersubjective recognition and 
grounded them on empirical (historical, sociological, linguistic and psychological) 
evidence instead of the teleological and transcendental premises o f the philosophy of
slave is the overarching concept in Hegel’s philosophy from the beginning until the end. This debate, 
however, does not concern me here. For my purpose in this chapter is to examine his logic o f 
recognition that has been used by different scholars regardless if  it was at the basis o f his entire 
philosophy or only in his early writings.
28 Margalit, however, argues that we can generally conclude from Hegel’s account that every subject is 
equally capable o f understanding that realising its humanity depends on recognizing the humanity in 
the other. Avishai Margalit, ‘Recognition II: Recognizing the Brother and the Other’, Aristotelian 
Society, supp. 75, (2001), p. 135.
29 For a meaningful treatment o f the notion o f negativity in Hegel’s philosophy and the Frankfurt 
school critique o f it see: Nina Belmonte, ‘Evolving negativity: From Hegel to Derrida’, Philosophy & 
Social Criticism, 28:1 (1997), pp. 18-58.
30 See for example: Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion if  Identity (New 
York: Routledge, 1990); Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, New Left Review, 3 (2000), pp. 107- 
120; William E. Connolly, identity/ difference: Democratic Negotiations o f Political Paradox (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); Arash Abizadeh, ‘Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On 
the Alleged Incoherence o f Global Solidarity’, American Political Science Review, 99:1 (2005), pp. 45- 
60.
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consciousness. Habermas has referred to George Herbert Mead as the one who used 
social psychology, to give empirical content to Hegel’s notion of intersubjective 
recognition and the formative process o f socialization. Habermas has utilized Mead’s 
ideas to ground his critical theory on universal discursive ethics. Mead contends that 
individuation is an intersubjective process mediated by language. He rejects the claim 
that the individual is a self-creating entity. That is, it constitutes itself independently 
and in isolation from others. A self-conscious human subject, he insists, emerges in a 
moment of crisis and contradictory impulses while interacting with others. What is 
primarily important and allows us access to the psyche, according to Mead, is the 
understanding o f the emergence of knowledge of the meaning of human behaviour in 
interaction. For Mead, a person becomes aware of her subjectivity when she can 
engender in herself the same reaction one action provokes in her partner to interaction, 
i.e. the ability to put herself in the other’s shoes. An individual can gain an awareness 
o f itself only ‘to the extent to which it learns to perceive its own action from the 
symbolically represented second-person perspective.’ 31 In short, ‘the individual 
acquires a sense of self by learning to differentiate him or herself from others by role 
playing the perspectives o f partners to interaction.’32 This is how the constitution of 
identity comes to be an intersubjective process that is linguistically mediated.
What constitutes identity, according to Mead, are the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. The 
‘me’ is the conservative aspect of the individual personality. It is the internalised 
‘generalized other’. In other words, it is the social norms that dictate the codes of 
conduct. The ‘I’, however, represents the uncontrollable fantasies, demands and 
impulses that continuously challenge the internalised social norms. The 
intersubjectivity of the self is reflected in the conflict between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. A 
self that is formed primarily by the ‘me’ is conventional. This conventional ego, 
Habermas insists, cannot meet the demands o f a modem society. Put another way, 
‘modem societies burden the individual with decisions that require a postconventional 
ego identity and thus also necessitates a radicalisation o f the actor’s practical self­
3’Axel Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition: The Moral Grammar o f  Social Conflicts (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1995), p. 75.
32 Jon Mahoney, ‘Axel Honneth’s Ethical Theory o f Recognition’, International Studies in Philosophy, 
32:1 (1999), p. 97.
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understanding...’.33 In a postconventional identity, however, the ‘I* and not the ‘me’ 
has the upper hand. Following Mead, Habermas argues that realising a 
postconventional identity does not mean leaving the community, which is a 
precondition for the development of an intersubjective ego, but appealing to a larger, 
universal communicative community that includes all the generalized others.
Mead vaguely distinguishes between two forms o f the ‘me’, the moral (self 
determination) ‘me’ and the ethical (self-realisation) ‘me’. The moral ‘me’ requires 
that the individual becomes intersubjectively aware of possessing the same moral 
qualities, rights and duties as all other members of its community. The self-realisation 
‘me’, conversely, demands that the individual distinguishes itself as a particular and 
irreplaceable person with unique abilities. This particularity demands the recognition 
of the larger community. One gets to gain her or his sense o f particularity, Mead 
argues, through a ‘transparent system o f the functional division o f labour.’34 The 
individual’s particularity has to be recognised by its partners to interaction as 
positively contributing to the common good o f the community. Consequently, the 
person does not only share moral commonalities with other members o f the 
community but also evaluative goals.
I shall turn now to address Habermas’s theory of ‘formal pragmatics’ and his 
reliance on Mead’s idea to develop an intersubjective notion of selfhood. It is 
important to explore Habermas’ theory because it claims to offer an account of 
democratic accommodation that is based on post-metaphysical premises. This account 
of accommodation is supposedly attentive to demands of democratic exclusion.
Habermas ’formal pragmatics
Habermas develops his notion of intersubjectivity based on his critique of the 
objectivist and subjectivist paradigms that dominated Western philosophy. The 
objectivist approach, Habermas argues, fails to offer an account of intersubjectivity 
because it subjects social situations to empirical and scientific rules implied in natural
33 Jurgen Habermas, ‘Individuation Through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s Theory o f  
Subjectivity’, in Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. William Mark Hohengarten 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 192-193.
34 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition: The Moral Grammar o f Social Conflicts, p. 89.
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sciences. In other words, it examines social practices and institutions from an external 
perspective of an observer aiming, primarily, to identify patterns of behaviour. 
Consequently, the agent in this account is neglected. Conversely, the subjectivist 
paradigm, Habermas contends, recognizes the participants’ perspectives, views and 
intentions but its main problem is that it assumes a Cartesian subject that is solely 
capable o f constituting itself. These approaches, Habermas insists, not only fail to 
account for an intersubjective notion o f selfhood but their metaphysical and idealistic 
assumptions and ideas tend also to suppress the individual in favour of universal 
forms and characterizations. This, Habermas maintains, is the case in the classic 
theories o f sociology too, where there has been a failure to distinguish in the process 
o f socialization between social differentiation that deals with the uniqueness of the 
subject and individuation processes that increase the subject’s autonomy. What is 
required, however, is an approach that catches these two components (uniqueness and 
sameness).
Habermas’ alternative to the subjectivist and objectivist paradigms is a 
communicative paradigm that allegedly takes intersubjectivity more seriously. This 
communicative paradigm is based on rethinking Hegel’s theory of recognition, by 
freeing it from the premises o f ‘the philosophy of consciousness’ which presupposes a 
self-conscious subject capable of reflecting and objectifying itself, backed by Mead’s 
ideas about the process o f individuation and a sophisticated theory o f meaning. 
Habermas’ communicative paradigm does not presuppose intersubjectivity but 
considers it from the beginning as the very existence o f meaning, validity and 
individuality. Unlike Rawls’s original position where the rational, egoist and 
‘unencumbered’ individual determines monologically the conditions and principles of 
justice, Habermas argues that moral agents, whose interests and needs are open to 
deliberation and transformation, are capable of putting themselves in the shoes of 
others and reaching through dialogue, mutual understanding and consensus about 
moral norms and their validity. Following Mead he proposes that:
individuation is pictured not as the self-realisation o f an independently 
acting subject carried out in isolation and freedom but as a 
linguistically mediated process of socialization and the simultaneous 
constitution of a life history that is conscious o f itself. The identity of 
socialized individuals forms itself simultaneously in the medium of
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coming to an understanding with others in language and in the medium 
of coming to historical and intrasubjective understanding with 
oneself.35
Habermas concludes that individuality constitutes ‘itself in relations o f intersubjective 
acknowledgment and of intersubjectively mediated self-understanding.’36 Briefly, the 
individualization process is not a monological process but an intersubjective process 
based on a network and a web o f mutual social relations o f recognition mediated by 
language.
Mead’s emphasis on the role of language as an inevitable medium in the 
process of individuation represents, Habermas insists, a paradigmatic shift from ‘the 
philosophy of consciousness’ which dominated Hegel’s theory to communication. 
Mead’s idea of ‘individuation through socialisation’ is what paves the way for 
Habermas to develop his theory o f communicative action (formal pragmatics).37 
Based on this theory of ‘formal pragmatics,’ Habermas contends that our moral 
intuitions do not stem from our contingent particular traditions but from something 
more universal. Every competent social agent, Habermas argues, obtains these 
universal moral intuitions through the process o f socialization. Yet they include a core 
of universal intuitions that are not culturally specific. According to the communicative 
paradigm, intersubjectivity can be understood when individuals interact with each 
other reaching the same interpretations of their actions and circumstances. 
Consequently, intersubjectivity necessitates a ‘sameness o f meaning’. Sameness of 
meaning assumes rules that govern communication. Every subject capable of speech 
and action acquires these rules. Following these rules, Habermas maintains, cannot 
happen monologically in isolation from others but only dialogically. This means that 
somebody else is needed to assess, evaluate and criticize. In short, to determine
35 Habermas, ‘Individuation Through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s Theory o f Subjectivity’, 
pp. 152-153.
36 Habermas, ‘Individuation Through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s Theory o f Subjectivity’, 
pp. 152-153.
37 For more on this paradigmatic shift and the influence o f Mead and other thinkers on Haberms’ notion 
of intersubjectivity see: Peter Dews, ‘Communicative Paradigms and the Question o f Subjectivity: 
Habermas, Mead and Lacan’, in Peter Dews (ed.), Habermas:A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999), pp. 87-117.
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whether a moral norm is valid and justifiable cannot be done solitarily but 
intersubjectively.
Habermas argues that the origins o f postmetaphysical38 communicative 
rationality are not to be found in an external and transcendental power but in the 
structures of the ordinary communicative practices people use in their daily life. The 
critical force of reason is inherent in everyday language and not in transcendental, 
external power. Unlike the strategic action that is oriented towards achieving private 
goals, the communicative action is oriented towards reaching mutual understanding 
( Verstandigung) and rational consensus. Rational consensus is possible, Habermas 
insists, because mutual understanding is an inherent telos o f ordinary language.39 
Reaching mutual understanding, he insists, requires that the partners to interaction use 
the ‘double structure of speech.’ The first is cognitive; the propositional component 
that states facts that form the world. The second is communicative; the illocutionary 
force o f the utterance that indicates how the propositional content is being put forth. 
Every speech act, Habermas maintains, includes these two dimensions. Additionally, 
every communicative speech act implicitly contains different validity claims (truth- 
objective world, normative rightness- social world, and sincerity- subjective world).40 
Thus, every speech act has an implicit commitment to provide sound justification. Put 
another way, it includes potential reasons that can be given, by the speaker to the 
hearers, in support o f its claims. The partners to communication, however, must 
accept these reasons based on their force (the force of the better argument that
38 Maeve Cooke points out that Habermas’s notion o f communicative rationality is postmetaphysical in 
two senses. The first is that it is rooted in the existing world and can be extracted by empirical research. 
The second is that its universal claims to validity are derived from existing human language in our 
world. However, Cooke challenges this argument by contending that Habermas draws his conclusions 
on assumptions that historically emerged in specific kinds of cultural and social contexts- post- 
traditional societies. Consequently, his argument for universal morality is problematic. For more about 
this point and Habermas’ formal pragmatics see: Maeve Cooke, ‘Meaning and Truth in Habermas’s 
Pragmatics’, European Journal o f Philosophy, 9:1 (2001), pp. 1-23.
39 Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1987), p. 311, On the Pragmatics o f Social Interaction: 
Preliminary Studies in the Theory o f Communicative Action, trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 2001).
40 Recently Habermas relinquishes this claim and argues that there are weak and strong communicative 
actions. The three validity claims to truth, normative rightness and truthfulness, he argues, rise only in 
the case of a strong communicative action. A weak communicative action, however, involves only 
validity claims to truth and sincerity but not to normative rightness. For more see: Jurgen Habermas, 
‘Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality’, in Maeve Cooke, (ed.) On 
the Pragmatics o f Communication (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 307-343.
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includes fairness, equality and impartiality) and not according to power relations 
among deliberators. The validity of a norm is established when ‘all possibly affected 
persons could agree (to it) as participants in rational discourses.’41 This Habermas 
calls the (D) principle. It is supposed to regulate the disputes among deliberators. 
These are the conditions of an ideal speech situation. It is ideal, Habermas stresses, in 
the sense that it forms a standard for regulating and judging speech situations.
Hitherto, I have tried to reveal Habermas’s account of intersubjectivity and 
show how reformulating Hegel’s and Mead’s ideas o f intersubjective recognition 
leads him to discourse ethics. While Habermas’ intersubjective account of selfhood 
seems appealing, in the following section I want to demonstrate that his final 
conclusion, namely a theory o f discourse ethics, fails to effectively deal with demands 
o f historically excluded social groups.
Criticizing Habermas
There are several criticisms that can be raised against Habermas’ theory. For 
example, Habermas’ account of intersubjectivity, which is derived from the 
philosophy of language to explain the process of socialization, tends to neglect the 
interiority of the subject and other signifying forces that might not be linguistically 
mediated. Habermas’s linguistic transcendentalism is based on a problematic implicit 
force that propels the extra linguistic and pre-linguistic unconscious to the domain of 
the interpretable or more precisely to the domain of the linguistic. Along similar lines 
Joel Whitebook argues that ‘Habermas’ commitment to the linguistic position is so 
strong that he is compelled to eliminate systematically the existence o f  any putatively 
pre-linguistic phenomena by assimilating their apparent pre linguisticality to the 
linguistic.’42 However, I want to focus my discussion on points that demonstrate the
41 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to A Discourse Theory o f Law and 
Democracy trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), p. 107.
42 Joel Whitebook, ‘Intersubjectivity and The Monadic Core o f The Psyche: Habermas and Castoriadis 
on The Unconscious’, Praxis International, 9:4 (1990), p. 356.
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ineffectiveness o f his theory to accommodate demands o f historically oppressed social
43groups.
Firstly, Habermas’s discourse ethics exclusively focuses on formal rules, 
cognitive and linguistic capacities and denies the roles o f esteem and culture in 
identity formation and politics. Habermas’ notion o f intersubjective selfhood 
‘privileges the linguistically mediated features of identity formation’ and neglects 
moral properties such as esteem.44 Ignoring the significance o f esteem for the self 
stems from Habermas’ exclusive focus on specifying the ideal conditions and 
pragmatic presuppositions of speech that supposedly make the universal procedure of 
public deliberation and will formation fair, legitimate and accessible to all. This focus 
on the ideal speech situation and its conditions leads Habermas to underplay the role 
o f cultural and social conditions, networks and structures in facilitating and making 
deliberation possible in the first place. The issue of esteem is o f a particular relevance 
to historically excluded social groups because it is the misrecognition and disrespect 
o f the identity and culture of these groups that generate oppression, injuries and low 
self-image.
Secondly, in the ideal speech situation Habermas assumes that all speakers 
who are involved in deliberation share equal communicative competence and have 
equal epistemological resources. To support their claims, speakers, according to 
Habermas, are expected to provide sound justifications to their interlocutors. The 
partners to communication accept these justifications as reasonable based on their 
force as arguments that rest on fairness, equality and impartiality and not on power 
relations among deliberators. It is this intersubjective exchange o f reasoning and 
recognition that lies at the core of public deliberation which supposedly lead to 
rational consensus on common political arrangements. The difficulty with this view is 
that in divided and pluralistic societies there are socio-economic inequalities that 
often overlap with cultural differences. These socio-economic inequalities do not only 
significantly effect the determination of what counts as reasonable but also directly 
influence the attainment and access o f communicative competence and 
epistemological resources. Indeed, historically excluded social groups who suffer
43 In the previous chapter it has been argued that Habermas’ notion o f identity is individualistic, 
formalistic and culturally specific. To avoid repetition I will not discuss these points again but focus on 
points that have not been raised yet and have direct bearing on Habermas’ account o f accommodation.
44 Jon Mahoney, ‘Axel Honneth’s Ethical Theory o f Recognition’, International Studies in Philosophy, 
31:1 (1999), p. 101.
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from economic and cultural exclusion, do not have the same level o f communicative 
competence and access to epistemological resources enjoyed by hegemonic groups. 
Therefore, even if excluded social groups enjoy formal equality to participate in 
public deliberation, the inequalities in communicative competence and access to 
epistemological resources considerably limit their effective participation and impact 
on the deliberative process and its results.
Finally, Habermas’ discourse ethics is unable to access the moral claims of 
oppressed social groups. For suppressed social groups present their moral claims in 
negative terms o f situated feelings o f injustices and injuries (<consciousness o f  
injustice) rather than in a comprehensive, generalized, consistent, abstract and logical 
moral system or order of values projected in theory of justice. The source of this 
particular formation of moral consciousness of socially oppressed groups, Honneth 
contends, is social-structural. He goes on to argue that unlike privileged and 
hegemonic groups who are enduringly compelled to normatively justify and legitimise 
their superiority appealing to general and universal claims that go beyond their 
specific context, the oppressed groups do not feel this pressure. Moreover, Honneth 
claims that whereas the dominant groups are pressured and stimulated to elaborate 
their normative beliefs, the cultural environment o f the underprivileged groups ‘does 
not include any pressure to elaborate the normative convictions o f its members.’45 
Honneth identifies two strategies of social control that profoundly influence the 
articulation of injustices felt by deprived groups in the public sphere and render 
Habermas’ discourse ethics ill-equipped in this regards. The first way of restricting 
the manifestation of injustices is by ‘systematically withholding the appropriate 
linguistic and symbolic means for their expression.’ This strategy is called 
‘desymbolization’. The second strategy limits the force of the claims of deprived 
groups through privatising the ‘class-specific consciousness of injustice’. This is done 
through a strong encouragement and support o f individualistic initiatives and actions 
by the state and other institutions whose main goal is to prevent a common collective
45 Honneth, ‘Moral Consciousness and Class Domination: Some Problems in the Analysis o f Hidden 
Morality’, in Axel Honneth, The Fragmented World o f the Social (Albany NY: State University o f  
New York Press, 1995), p. 211.
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understanding and cooperation that helps people to articulate their feelings of 
injustices and act to change them.46
Conclusion
Based primarily on communitarian criticisms, this chapter has argued that the 
Rawls’ and Habermas’ accounts of selfhood generate several problems that 
considerably undermine the ability o f their respective theories to accommodate 
demands of historically oppressed social groups. Rawls’ notion of selfhood poses 
problems to his account o f democratic accommodation because it is too thin and still 
based on metaphysical assumptions which downplay the significance of culture, 
history and identity. Habermas’ post-metaphysical intersubjective account o f selfhood 
leads to ‘desymbolization’ and ‘privatisation’ of oppression and injustice. Moreover, 
Habermas’ reduces intersubjectivity to merely linguistic and cognitive forces for 
validating legal procedures and rules and ignores the role o f esteem and culture for the 
self. Furthermore, Habermas downplays the inequalities in the level o f communicative 
competence and access to epistemological resources.
Relying mainly on the challenges communitarians have raised against the 
excessively thin and individualistic notion o f social ontology that underlie liberal 
theories, several scholars have argued that an alternative approach is required. This 
approach has, among other things, to be more attentive to cultural diversity, esteem, 
oppression, and distinct identities. More specifically, this approach should place 
excluded social groups, their cultural distinctiveness, and their collective rights at its 
core and defend them against an individualistic, legalistic, assimilative and difference- 
blind from of liberalism.
46 Honneth, ‘Moral Consciousness and Class Domination: Some Problems in the Analysis o f Hidden 
Morality’, pp. 212-215.
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4. CULTURE, THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND THE 
POST-STRUCTURALIST THESIS
It has been argued that Rawls’ and Habermas’ notions o f selfhood are 
excessively thin, individualistic and abstract. Citizens, in the ‘original position’ or the 
‘ideal speech situation’, are required to transcend their particular identities and 
affiliations in order to achieve rational consensus on common political arrangements. 
In their models of democratic politics citizens are viewed as essentially similar and as 
bearers of interests. Citizens enjoy formal equality and form voluntarily political 
associations and groups to pursue and protect their interests. The state in these models 
is viewed as a neutral entity towards the cultures, values and different notions o f the 
good of its citizens. It is this insistence on sameness, cultural neutrality, and interest 
rather than on cultural difference and identity that has considerably contributed to the 
rise o f a particular type o f the politics of recognition that is often referred to as 
‘identity politics’.
According to proponents of identity politics, citizens are not abstract and 
ahistorical subjects but culturally, socially and historically embedded and situated 
beings. It is this different understanding of the nature of identity formation that lies at 
the core of identity politics. Identity politics relies on a thicker notion of social 
ontology that accords major significance to identity, culture and context in the 
operation of politics. According to proponents o f identity politics, members of 
particular social groups are oppressed and excluded primarily because of their 
particular identity rather than their interests. In other words, it is one’s identity as a 
Native Canadian, a black or a woman that makes her vulnerable to violence, cultural 
imperialism, exploitation or other faces of oppression. A wide range o f views and a 
broad scope of political struggles fall under the rubric of identity politics.1 Identity 
politics, nevertheless, is widely referred to as a form of politics that seeks to liberate
1 It is beyond the scope o f this thesis to trace and map out all o f these views and struggles. For more on 
these various views and struggles see: Michael Kenny, The Politics o f Identity: Liberal Political 
Theory and the Dilemmas o f Difference (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004); Susan Bickford, ‘Anti-Anti- 
Identity Politics: Feminism, Democracy, and the Complexities o f Citizenship’, Hypatia, 12:4 (1997), 
pp. 111-131; A. Wolfe and Y. Klausen, ‘Identity Politics and the Welfare State’, Social Philosophy and  
Policy, 14 (1992), pp. 231-255, ‘Other People’, Prospect, December (2000), pp. 28-33.
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excluded social groups and give full recognition to their authentic distinct identities. 
One o f the first and most prominent advocates of this form o f politics is Charles 
Taylor. Taylor has criticized the atomism and blindness to cultural differences that 
characterize dominant contemporary interpretations of liberalism.2 He has proposed 
‘the politics o f recognition’ as a substitute to difference-blind liberalism. Taylor 
grounds his account of politics on a dialogical notion of selfhood that accords 
significant roles to identity, cultural difference and collective rights.
This chapter is divided into two parts. Charles Taylor’s theory of recognition 
is the focus of the first part. The first part focuses on Taylor’s theory because of its 
principal centrality to the debate on recognition. The second part concentrates on 
Judith Butler’s criticisms o f the politics of recognition. In the first part I will argue 
that while Taylor’s demands to give due recognition to excluded and oppressed social 
groups is an important advance beyond the liberal notion of tolerance that underlie 
Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories, his account of recognition arguably relies on an 
essentialist conception of culture which poses serious challenges to his notion of 
democratic accommodation. In the second part I will argue that while Butler’s views 
pose some significant challenges to identity politics by revealing the oppositional 
logic that lies at its core and the important role power relations play in identity 
formation and politics, her post-structuralist model of identity is ultimately not 
persuasive.
2 For more on Taylor’s views see: Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), Sources o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), The 
Ethics o f  Authenticity (London: Harvard University Press, 1992), ‘The Politics o f  Recognition’, in Amy 
Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73.
3 The term ‘the politics o f recognition’ appears in Taylor famous piece: ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, 
in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73. It should be noted, however, that in the literature ‘the 
politics o f recognition’ is often distinguished from ‘identity politics’. For the first is a more inclusive 
category than the second. Identity politics tends not to address political and social exclusion rooted in 
class and economy for instance. In this thesis I consider Taylor’s theory as belonging to ‘identity 
politics’ because o f its principal emphasis on cultural recognition.
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P a r ti
The politics o f  recognition and the challenge o f  culture
Taylor also relies on the ethical theory of Hegel and the psychological theory 
o f  George Herbret Mead to conceptualise a dialogical notion o f selfhood.4 According 
to the dialogic argument, the sense of selfhood is gained and developed through the 
recognition o f ‘significant others’ in social interaction. Rawls’ and Habermas’ 
considerably downplay the role of culture in the formation of the self and the 
operation o f politics. Rawls and Habermas explicitly avoid tackling core ontological 
issues in public deliberation under the pretext that ontological questions o f the good 
will hinder achieving consensus on neutral political principles that are supposed to 
secure individual and democratic rights. Taylor rejects this view and argues that 
ontological issues such as identity and culture clearly influence our public deliberation 
on political principles and fundamental rights. Taylor identifies two major changes 
that have made the modem preoccupation with identity and recognition indispensable. 
The first is the breakdown of social hierarchies.5 This collapse has led to the 
replacement o f the notion o f honour, according to which recognition was attainable
4 Taylor is not the only theorist o f recognition that relies on recasting Mead’s and Hegel’s views. Axel 
Honneth also invokes Hegel’s and Mead’s ideas and develops what he calls a ‘formal conception o f  
ethical life’. Materializing Hegel’s notion o f intersubjective recognition (in the sense o f disarming it 
from its metaphysical premises) through appealing to Mead’s social psychology and empirical 
evidences from sociology and history leads Honneth to the following conclusion: the attainment o f  
person’s sense o f  identity and the realisation o f its desires and needs as a fully autonomous individual, 
decisively rely on the development o f self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. These three modes 
o f ‘practical relations-to-self can only be achieved and sustained intersubjectively. These relationships, 
Honneth emphasizes, are not pre-given but constituted and achieved through social struggles. What 
drive these diverse social struggles are not solely interests but primarily moral claims; feelings of 
disrespect and indignation that stem from denial o f recognition. Based on the three modes o f positive 
relations to oneself; self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem, Honneth distinguishes among three 
forms o f recognition that a ‘healthy’ identity relies on; love, rights, and esteem. For more on Honneth’s 
theory and its weaknesses see: Axel Honneth, The Struggle fo r Recognition: The Moral Grammar of 
Social Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), The Fragmented World o f  the Social, Charles W. 
Wright (ed.) (Albany NY: State University o f New York Press, 1995), ‘Recognition I: Invisibility: On 
the Epistemology o f  ‘Recognition” , Aristotelian Society, Supp (75), (2001), pp. 111-126; Avishai 
Margalit, ‘Recognition II: Recognizing the Brother and the Other’, Aristotelian Society, Supp (75), 
(2001), pp. 127-139; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political- 
Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003); Simon Thompson (review article),‘Is Redistribution a 
Form o f Recognition? Comments on the Fraser-Honneth Debate’, Critical Review o f International 
Social and Political Philosophy, 8:1 (2005), pp. 85-102; Allen Jonathan, ‘Decency and the Struggle for 
Recognition’, Social Theory and Practice, 24:3 (1998), pp. 449-469; Roger Foster, ‘Recognition and 
Resistance: Axel Honneth’s Critical Social Theory’, Radical Philosophy, 94 (1999), pp. 6-18; 
Christopher Zum, ‘Review Essay: Anthropology and Normativity: A Critique o f Axel Honneth’s 
‘Formal Conception o f Ethical Life’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 26:1 (2000), pp. 115-124.
5 For more on these two changes see: Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, pp. 26-37.
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only by few, with a notion o f dignity according to which recognition was attainable 
universally by everyone. The second major change that has considerably contributed 
to the emergence of identity and recognition as inevitable in modern societies is the 
rise of ‘the ideal of authenticity.’ Taylor claims that central to the modem notion of 
selfhood is its intrinsic inner voice o f authenticity that makes her/ him culturally 
distinct. Authenticity is the moral force to be true to ‘my own inner nature’ which 
makes me distinct from others. My inner distinctiveness can only be articulated and 
discovered by me and is that which gives shape to my identity.6 Identity is not gained 
through ‘solitary reflection’ but crucially depends on the recognition granted by 
‘significant others’ in social interactions. The approval or disapproval of these 
significant others substantially influences our identities. The absence of recognition, 
Taylor argues, can cause moral harm and injury to the self-esteem and self-image of 
the misrecognized person or group. Taylor insists that ‘Due recognition is not just a 
courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.’7
Taylor appeals to the ideas o f the German thinker Johann Gottfried Herder to 
invoke the principle of authenticity. Similar to Herder, Taylor believes that the 
principle o f authenticity, i.e., being true to your own inner distinctiveness, applies to 
individual persons as well as to groups. Enthusiastically supporting Herder’s ideal of 
authenticity, Taylor states ‘Just like individuals, a Volk should be true to itself, that is, 
its own culture. Germans shouldn’t try to be derivative and (inevitably) second-rate 
Frenchmen, as Frederick the Great’s patronage seemed to be encouraging them to 
do.’8 The need to belong to a culture and society, according to Taylor, is a basic 
human need. It is as basic as food, shelter and freedom. In other words, belonging to a 
culture is constitutive of what defines us as humans. Taylor believes that identity and 
culture have inner natures and essences.9 Human beings do not achieve self- 
realization outside of the structures of society and culture. Culture and society, 
according to Taylor, are organic structures into which humans are bom. Yet unlike 
liberal scholars who view culture either as insignificant for politics or just as a
6 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 30.
7 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, pp. 25-26.
8 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 31.
9 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Introduction’ in James Tully (ed.), Philosophy in an age o f Pluralism: the philosophy 
o f Charles Taylor in question (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 2.
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framework for individuals to determine and pursue their notions o f the good life, 
Taylor believes culture is intrinsically valuable.
The move from honour to dignity has given rise to what Taylor calls ‘the 
politics o f equal dignity’. A from of politics according to which individuals are 
viewed as essentially similar in the sense that they enjoy an identical set of rights and 
entitlements. The ideal of authenticity has given rise to ‘the politics of difference’ 
which demands the recognition of the distinct identity of each individual or group. 
The first form of politics emphasizes the universal human capacity to define and 
pursue an autonomous life. It is precisely this human capacity that individual rights 
are supposed to protect. The second form of politics focuses on a different universal 
human potential, that is, the capacity to define and form a distinct identity as 
individuals and groups. Both of these forms of politics, nevertheless, are based on the 
notion o f equal respect. However, while in the first form o f politics the notion of equal 
respect cherishes sameness, i.e., treating people in a difference-blind fashion; in the 
second form o f politics the notion of equal respect values difference and 
distinctiveness.10
According to Taylor, the politics of equal dignity has been associated with a 
particular kind of liberalism, namely a liberalism that is primarily difference-blind and 
procedural (advocated by scholars such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin). Taylor 
clearly favours a different kind o f liberalism, one that is not based on ‘homogenizing 
difference’ but on endorsing and protecting cultural difference. This form of politics 
does not only recognize the significance of particular fundamental individual rights, 
but also the importance o f protecting certain collective rights of minorities. The 
problem with the politics of equal dignity, Taylor argues, is not only that it is 
‘inhospitable to difference’ and ‘suspicious of collective goals’, but also implausibly 
assumes that there is allegedly a set of difference-blind principles that form a neutral 
ground for different cultures to coexist. These difference-blind principles supposedly 
provide a political framework that is neutral towards the different projects o f the good 
life. Taylor argues that the liberal demand to relegate the notions of the good to the 
private sphere itself reflects a commitment to substantive goals. The universal 
difference-blind principles in fact reflect particular values and cultures. The separation 
between the church and the state that has been favoured by this kind o f liberalism is
10 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, pp. 37-44.
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the product of a specific religious history. Liberalism, he insists, ‘is not a possible 
meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression o f one range o f cultures, 
and quite incompatible with other ranges.’11 Taylor’s rejection o f the neutrality o f a 
difference-blind liberalism does not imply that he proposes a form o f politics which 
tolerates all types of cultures. He clearly states that liberalism, in its procedural and 
non-procedural forms, has to draw lines of tolerance. He claims that ‘liberalism can’t 
and shouldn’t claim complete cultural neutrality. Liberalism is also a fighting creed.’12 
Taylor admits that there are members of social groups who are citizens in our 
societies and also belong to cultures that undermine our cultural and philosophical 
values. The challenge, Taylor claims, ‘is to deal with their sense of marginalization 
without compromising our basic political principles.’13
Taylor argues that the demand for recognition o f hitherto excluded social 
groups does not only require acknowledging the distinct identities and cultures of 
these groups but also recognizing their cultural worth. Underlying this demand, 
according to Taylor, is ‘a premise that we owe equal respect to all cultures’.14 Taylor 
examines two formulations o f this premise. The first formulation makes the claim that 
the equal worth o f all cultures is a matter o f right. The second formulation makes a 
weaker claim that a comparative cultural study will enable us to see the worth o f ‘a 
culture sufficiently different from our own’.15 Taylor rejects the stronger claim and 
favours the weaker one. He argues that the stronger claim is problematic because 
judgments of worth need not be grounded on principles of ethics. In other words, 
judgments of value should not rest on ‘our own wills and desires’ but on independent 
criteria.16 The weak claim is based on ‘a starting hypothesis’ that they we ought to 
apply when we start studying a culture amply different from our own. This starting 
hypothesis assumes that ‘cultures that have animated whole societies over 
considerable stretch o f time have something important to say to all humans.’ While
11 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 62.
12 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 62.
13 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 63.
14 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 66, and The Ethics o f  Authenticity (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), p. 36.
15 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 67.
16 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 69.
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this presumption does not rule out a possible positive judgment a priori (because 
doing that would be arrogant and ethnocentric), it does not imply that we will 
necessarily come up with a positive judgment about the value of the culture. The 
comparative cultural study that underlies this hypothesis enables us, Taylor insists, to 
expand our horizon, learn and understand other cultures and revise and transform our 
standards.17 This comparative study of other cultures is crucial for excluded social 
groups because it requires from the hegemonic groups to review their views about the 
worth and image of marginalized groups. Taylor argues that the dominant groups tend 
to depict excluded social groups as inferior. The struggle for recognition necessarily 
requires the transformation of this demeaning depiction and the judgments of worth 
applied by the dominant group.18
Problems in Taylor’s theory o f  recognition
Taylor’s theory of recognition has been subject to several criticisms.19 
Scholars such as Linda Nicholson have argued that Taylor’s analysis focuses on 
recognizing the distinctiveness and worth of the identity and culture of excluded 
social groups while ignoring the importance o f the process of recognition itself and 
the power relations implicated into it.20 Maeve Cooke identifies an ambiguity in 
Taylor’s principle o f authenticity and shows that this principle requires capacities
17 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, pp. 67-73.
18 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, pp. 66.
19 See for example: James Tully (ed.), Philosophy in An Age o f  Pluralism: The Philosophy o f Charles
Taylor in Question (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Horton, ‘Charles Taylor:
Selfhood, Community and Democracy’, in April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (eds.), Liberal Democracy 
and Its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 155-174; Joel Anderson, ‘The Personal Lives o f  
Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor’s Value Theory’, Constellations, 
3:1 (1996), pp. 17-38; Michael Kenny, ‘Liberalism and the Politics o f Recognition’ in The Politics o f  
Identity: Liberal Political Theory and the Dilemmas o f Difference (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004), pp. 
148-168; Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f  Multiculturalism (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, New Left Review, 3 
(2000), pp. 107-120; Jacob T. Levy, The Multiculturalism o f Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000).
20 Linda Nicholson, ‘To Be or Not To Be: Charles Taylor and The Politic o f Recognition’, 
Constellations, 3:1 (1996), pp. 1-16.
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which are strikingly similar to ones found in the value o f individual autonomy.21 Paul 
Saurette identifies other ambiguities and inconsistencies that stem from Taylor’s 
attempt to score balance between individual rights and social good22 Seyla Benhabib 
points out the difficulty that emerges from the analogy Taylor draws between the 
recognition individuals demand and that which Volks require 23 However, the focus of 
my assessment of Taylor’s account of recognition revolves primarily around the 
notion o f culture that underlies his theory. This notion of culture, I argue, undermines 
the adequacy of his account of democratic accommodation to effectively deal with 
historical injustices.
Taylor argues that comparative cultural study is likely to transform our 
standards and measures and therefore blocks the adoption o f ethnocentric and narrow 
views. While seemingly Taylor’s account o f politics aspires to achieve mutual 
understanding through dialogue with the other, the trouble with his account, however, 
is that even after the transformations have taken place he maintains a very clear 
distinction between ‘our culture’ and ‘their culture’. In other words, despite the 
dialogue and interaction among different cultures in the same political society, Taylor 
still refers to cultures as having clear and rigid boundaries o f belonging. Taylor 
explicitly rejects ‘homogenizing difference’ that is often led by a hegemonic group. 
However, again Taylor refers to homogenizing as potentially happening only among 
cultures but not within the boundaries o f an individual culture. Taylor endorses 
Herder’s principles of authenticity and argues that it is applicable not only to 
individuals but also to groups. The principle o f authenticity clearly points towards an 
essentialist notion of culture. The principle of authenticity implies that each identity 
and culture has an inner original essence/nature that makes it clearly distinct from 
other cultures. This originality, according to Taylor, can be articulated and 
discovered.24 Using these latter terms implies as if the inner nature is fixed and 
constant that needs to be discovered in interaction. Taylor supports Herder’s claim
21 Maeve Cooke, ‘Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics o f Recognition’, 
Political Theory, 25:2 (1997), pp. 258-288.
22 Paul Saurette, (review essay), ‘Questioning Political Theory: Charles Taylor’s Contrarianism’, 
Political Theory, 32:5 (2004), pp. 723-733.
23 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 51-59.
24 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 31.
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that Germans should be true to themselves, i.e., to their own culture and not ‘try to be 
derivative and (inevitably) second rate Frenchmen’.25 It is very plausible to infer from 
this that Taylor depicts ‘Germans’ and ‘Frenchmen’ as clearly distinct, different and 
fixed categories. Briefly, Taylor tends to treat cultures as distinct, coherent and 
homogeneous wholes that their ‘survival’ and ‘integrity’ need to be secured and 
protected.26 The problem with this notion of culture is that it overlooks internal 
differences and the potential pressure exercised on individuals to comply with the 
norms, values and practices o f the group’s culture. In other words, his notion o f 
culture seems to impose specific single identity which ignores multiple identities that 
stem from intermarriages, cultural interconnectedness, social mobilization and 
political goals. 27 This essentialist notion o f culture can endanger individual 
autonomy.28
Unlike liberal egalitarian theories which view oppression mostly in economic 
terms and focus on socio-economic injustices, Taylor’s theory focuses on struggles 
for recognition that stem primarily from cultural oppression. Taylor is primarily 
motivated and inspired by his experience in Canadian politics. While he has been 
committed to the significance o f federalism in Canada, he has supported the claims of 
those who want to grant rights to protect indigenous groups and preserve the 
Francophone culture within the province o f Quebec.29 He appeals to Herder’s ideas to 
conceptualise these particular struggles for recognition and draws general political 
and philosophical conclusions which he views as applicable to other struggles of 
recognition. One crucial problem with these political and philosophical conclusions is
25 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p. 31.
26 For more on the need to secure the survival and integrity o f culture see Taylor’s example o f  the 
French Culture in Quebec: Taylor, ‘The Politics o f  Recognition’, pp. 40-41 and pp. 58-61.
27 Brenda Lyshaug points out that Taylor’s principle o f cultural authenticity implies an essentialist 
notion o f culture. See her article: Brenda Lyshaug, ‘Authenticity and the Politics o f Identity: A Critique 
of Charles Taylor’s Politics o f Recognition’, Contemporary Political Theory, 3 (2004), pp. 300-320.
28 On the risk o f inhibiting autonomy in Taylor’ theory o f  recognition see: K. Anthony Appiah, 
‘Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction’, in: Amy Gutmann 
(ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), pp. 149-163.
29 Several scholars have pointed out the strong and explicit influence o f Taylor’s experience in 
Canadian politics on his political and philosophical conclusions. For more on this point see: Nicholas H. 
Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals, and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), pp. 183- 
192; Linda Nicholson, ‘To Be or Not To Be: Charles Taylor and The Politic o f Recognition’, 
Constellations, 3:1 (1996), p. 8.
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that they view struggles for recognition primarily in cultural terms. According to 
Taylor due recognition is a fundamental human need. He goes on to argue that the 
lack or denial o f due recognition, i.e., inferior and demeaning depiction, of the 
individual’s or group’s identity can cause serious injury and harm to their self-image 
and esteem. The trouble with Taylor’s account here is that it views struggles for 
recognition as ultimately revolving around cultural and symbolic remedies such as 
language rights demanded by Quebeckers in Canada. As we have indicated in the 
introduction o f this thesis, claims of historical injustice involve cultural as well as 
socio-economic components. Cultural and socio-economic injustices are intimately 
interlinked and intertwined.30 In other words, the demeaning and inferior depiction of 
social groups and their members is intimately linked to their economic exploitation 
and marginalization.
In summery, unlike the difference-blind liberalism that views identity and 
culture as irrelevant to politics, Taylor’s proposes a form o f politics that assigns 
significance to the identity and cultural distinctiveness o f social groups that have 
experienced exclusion and injustice. Taylor’s form o f politics recognizes the 
previously denied, hidden or suppressed collective identities o f certain social groups 
and calls for their protection and respect. While Taylor’s demands to give due 
recognition to excluded and oppressed social groups yields important progress 
towards democratic accommodation that goes beyond the narrow liberal notion of 
tolerance that underlie Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories, his account of recognition 
seems to rely on an essentialist conception of culture which poses serious challenges 
to his notion o f democratic accommodation. Moreover, Taylor’s focus on identity and 
cultural distinctiveness overlooks specific demands that are particular to social groups 
that have suffered from historical injustices. In other words, although Taylor’s theory 
of recognition focuses on situatedness and embeddedness, it seems to stop short of 
indicating the importance of collective memory and taking responsibility and offering 
an apology in the case o f demands o f historical injustice. In the final chapter I will 
argue that it is the politics of reconciliation that capture these issues. Additionally, the 
politics o f reconciliation avoids the problem of essentialism that plagues identity 
politics by seeking and encouraging the solidarity of non-members. Now I want to
30 On the interconnectedness o f cultural and economic injustices see: Nancy Fraser, ‘From 
Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemma o f Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age’, New Left Review, 212 
(1995), pp. 68-93, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, New Left Review, 3 (2000), pp. 107-120.
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turn to discuss briefly the post-structuralist thesis which poses further challenges to 
identity politics.
Part II
The death o f  the subject and the politics o f  recognition
Post-modern and post-structural31 theorists have raised several important 
challenges to the politics of recognition. They argue that the claim that theories of 
recognition are grounded on post-metaphysical premises rather than on metaphysical 
ones is not convincing. For the ‘shadow’ o f the dead Judeo Christian God; i.e. 
metaphysical principles, is still present in these theories o f recognition. The most 
prominent proof for this presence, they insist, is the reliance on ‘metaphysics of 
substance’ in conceptualising identity, politics, ethics and meaning. 32 More 
specifically, post-structural theorists have charged the politics o f recognition, 
advocated by scholars such as Taylor, of defending essentialist accounts of identity 
and culture that necessarily lead to reification, separatism, repression and closure.
This part o f the chapter discusses briefly the post-structuralist views of Judith 
Butler because of the challenges they pose to identity politics. It goes on to argue that 
while her views provide important criticisms against identity politics by revealing the 
oppositional logic that lies at its core and the important role power relations play in 
identity formation, her post-structuralist model of identity is neither ultimately 
compelling nor attractive. For the over-exaggerated role she accords to discourse and 
processes of signification in the formation of identity, the excessive subversion and 
transformation which are translated into the demand to transcend the limits and
31 A wide variety o f thinkers such as Freidrich Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Theodor Adorno, Lucy Irigaray and Judith Butler are often included 
under the umbrella o f postmodernism or post-structuralism. These thinkers hold different views. While 
the views o f the more radical or ultrapostmodemist among them, such as Nietzsche, Deleuze, and 
Lyotard, undermine the very possibility o f politics and identity, the views o f other less radical thinkers, 
such as Adorno and Butler, still view identities as contingent. However, these identities, the less radical 
group insists, do not demand the elimination o f politics but serve as the ‘ungrounded ground’ o f it. The 
discussion here will focus primarily on the claims o f Judith Butler. Judith Butler argues that she 
defends a post-structural theory and not a post-modem one. For post-modernism, according to her, is a 
very wide and vague term that includes arguments that she could not accept. However, this debate, 
valuable or not, does not concern us in this chapter. Additionally, I am not implying that post­
modernism or post-structuralism designate one fixed theory but they include different views and 
schools o f thought.
32 Judith Butler uses the term ‘metaphysics o f substance’ in her book: Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion o f Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 16-25.
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boundaries of culture and context, and the enthusiastic celebration of a hybrid mode 
o f being, lead to detached ‘linguistified’ and hybrid identities which are not 
sufficiently sensitive to cultural, historical and social forces.
Identity politics and the post-structuralist thesis
Butlers argues that the identity categories which are often presumed to lie at 
the foundation of feminist politics portray feminism as identity politics. The trouble 
with identity politics, Butler argues, is that it is rooted in a problematic metaphysical 
binary logic of identification. She argues that this logic of identification restricts 
identity to oppositional ontological categories such as ‘male’ versus ‘female’, and ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’. This binary and oppositional logic o f identification relies on a 
‘metaphysics of substance’ in which the subject is presupposed as a given, self­
identical, constant, unified and internally coherent entity.33 The binary logic of 
identification implies that the subject has authentic core traits that define his or her 
identity. This logic o f identity requires the existence o f an external other in contrast to 
which the subject defines itself. Butler goes on to argue that even in social theories, 
such as Taylor’s, which insist on a dialogically constituted and situated self, the 
discursive and dialogical process through which one gains his or her identity is framed 
in an oppositional epistemological frame.34
The problem, therefore, with the binary logic that underlies identity politics is 
that it denies the internal complexity and indeterminacy within each of the 
dichotomous categories, ignores the intersection between both o f these categories and 
imposes unified and essentialised identities through presenting the binary categories 
as the only ontological modes o f being. The denial o f internal complexity and 
indeterminacy of identity, the failure to capture identities that exceed the boundaries 
o f the two dichotomous categories and the drive to essentialise and impose unified 
identities give rise to several risks that are associated with identity politics. Most 
importantly among these risks is the problem of essentialism that could license 
balkanisation, patriarchy, closure, xenophobia and radical forms o f nationalism.
33 For more on the binary logic o f identity see: Judith Butler: Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion o f  Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 13-16.
34 Butler: Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion o f Identity, p. 143.
102
Consequently, Butler and several other post-structural theorists have called for the 
revaluation of the principles and ideas that underlie this oppositional logic of identity 
to conceive a different form of politics that is capable o f overcoming the constraints 
and limits of identity politics and recognizing the multiplicity and hybridity o f identity. 
In other words, a form o f politics that is capable o f theorizing alternative modes o f 
recognition, thinking and being that have been either ignored and erased or are 
inconceivable. These alternative modes, she claims, are dynamic, contradictory, 
uncertain, groundless and unfamiliar.
The subject, according to Butler, is not a pre-given and self-creating entity. 
Rather, it is discursively constructed. It is the artefact o f continuous linguistic and 
discursive processes that are implicated by power relations. These processes 
determine diverse roles and positions for the subject to hold. Butler contends that the 
subject is performatively formed. It is constituted through a performative act. This 
performative speech act is not merely about stating utterances but about bringing into 
being an action. Put another way, performative utterance is not about describing 
objects or actions but about giving a birth to what it names. Butler argues that:
[T]o be constituted by language is to be produced within a given 
network of power/discourse which is open to resignification, 
redeployment, subversive citation from within, and interruption and 
inadvertent convergences with other such networks.35
The subject, however, is not situated relatively to the positions and roles it holds but is 
constituted by them. In other words, they are not instrumentally external forces but 
constitutive of its formation. These positions, Butler stresses, are not merely 
theoretical constellations but entrenched by ‘organizing principles of material 
practices and institutional arrangements.’36 Butler denies the claim that there are ‘free 
wills’ and free subjects who can act autonomously and freely in a space where power 
is bracketed. For power relations operate everywhere.
35 Judith Butler, ‘For a Careful Reading’, in Feminist Contentions: a philosophical exchange, (New  
York: Routledge, 1995), p. 135.
36 Judith Butler, ‘Contingent Foundations’, in Feminist Contentions: a philosophical exchange, (New  
York: Routledge, 1995), p. 42.
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Butler rejects the claim that criticizing the subject means repudiating it. Rather, 
it means, she insists, to interrogate its formation as apolitical and as a pre-given entity. 
The constitution o f the subject, according to her account, is not prior to politics; lies in 
the normative domain outside o f the boundaries of the political. Rather, it is a political 
process par excellence where power relations, exclusion and repression are involved. 
Put another way, the process of subjectivity formation, she maintains, involves 
exclusion, differentiation and repression. These latter elements are often concealed by 
claims of autonomy and independence. Relying on assumptions from psychoanalysis, 
Butler argues, that the exclusionary process of differentiation is inevitable for the 
formation of the subject as a unique and particular being. The aim of a post-structural 
theory, or what she calls ‘feminist genealogy,’37 is to trace these exclusions and 
repressions. To put it in Butler’s terms:
to deconstruct the subject is not to negate or throw away the concept; 
on the contrary, deconstruction implies only that we suspend all 
commitments to that to which the term, “the subject,” refers, and that 
we consider the linguistic functions it serves in the consolidation and 
concealment of authority. To deconstruct is not to negate..., but to call 
into question..., to open up a term, like the subject, to a reusage or 
redeployment that previously has not been authorized.38
The redeployment o f the subject as an open site for enduring multiple 
resignifications liberates it from the closure, separatism and reification of identity 
politics. Challenging the giveness and the fixedness of categories such as woman, 
black, or Muslim, allow new, overlooked and erased meanings and modes of being to 
arise. Here Butler, and several other post-structural theorists, seems to imply a hybrid 
notion o f identity that views the individual as an experimental subject that is 
continuously engaged in struggle and subversion that necessarily lead to detachment 
from social and cultural practices and norms.
37 For more on her notion o f feminist genealogy see Butler: Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion o f  Identity, pp. 5-6.
38 Butler, ‘Contingent Foundations’, p. 49.
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Criticizing Butler
The experimental and hybrid notion o f identity that Butler enthusiastically 
defends is not plausible. For it has been demonstrated that intersubjectivity establishes 
that the individual self-realisation does not lie in the distance the individual maintains 
from its social and cultural bonds and norms. Rather, it lies in a network of social 
relations of mutual recognition. Individuals cannot achieve their chosen aims 
solipsistically away from the normative affirmation of others. One’s practical claims 
and goals gain recognition when a counterpart positively affirms them. Axel Honneth 
argues that:
Subjects are really only capable o f realizing the possibilities of 
freedom when they can, without constraints, positively identify, from 
the perspective of assenting others, with their own objectives; the 
realization of freedom presupposes the experience o f recognition 
because I can be in true and complete accord with my goals o f action 
only to the extent that I can be sure of the normative agreement of a 
communicative community which, if not a concrete one, is at least an 
idealized one.39
Butler’s notion of identity, therefore, seems to underestimate the role of 
cultural and social networks, practices and institutions. More precisely, Butler tends to 
‘linguistify’ subjectivity formation in the sense that it views linguistic practices or the 
structure o f signification as the primary site for subjectivity formation. Therefore, she 
downplays the significance o f other important structures and practices such as culture 
and family traditions in the process of identity formation.40 The speech-act theory o f 
performative gender and identity constitution confines the process o f gender and 
identity formation to discourse, signification and processes of meaning-constitution 
and therefore fails to explain the acquisition of human capabilities (such as self
39 Honneth, ‘Pluralization and Recognition: On the Self-Misunderstanding o f Post Modem Social 
Theories’, p. 226.
40 It is quite evident to the reader that in her book Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion o f  
Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999), Judith Butler overemphasizes the role o f discourse and 
processes o f signification and meaning-constitution.
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determination) and the constitutive role o f cultural, social and psychological forces in 
identity formation. Put differently, several thinkers such as Seyla Benhabib have 
argued that Butler’s performative account of gender and identity formation fails to 
capture well the complexities and multiple dimensions that are involved in gender and 
identity formation. Briefly, Butler’s account of identity formation overemphasizes the 
role of linguistic and discursive forces and underestimates the role of cultural and 
social forces.41 These cultural and social forces, as it has been argued in previous 
chapters, are particularly important in the context o f historical exclusion because of 
their role in understanding experiences of oppression and their causes.
Moreover, Butler’s claim that subjects are always caught in a continuous 
process of resignification and regimes of power relation implies that there is no 
moment of stability. Additionally, while the argument that subjectivation involves 
power relations seems to be plausible, it is implausible to entirely reject the possibility 
o f autonomy and normative claims. For denying the possibility of autonomy and 
normative claims necessarily lead to a problematic strand o f politics that lacks any 
kind o f regulative principles. Put another way, it might lead to a politics where 
everything goes.
To sum up, by revealing the binary logic of identification that underlies 
identity politics and focusing on the regimes o f power engaged in identity formation, 
Butler’s post-structuralist views pose serious challenges to identity politics. However, 
it has been argued that her approach is incomplete because it does not fully capture 
forces other than linguistic that are involved in the constitution o f identity in particular 
and politics in general. Moreover, presenting the individual as an experimental and 
hybrid agent that is always engaged in subversion leads, maybe unwillingly, to an 
unsituated, transcendent and detached notion of identity that is open to similar 
criticisms posed against liberal atomism.
Conclusion
Taylor and other theorists o f recognition have argued that to achieve fair 
political arrangements that are capable of accommodating demands of excluded social 
groups, we need more than the difference-blind and neutral form o f politics proposed
41 Seyla Benhabib, ‘Subjectivity, Historiography, and Politics’ in Feminist Contentions (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), pp. 108-111.
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by John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. Taylor has claimed that considerations of 
justice, equality, liberty and citizenship necessarily lead to taking context, situatedness, 
and cultural pluralism into account. This chapter has demonstrated, however, that 
while acknowledging an important role for culture in politics in general and identity 
formation in particular is plausible, it is not evident that every notion of culture plays 
a constructive role. More specifically, the notion of culture that seems to underlie 
Taylor’s politics o f recognition is an essentialist notion. The problem of this notion is 
that it views culture as a closed, fixed, given and organic entity. Viewing culture this 
way leads to closure, essentialism, homogeneity and balkanization. Moreover, while 
Taylor’s theory o f recognition achieves some important progress towards addressing 
democratic exclusion by placing excluded social groups, their identities, cultures, and 
rights at its core, it remains silent on the significance o f the historical dimension in 
cases of excluded social groups who have suffered some form of historical exclusion 
and injustice. The historical dimension of exclusion, it has been claimed in the 
introduction o f the thesis, gives rise to specific types of demands, such as collective 
memory, acknowledging historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering 
an apology for causing these injustices, which seem to go beyond the frame o f 
Taylor’s account o f democratic accommodation.
Judith Butler has presented a post-structuralist theory that aspires to offer an 
emancipatory form of politics which releases individuals from the chains of 
metaphysics and essentialism. This chapter has argued that while this emancipatory 
form o f politics generates significant criticisms against identity politics by unmasking 
the binary logic o f identity and the structures of power that are involved in the 
formation o f identities in particular and politics in general, its hybrid and subversive 
notion o f identity considerably undervalues the significance of culture, background 
and situatedness in politics. Moreover, by focusing excessively on the role of 
discursive and signification processes, this form o f politics tends to ‘linguistify’ the 
formation o f subjectivity and ends up adopting an excessively linguistic notion of 
selfhood. Finally, Butler’s notion of selfhood turns out to be similar to the atomistic 
liberal notion, at least, in being narrow and detached.
One might argue that the most interesting and recent face of the contemporary 
debate on democratic accommodation is one that avoids the essentialism of identity 
politics advocated by scholars of recognition such as Taylor. This new face 
emphasizes the interdependence, fluidity and hybridity o f identities and cultures of
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social groups.42 It presents theories of democratic accommodation which propose 
different conceptualisations of ontological issues such as culture, representation and 
dialogue. In the following two chapters I will examine primarily theories that belong 
to this new face o f the debate on democratic accommodation. More precisely, 
chapters 5 and 6 form a section that focuses primarily on ‘integrative’ approaches 
which try to combine non-essentialist notions of recognition with deliberation or 
dialogue to offer effective accounts o f democratic accommodation. I will approach 
these accounts through the focus on the ontological questions of representation and 
intercultural dialogue.
42 There has been an extensive and rich debate in cultural anthropology about the different meanings of 
the term culture. Generally the debate focuses on two main meanings o f the notion o f culture; 
essentialist and non-essentialist. Several political theorists have appealed to anthropology to invoke a 
notion o f culture. For more on the debate on culture in cultural anthropology see: Clifford Geertz, 
‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory o f Culture’, in Interpretation o f Cultures; Selected 
Essays (London, Hutchinson: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3-30, Negara: The Theatre- State in Nineteenth 
Century Bali (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), ‘The Uses o f Diversity’, Michigan 
Quarterly Review, 25:1 (1987), pp. 105-123; Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a 
Reflexive Sociology, (trans.) Matthew Adamson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections From Cultural Writings (eds.) David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith; (trans.) 
William Boelhower (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985); Kate A. F. Crehan, Gramsci, Culture and 
Anthropology (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: 
Vintage, 1994), Orientalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1995), Power, Politics, and Culture: 
Interviews with Edward W. Said  Gauri Viswanathan (ed.), (New York : Pantheon Books, 2001), 
chapters 8-10, ‘Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors’, Reflections on Exile and 
Other Literary and Cultural Essays (London: Granta, 2001), pp. 293-316; Eric R. Wolf, Envisioning 
Power: Ideologies o f Dominance and Crisis (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999), Europe 
and the People without History (Berkeley; California; London: University o f California Press, 1997); 
James Clifford, and George E. Marcus, Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics o f Ethnography 
(Berkeley: University o f California, 1986); James Clifford, The Predicament o f  Culture: Twentieth- 
century Ethnography, Literature and Art (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); David 
Scott, ‘Criticism and Culture: Theory and Post-colonial Claims on Anthropological Disciplinarity’, 
Critique o f Anthropology, 12:4 (1992), pp. 371-394, ‘Culture in Political Theory’, Political Theory, 
31:1 (2003), pp. 92-115; Paul Kelly, ‘Introduction: Between Culture and Equality’, in Paul, Kelly (ed.) 
Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and Its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); 
Adam Kuper, Culture: The Anthropologists’ Account (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1999).
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SECTION III: INTEGRATIVE THEORIES
5. ON REPRESENTATION
This chapter examines another constitutive ontological issue that is central to 
theories of democratic inclusion, namely, the issue of representation. While 
proponents o f identity politics have viewed ‘descriptive representation’ as an effective 
tool to show sensitivity to social divisions and accommodate the demands o f excluded 
social groups, other scholars have pointed out the issues o f essentialism and 
reproduction of existing inequalities as the main dangers o f this descriptive notion of 
representation and thus have demanded to release representation from the chains of 
essentialism. The dispute between those who view group representation as a positive 
tool to achieve inclusion and those who view it as a negative instrument that 
essentialises identities and reproduces existing hierarchies, has given rise to an 
integrative approach that aims to combine components from both sides and offers a 
more elaborated notion o f representation. The aim of this chapter is to analyse 
critically these three main approaches to representation. The chapter, however, does 
not aim to provide an exhaustive and conclusive discussion o f all the aspects 
(metaphysical, linguistic and aesthetic) o f the notion of representation. Rather, it aims 
to examine the notion o f representation as it is often used in the debates on 
recognition and democratic accommodation.1
1 Although these aspects o f the notion o f representation are closely connected, this chapter does not 
deal with linguistic representation but primarily with political representation. In the linguistic context 
representation, it is said, is the production o f meaning through language. The debate on linguistic 
representation has influenced and inspired several political theorists. Three major different approaches 
of meaning can be identified: reflective, intentional, and constructivist. The constructivist approach, 
however, is the dominant one. These three approaches try to answer the question: where does meaning 
come from? The reflective and intentional approaches are ultimately not persuasive and are open to 
many criticisms. The reflective or mimetic approach holds the view that meaning lies in the objects, 
persons, ideas or events themselves. Meaning, according to this approach, lies in the real and actual 
world and the task o f language is merely to mirror and imitate the real meaning that already exists in 
the world. This approach is based on the classical Greek notion o f mimesis. According to this notion, 
the function o f language and painting is to mirror nature. One of the fundamental underlying 
assumptions o f this approach is the existence o f  a true and real meaning that is universal, fixed and 
unchangeable. A major problem o f this approach, among others, is that it fails to explain how we fully 
understand words, sounds, ideas, and images that are totally fictional, imaginary and fantasy. 
Conversely, the intentional approach argues that it is the speakers who impose meanings on the world: 
objects, ideas and images. According to this approach, words convey the private intended meanings
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This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the move from 
liberal interest-based pluralism to identity-based representation. It illustrates that 
identity-based representation, advocated by proponents o f identity politics, is 
primarily inspired by a ‘descriptive Aristotelian notion o f representation,’ or what the 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida calls ‘metaphysics of presence.’ Drawing chiefly 
on the work o f post-modern critics o f recognition, it will be argued that this 
Aristotelian notion of representation is problematic because it is hierarchical, unitary 
and based on an oppositional logic of identification. In short, descriptive 
representation runs risks such as essentialism, closure, separation and hierarchy. 
Avoiding the essentialism and hierarchy o f the descriptive Aristotelian notion o f 
representation, has led post-modern theorists to develop and advocate non-essentialist 
hybrid notions o f representation. The second part explores Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari’s rhizomic notion of representation. While Deleuze and Guattari’s views 
offer insightful critique o f the notion o f descriptive representation found in identity 
politics, I will argue that their alternative, i.e., rhizomic and horizontal modes of 
representation, is problematic because it defends implausible notions of identity and 
politics. The last part analyses the views o f Iris Marion Young and Melissa Williams. 
These two scholars have proposed integrative and modified notions o f representation. 
These integrative notions try to incorporate views from different models of 
representation, such as the liberal interest-based pluralism, the descriptive Aristotelian 
notion o f representation and the non-essentialist account of representation, and aim to
that the speaker accords to them. The main flaw of this approach, however, is that it presents language 
and meaning to be entirely private. In other words, it implausibly assumes that there are private 
languages where a sole individual can make sense o f her own world without anybody else. This is 
problematic because the core o f language is communication and interaction that are based on common 
linguistic codes and conventions. Language cannot be entirely private. For our private intended 
meanings to be shared and intelligible they have to rely on codes and conventions that are commonly 
and publicly recognized. The social constructivist approach recognizes the public, relational and social 
dimension o f language. It rejects the view that the material world - things in themselves - or individual 
speakers o f  language are able to define and fix meaning in language. Meanings are not ‘given’ and 
fixed properties but are socially constructed. We rely on the two representational systems, the 
conceptual and the linguistic, to produce meaning. Briefly, language is not given by God or discovered 
in nature, but it is the production o f human social agents. Human beings construct meaning through 
using their own representational systems to make the world meaningful and to communicate about the 
world meaningfully to others. The social constructivist approach has two variants; the semiotic 
influenced by the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the discursive influenced by Michel Foucault. 
The major difference between the semiotic and discursive approaches, is that while the first, i.e., 
semiotic, exclusively focuses on ‘the how o f representation’ i.e., on how language constructs meaning 
(the poetics o f representation), the second approach focuses more on ‘the effects and consequences o f  
representation,’ i.e., on its implications on conduct, norms, and identities (its politics). For more on 
these three approaches see: Stuart Hall (ed.), Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying 
Practices (London: SAGE, 1997).
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avoid their major weaknesses. It will be argued that although their integrative notions 
o f representation are appealing, they remain insufficient to adequately tackle demands 
o f historically excluded social groups.
Part I
Under-representation and the politics o f  recognition
It has been argued in chapters 2 and 3 that egalitarian theories of deliberative 
democracy are primarily procedural, legalistic, individualistic, insensitive to 
situatedness and blind to racial and social divisions and hierarchies. These 
deliberative theories often promote an interest-based politics. According to them, race, 
gender, religion and similar features are irrelevant to the political process and 
representation. In other words, the political process secures that every individual 
citizen, regardless o f his or her colour, gender, race, sex, social class, age etc., has an 
equal opportunity to influence the electoral process (one person, one vote). The result 
o f this process, therefore, is fair regardless o f its content. Groups or associations 
according to these deliberative approaches are voluntary and they are tolerated and 
accepted when they advocate interests and not identity, race, religion etc. Briefly, 
politics primarily deals with the aggregation of interests and preferences within fair 
procedures and thus political representation should be exclusively confined to 
representing these interests and preferences.2 Judith Squires calls this form o f 
representation a functional representation.3 It was primarily the blindness and 
insensitivity to social divisions, exclusions and inequalities and the under­
representation o f minorities and excluded social groups which have led to the move 
towards the politics of recognition.
Based on these criticisms, proponents of identity politics have rejected this 
liberal model o f pluralism and suggested a descriptive notion of representation instead.
2 For more on liberal representation and its interest-group pluralism see: Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to 
Democratic Theory (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956); Democracy and Its Critics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
3 Judith Squires draws a useful distinction between four types of representation. These types are 
ideological, functional, geographical and social. Ideological representation refers to the representation 
o f beliefs, functional to the representation o f interests, geographical to the representation o f  
constituencies, and social to the representation o f identities. Judith Squires, Gender in Political Theory 
(Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 201-204.
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The development o f the civil rights movement in the US, the feminist movements and 
other social movements in the 1960s and 1970s has considerably contributed to 
emergence o f ‘descriptive representation’. These social movements have placed the 
voices, claims and rights of excluded and oppressed social groups at the core o f their 
advocacy and struggle. Among these social movements, some have increasingly 
focused on the specificity and ‘authenticity’ o f experiences o f exclusion and their 
intimate link to specific identities. These unique experiences o f exclusion and their 
intimate link to identities, it is said, lead to the constitution o f distinct excluded social 
groups. Inspired by identity-based politics, several political theorists and activists 
have claimed that a more adequate and fair political representation requires the 
representation o f the different social groups that make up the political body. Put 
differently, achieving appropriate political inclusion necessarily requires, they insist, 
including members of the excluded social groups. This can be achieved through 
practical mechanisms such as the quota system.4
Relying primarily on the views o f post-modern critics of recognition such 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, I will argue that the group-based representation 
which is often adopted by proponents o f identity politics suffers from several 
problems that render it unsuccessful and problematic. A group-based representation, it 
will be argued, essentializes identities, imposes homogeneity, overlooks internal 
complex differences, prioritizes the collective over individual autonomy and solidifies 
and reinforces the separations and hierarchies between different groups. However, 
although Deleuze and Guattari provide valuable criticisms against descriptive 
representation, I will argue that their notions of representation and politics are not 
convincing.
Deleuze and Guattari have argued that the notion o f representation that is 
defended by proponents of identity politics has been primarily constructed within an 
Aristotelian framework. Representation conceived in Aristotelian terms is limited to
4 For more on the development o f ‘descriptive representation’ and its link to social movements and 
identity politics see: Anne Phillips, ‘From a Politics o f Idea to a Politics o f  Presence?’, The Politics o f  
Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1-26, and ‘Dealing with Difference: A Politics 
of Ideas, or a Politics o f Presence’, in Seyla, Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting 
the Boundaries o f  the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). Phillips 
distinguishes between a ‘politics o f ideas’ and a ‘politics o f presence’. Whilst the first focuses on the 
diversity o f ideas and preferences, the second emphasizes the importance o f  caucuses and quotas o f  
presentation. She argues that a combination between these two forms o f politics is not only possible but 
necessary for modem societies.
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particular modes o f acting and thinking. Unlike Plato’s ‘Theory of Forms’ that 
presumes the existence of a One pure form that others are defined according to 
lacking what this One has, Aristotle proposes a different notion o f difference that 
allows more plurality and differentiation but within clear and rigid limits o f totality. 
This Aristotelian notion prioritises the existing, defined and actual over the infinite 
and potential. It is ultimately framed and limited into a totality that prioritises the 
whole over its parts. What lies at the core of Aristotle’s notion is the primacy of telos\ 
an inherent defined end that a thing progresses towards. This process o f becoming, to 
achieve the telos or end, is taking place according to clearly defined principles and 
within ‘boundaries that are carefully constructed and fiercely maintained.’5 Briefly, it 
takes place in a fixed, closed and defined system of principles that does not have 
enough room for contingencies, disruptions and ambiguities. The consequence of this 
logic is ‘a series o f hierarchies privileging determinacy over indeterminacy; intention 
over accident; formal, efficient, and final causes over material cause; space over time; 
and being over nonbeing.’6
The establishment o f the Aristotelian notion of representation as the standard 
and norm for images and thought, Deleuze and Guattari insist, is not simply a 
contingent historical event, but reflects a more profound philosophical preference. 
Deleuze argues that in answering the question: what is difference, philosophy 
preferred a particular definition of difference and therefore specific modes of 
representation. This preferred notion of difference was chiefly Aristotelian. Deleuze 
argues that the Aristotelian model of organic representation has dominated most of the 
political, ethnic, social, artistic, economic, philosophical, scientific and linguistic 
practices in the Western tradition. He examines the emergence and formation of the 
Aristotelian notion o f representation as ‘the single and authoritative source of visible 
intelligibility and political stabilization.’ The Aristotelian model of representation is
5 Some scholars have argued that the Christian thinkers who later adopted Aristotle’s ideas interpreted 
them in a very rigid way overlooking alternative avenues that might be pursued and exceed his logic. 
According to these scholars, Aristotle does not deny disruptions, contingencies, and ambiguities within 
his fixed, closed and hierarchically ordered system but even tries to include them into his defined 
totality. These contingencies and paradoxes that Aristotle, often unsuccessfully, attempts to contain in 
his system point out for potential alternative routes o f thought and being that cannot be captured by 
Aristotle’s restricted framework. See Nathan Widder, Genealogies o f Difference (Urbana, III.: 
University o f Illinois Press, 2002), p. 62.
6 Widder, Genealogies o f  Difference, p. 62.
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attractive, according to him, because it is intelligible and simplistic.7 The Aristotelian 
notion o f difference presupposes a kind of sameness. To account for difference we 
have to share something - identity. In other words, it assumes the existence o f a single 
centre or referent that everything is measured and differentiated (mediated) according 
to its proximity - a principle of proximity to being and a degree of being - to this 
centre (this necessarily leads to hierarchy of distribution and imposes unity). 
Consequently, this model seeks to secure coherence, logic, order and hierarchy. 
Descriptive and organic representation, Deleuze argues, is based on a binary and 
oppositional logic o f identification.8 This binary and oppositional logic has been used 
to legitimize and construct strict and rigid social and political norms and practices.9
Proponents o f a group-based representation, who demand the presence of 
members o f excluded social groups as the representatives o f these groups, are clearly 
inspired by the descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation. These proponents go 
on to argue that achieving an effective and fair representation of under-represented 
and excluded social groups necessarily requires guaranteeing the presence of certain 
members o f these groups in legislative, administrative and decision making bodies.
7 Dorothea Olkowski claims that Aristotle’s notion o f time is fully compatible with his organic 
representations. His conception o f time takes ‘now’ to be its unit o f measure for ‘before’ and ‘after’ as 
i f ‘now’, despite its multiple points, is fixed, static or nontime. Recognizing motion destabilizes ‘now’ 
and gives birth to a new mode o f time that exceeds the Aristotelian one. Dorothea Olkowski, Gilles 
Deleuze and The Ruin o f  Representation, (Berkeley, University o f California Press, 1999), pp. 21-22.
8 Representation in Aristotle’s account, Dorothea Olkowski argues, is composed of two elements. ‘The 
first consists o f the differences (conceived in terms o f analogy) between species that are subsumed 
under the identity o f  a genus, or it consists o f the genus that stands in relations of analogy with other 
genera. However, this abstract, in order to be a representation, insofar as it subsumes species, must also 
rely on what constitutes them, a second element, namely resemblance that presumes the continuity o f  
the sensible intuition in a concrete representation.’ Therefore, according to Deleuze the Aristotelian 
notion o f representation is ‘organic’, when it is based on the four elements o f judgment; namely, 
identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance. Terms according to Aristotle differ through mediation 
of something else. The mediated Aristotelian difference, Olkowski states, ‘submits itself fully to the 
identity o f the concept, to the opposition o f  predicates, to the analogy o f judgment, and to the 
resemblance o f perception.’ Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is this form o f organic and oppositional 
representation that they question and reject. ‘If difference were to show itself at all as a concept and 
reality, it could do so in this model only as a crack, a catastrophe, a break in resemblance or as the 
impossibility o f  claiming identity, opposition, analogy, or resemblance where reflection demands that 
they should occur.’ For more see: Dorothea Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin o f  Representation,
p. 20.
9 Some scholars have indicated that Renaissance artists fought against the theorists’ preferences o f  
static, symmetrical, logical and hierarchically ordered form o f representation (drawing). These 
Renaissance artists favoured a more dynamic and fluid one. They preferred the ‘living quality o f  
images in movement to the mirrored perfection o f nature.’ At the end, however, the model o f mirroring 
and idealizing prevailed. For more on this see David Summers’ book on Michelangelo and the 
Language o f  Art and Dorothea Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin o f Representation, (Berkeley, 
University o f California Press, 1999), p. 16.
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Securing the representation of the excluded social groups in these bodies, it is 
believed, will necessarily enhance their conditions because their representatives will 
influence the decision making process and the allocation of resources. There are 
different mechanisms that an identity-based notion o f representation suggests to 
overcome under-representation of excluded social groups. The most common 
mechanisms are caucuses and quotas, i.e., specific number of seats or positions that 
are allocated to members o f the excluded social groups. In the following discussion it 
will be argued that an identity-based representation, enthusiastically adopted by 
advocates of identity politics, is not compelling and runs some serious risks such as 
essentialism, separation and balkanisation.
The problems o f  descriptive and organic representation
Descriptive representation has attracted several criticisms from liberals, 
democrats and post-modernists.10 Most o f these criticisms revolve around issues such 
as essentialism, accountability, individual autonomy, balkanisation and equality. In 
the following discussion, however, I will focus only on three major problems that 
plague descriptive representation. These problems undermine the ability o f identity 
politics to sufficiently accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups. 
First, it seems that descriptive representation implies that experiences of oppression 
give rise to specific perspectives and feelings that are fully transparent and accessible 
only to the oppressed and cannot be shared and understood by those who do not live 
these experiences of oppression. This claim might even be stronger in cases o f 
historical injustices where oppression is often persistent and institutionalised. 
However, the difficulty with this claim is that it supports the unreasonable view that 
entirely doubts and rejects the ability o f non-members to grasp the oppression 
suffered by members of excluded and oppressed social groups. There are many 
national and international human rights and peace activists who are not members of 
excluded social group and still faithfully advocate the rights of these groups. In the
10 For more see for example: Melissa S. Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and 
the Failings o f Liberal Representation, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 178- 
181; Anne Phillips, ‘From a Politics o f Idea to a Politics o f Presence?’, The Politics o f Presence 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 21-26; Iris Marion Young, ‘The Ideal o f Impartiality’, in 
Justice and the Politics o f Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 96-121.
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concluding chapter it will be argued that it is precisely this type of national and 
international solidarity that the politics of reconciliation relies on to refuse the 
monopoly on grasping suffering and oppression that inhibit dialogue and mutual 
understanding.
Second, allocating a fixed number of seats to members of excluded social 
groups implies that these groups are distinct and share common identities, interests 
and opinions. This logic o f reasoning clearly imposes a particular homogenous 
identity on the excluded social groups. Imposing these identities does not only 
essentialise identities, but also ignores the diversity of views and opinions within the 
same group, the multiplicity of affiliation and the role o f the individual agency in 
determining the meaning of their social norms, values and features. In short, 
descriptive representation unconvincingly relies on assumptions that presuppose that 
the wills, opinions, interests, identities and cultural boundaries of the excluded social 
groups are self-evident, fixed and constant. The depiction o f certain social groups as 
inferior and thus subjecting them to oppression that continues over a long period o f 
time generates collective memory, particular experiences and history of oppression. 
The existence o f a legacy of oppression is important for the struggle of historically 
excluded social groups, among other things, because of its ability to challenge the 
hegemonic national narrative that justifies or denies that oppression. While a 
membership, often involuntary, in excluded social group plays a major role in 
structuring, determining and restricting the life prospects and choices o f the members 
and leads to experiencing particular experiences, it is implausible to view these social 
groups, their collective memory and history as entirely coherent and unified. Indeed, 
many excluded social groups can be distinguished from the oppressing groups but that 
should not lead to overlook the internal differences, conflicts and multiplicities of 
views, interests and preferences within the groups. The politics of reconciliation, it 
will be argued in the concluding chapter of the thesis, recognizes this complexity and 
multiplicity because it holds the view that narration and testimony are likely to 
generate multiple, and sometimes conflicting, views and stories within the excluded 
social group about the their memory and history of exclusion.
Third, identity-based representation will very likely accelerate conflicts and 
segmentation and reinforce the hierarchical divisions and separations between groups. 
Group-based representation is based on a binary and oppositional logic o f 
identification. As it has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, this logic develops
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and promotes dichotomous categorization such as ‘us’ versus ‘them’, ‘black’ versus 
‘white’, and ‘men’ versus ‘women’. It is precisely these dichotomous and oppositional 
classifications that draw rigid boundaries between groups that are likely to licence 
hatred, separation and fragmentation, thus leading to political and social instability. 
To meet these challenges of balkanization and rigid separations, defenders o f group 
representation are required to develop relatively clear standards that enable us to 
distinguish between those who have strong claims for representation and those who 
have weak ones. In cases of historical exclusion it will be argued in the final chapter 
that the politics of reconciliation offers relatively clear standards to distinguish 
between strong and weak claims because o f its emphasis on the persistence of 
exclusion over a long period of time and collective memory.
Based on the above-discussed problems and some others, several theorists 
have proposed alternative notions of representation that aspire to bypass the problems 
that stem from descriptive representation. In the following two parts I will explore 
respectively Deleuze and Guattar’s non-essentialist notion of representation and Iris 
Marion Young’s and Melissa Williams’ integrative notions o f representation against 
the demands of historical exclusion.
Part II
Non-essentialist notions o f  representation: Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadism
Deleuze and Guattari have offered valuable criticisms against descriptive 
representation. They have argued that the descriptive representation essentialises 
identities, imposes unity and coherence and overlooks the complexities and 
interdependence of identities. They, however, do not only propose a critique of 
descriptive representation but they also offer an alternative notion to it. More 
specifically, they propose a non-essentialist notion of representation that challenges 
the fixation o f group identities and recognizes the multiplicity o f belonging, fluidity o f 
identities and conflict and resistance. To release representation and politics from the 
constraints of essentialism, coherence and unity we need, they insist, to destabilize the 
fixation of identities and celebrate their contingency and hybridity. This part of the
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chapter explores Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘nomadic’ notion of representation.11 It will 
be argued that while Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas are useful to critically examine 
descriptive representation, their alternative notion of representation is problematic and 
does not propose an appealing account of democratic accommodation.
In their common work Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is the descriptive 
organic notion of representation with its fierce ‘desire’ to coherence, logic, order and 
hierarchy that they are so keen to reject. They reject it primarily because of its failure 
to capture conflict, resistance, irruption, mobility and multiplicity that are involved in 
the process of ‘becoming’.12 According to them there is always a ‘monstrous’ aspect 
in representation that the Aristotelian descriptive notion o f representation denies. This 
cruel and monstrous aspect, they persist, cannot be escaped. The cruel and monstrous 
aspect exceeds the frame o f the descriptive notion o f representation and distorts the
11 Though this chapter focuses on Deleuze and Guattari’s, Iris Marion Young’s and Melissa Williams’ 
views, the author is aware of the existence o f other attempts that have proposed alternatives to the 
liberal interest-based pluralism and the identity-based representation o f identity politics. These attempts 
have advocated a more robust democratic theory based on active participation and engagement. 
According to this robust democratic theory, the remedy to the deficiencies o f interest-based pluralism 
and identity-based representation lies in adopting radical notions o f democratic engagement, 
deliberation and empowerment. Within this robust democratic approach we can identify, nevertheless, 
two different groups o f scholars that hold different views. While one group adopts republican forms o f  
politics, the other one embraces agonistic notions o f politics. Critical theorists, such as William 
Connolly, Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Derrida and Homi Bhabha, have adopted agonistic views that are 
relatively similar to the views o f Deleuze and Guattari. For them identities are embedded in structures 
o f power. Politics is about destabilizing, negotiating and contesting these identities and exposing the 
power structures. Generally, instead o f a teleological, synchronous, predictive, progressive, serial and 
linear notion o f difference they, though they hold slightly different views, propose a disjunctive, 
liminal, disruptive, repetitive, schizophrenic and subaltern notion. Although their views are less radical 
than Deleuze and Guattari’s, they face similar challenges that Deleuze and Guattari’s views face. The 
republican alternatives are not particularly promising either. For in addition to valid concerns o f scale, 
practicality and feasibility o f direct democracy in contemporary massive and complex societies, the 
claim o f privileging a single notion o f the good life, that o f politically engaged citizenry, is not 
convincing. According to many scholars and particularly value pluralists, there are several competing 
equally valuable ways o f living good lives. Moreover, the emphasis on a collective identity raises 
serious doubts about the ability o f this version to effectively deal with diversity in general and the 
demands o f historically excluded social groups in particular. For more on agonistic views see: Chantal 
Mouffe, Dimensions o f Radical Democracy (London, Verso: 1992), The Democratic Paradox (London: 
Verso, 2000), ‘Democracy, Power, and the “Political”’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1996), pp.245-256; William Connolly, Identity/ difference: Democratic Negotiations o f Political 
Paradox (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jacques Derrida, ‘Sending: On Representation’, 
trans. Peter Dews and Mary Dews, Social Research, 49 (1982), pp. 294-326; Homi K. Bhabha, 
‘DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins o f the Modem Nation’, in Nation and Narration, 
Homi K. Bhabha, (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1990). For republican views see: Benjamin Barber, Strong 
Democracy (Berkeley, California: University o f California Press, 1984); Richard Dagger, Civic 
Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); 
Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory o f  Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997).
12 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Nomadology: The War Machine (New York: Semiotex(e), 1994).
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order, coherence and hierarchy it seeks to achieve and secure. They propose an 
alternative form o f representation that recognizes what they call the perpetual 
movement, struggle, hybridity and fluidity of identity. This alternative form, therefore, 
challenges the fixation, hierarchy, coherence and singularity of identity. They call this 
form of representation ‘rhizomic,’ (rhizome is ‘a subterranean plant stem that grows 
horizontally, sending out roots below and stems above’). In other words, unlike the 
hierarchical, closed and static Aristotelian notion of representation, rhizomic 
representation is nomadic, flexible, non-hierarchical and irreducible to one single core 
reference (it simultaneously participates in the constitution o f multiple forms). 
Olkowski argues that the measure ‘Deleuze proposes to account for monstrous 
difference is the “nomadic nomos, without property, enclosure or measure. . . .  an 
allocation o f those who distribute themselves . . .  in a space without precise limits.’” 13 
The ‘nomadic nomos’, however, should not be viewed as an anarchic and 
chaotic organization o f elements because ‘It begins with substances that are molecular 
or quasi-molecular elements - assemblages - and imposes upon them a form that 
consists only o f connections and successions.’ 14 Assemblage is neither a pure 
becoming nor a pure chaos and void. It simultaneously includes forces and 
movements of formation and demolition, stratification and destratification, 
territorialization and deterritorialization. All o f these movements lead to conflictual 
and contradictory flows.15 Briefly, assemblage is neither a discrete subject or object 
nor undefined anarchy o f amorphous substances. Rather, it is the composition and 
arrangement o f the different movements, flows and distribution o f these matters. To 
put it in Olkowski’s terms:
Thus, while the assemblage cannot be identified as either a subject or 
an object (only representation does this), neither is it the indeterminate 
chaos o f unformed matters. Rather, it is a configuration o f speeds (thus
13 Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin o f  Representation, p. 24.
14 Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin o f  Representation, pp. 26-27.
15 Deleuze and Guattari, Nomadology, p. 4; Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin o f Representation, 
pp. 26-27.
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movements), intensities (qualitative variations), and varying
distributions of its elements.16
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the Aristotelian organic notion of 
representation is connected to the hierarchical distribution of power that the state 
apparatus deploys. They use the term ‘state apparatus’ to refer to the most fixed and 
hierarchized arrangement of power. This state apparatus uses the simplicity, 
intelligibility and inflexibility of organic representation to justify its existence and 
operation. Like organic representation, the state apparatus views the ever-mobile 
nomad as a monster or a criminal. The mobility o f the nomad and its distribution in a 
space without definite boundaries create what Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘war 
machine’. This war machine is not an organized and institutionalized force, like an 
army, but a mode o f organization that is irreducible and exterior to any state apparatus. 
As they put it, the war machine ‘seems to be irreducible to the State apparatus, to be 
outside its sovereignty and prior to its law.’17 It is external in the sense that it exceeds 
the frame o f the state apparatus. It escapes its borders, intelligibility and 
comprehension, therefore it is monsterfied, criminalized and often punished and 
rejected.
In short, Deleuze and Guattari argue that an organic notion o f representation is 
inadequate means to account for difference and becoming. For, it creates a narrow 
form of being that strives to secure hierarchical and logical order. In other words, it 
fails to capture the multiplicity, fluidity and multidimensionality o f becoming. 
Alternatively, Deleuze and Guattari propose a rhizomic notion o f representation that 
undermines and destabilizes the fixity, coherence, hierarchy and immobility o f 
identity. This notion supports differentiated forms of being and affiliation that are not 
reduced to a single unit or common base. Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomic 
representational schema invites us to assemblage along different lines that recognize 
the multiplicity and mobility of identification. It invites us to account for a more 
plural mode of pluralism that does not rely on a one single base. In the following 
section, however, I will argue that while Deleuze and Guattari’s views are thought-
16 Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin o f Representation, p. 27.
17 Deleuze and Guattari, Nomadology, p. 2; Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin o f Representation, 
pp. 29-30.
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provoking and insightful, their notion of representation is problematic for various 
reasons.
Problems in Deleuze and Guattari’s approach
Although one might raise several criticisms against Deleuze and Guattari’s 
views18,1 will confine my discussion to two major points that demonstrate the failure 
of their views to provide an appealing account of democratic inclusion. First, Deleuze 
and Guattari assume a type of agency that is implausible and if it is to be found it 
characterizes a small number of people. Their notion of politics favors a cosmopolitan 
nomadic citizen o f the world who feels ‘at home everywhere and nowhere.’ They 
enthusiastically view identity as fluid, hybrid, conflictual and in a perpetual flux. 
Their extreme nomadism does not only deny the role o f influential forces o f grouping, 
such as race, culture, ethnicity, religion, history and nation, but also imposes 
excessive hybridity, fluidity and struggle which involve very strong degree o f 
transformation and subversion. This insistence on excessive hybridity, transformation 
and subversion necessarily leads to unreasonable transcendentalism and detachment 
from concrete social and cultural contexts and to the underestimation of the 
significance of culture, collective memory and history in identity formation and 
operation of politics. Their extreme individualism and nomadism, which lead to 
constant instabilities, undermine the very possibility o f representation, identity and 
politics. Indeed, historically excluded social groups demand the transformation of the 
status quo which is a state of inequality, denial and oppression. This transformation, 
however, does not require transcending their culture, identity, memory and history but 
recognizing and respecting them.
Second, Deleuze and Guattari propose a rhizomic notion o f representation that 
aspires to overcome the essentialism, coherence and hierarchy found in the descriptive 
notion of representation. Although this rhizomic notion seems more appealing than 
the descriptive notion, Deleuze and Guattari do not provide guidance on how to cash
,s Some o f these criticisms can be found in: Catherine Malabou, ‘Who’s Afraid o f Hegelian Wolves’ in 
Paul Patten (ed.) Deleuze: A Critical Reader (Oxford, Blackwell, 1996), pp. 114-138; Vincent 
Descombes, Modern French Philosophy Trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980); Nathan Widder, Genealogies o f Difference (Urbana, III.: University o f Illinois 
Press, 2002); Roxanne L. Euben (review) , ‘Journeys to “The Other Shore’” , Political Theory, 28:3 
(2000), pp. 399-420.
121
out these modes of horizontal and rhizomic modes into practical proposals and 
concrete mechanisms of representation. Therefore, their views remain abstract and 
underdeveloped. They are underdeveloped in the sense that their theoretical premises 
are not sufficiently developed and we remain puzzled and unclear about their 
applicability and feasibility in concrete political contexts. Their views are not 
particularly appealing to historically excluded social groups because these groups are 
often concerned with practical and feasible mechanisms and policies that can change 
their conditions and status while recognizing and respecting their memories, cultures 
and histories.
Thus far, I have argued in parts I and II of the chapter that the descriptive 
notion o f representation as well as the rhizomic hybrid non-essentialist notion of 
representation are problematic. While the descriptive notion of representation found in 
identity politics imposes harmony and unity and fixes identities, the hybrid non- 
essentialist notion of representation advocated by Deleuze and Guattari implausibly 
endorses too much conflict, contest, flexibility, shifting configuration o f power 
relations and fluidity and thus undermines the very possibility o f politics, 
representation and identity. In the subsequent part, I will explore the attempts o f some 
scholars to present integrative versions of representation. These integrative versions 
aspire to combine elements from different approaches and offer more appealing 
solutions to the problems that face interest-based pluralism, descriptive representation 
and rhizomic non-essentialist representation. While these integrative approaches are 
closer than any of the hitherto discussed approaches to accommodate demands o f 
historically excluded social groups, it will be argued that their accounts of democratic 
inclusion remain insufficient.
Part III
Integrative notions o f  representation
The problems that plague the interest-based pluralism of egalitarian theories of 
deliberative democracy, the descriptive representation o f identity politics and the 
horizontal non-essentialist representation of post-modern theories, have stimulated 
several thinkers to develop modified and integrative proposals that combine views 
from these different approaches. In this part I will explore the views o f two scholars
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who present modified notions o f representation. More specifically, I will briefly 
examine the attempts o f Iris Marion Young and Melissa Williams to offer defensible 
models o f representation. I will argue that while their elaborate accounts are clearly 
more sensitive to pluralism and experiences o f exclusion than the hitherto discussed 
ones, they both, for different reasons, remain insufficient to effectively accommodate 
the demands o f historically excluded social groups. I will turn to analyse Iris Marion 
Young’s views and then move to Melissa Williams’.
Representation, it is often argued, is incompatible with participation and 
deliberation. 19 While deliberation involves immediacy, unmediated presence, 
directness, self-government and horizontal relations between the state and its citizens, 
representation, it is argued, involves deferring judgments, transcending immediateness, 
promoting vertical relationship between the state and its subjects and delegating 
representatives. Young refuses the argument that representation is incompatible with 
participatory and deliberative democracy and argues that ‘in large-scale mass society, 
representation and participation mutually require each other for politics to be deeply 
democratic.’20 Similarly, Nadia Urbinati argues that representation and deliberation 
are not opposed but related and constitute ‘the continuum o f political action in modem 
democracy.’ 21 Representation, according to Urbinati, carries the potential o f 
transcending the immediateness of the experience, deferring judgments, orienting 
political subjects towards the future, creating a distance between the moment o f 
speech and decision and therefore enabling reflexivity and protecting citizens from the
19 Bernard Manin argues that viewing direct democracy and representative democracy as opposites is 
inaccurate. For in Athenian direct democracy the assembled citizens did not exercise all the executive 
powers and authorities. There were other institutions that executed substantial tasks. The chief 
institution o f  the representative system is election. Yet, before the invention o f the representative 
system, the governors were selected on basis o f lot. The institution o f lot was found not only in the 
Athenian democracy but also in the Roman Empire, Italians republics o f the middle ages and the 
Renaissance (Florence and Venice). Lot matched fundamental democratic principles. It was compatible 
with ‘the imperative o f rotation; it reflected the democrats’ deep distrust o f political professionalism; 
and above all, it produced an effect similar to that paramount principle o f democracy isegoria- the 
equal right to speak in the Assembly.’ Lot secured the equal probability o f each citizen to have an equal 
share in exercising the tasks that were performed by few citizens. Manin, The Principles o f  
Representative Government, p. 41.
20 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 123- 
124.
21 Nadia Urbinati, ‘Representation as Advocacy: A Study o f Democratic Deliberation’, Political Theory, 
28: 6 (2000), p. 759.
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rhetoric o f politicians.22 Based on these reasons, some scholars have viewed 
representation as morally distinctive.23
Subscribing to this view about the compatibility of representation with 
deliberation and participation, Young proposes a ‘communicative’ account of 
democracy that aims to offer an institutional framework that accommodates pluralism 
and difference. Young argues that domination and oppression are significant 
characteristics o f politics. Domination and oppression take the form of institutional 
constraints that hinder the self-determination and self-development of individuals 24 It 
is precisely this domination and oppression that leads her to complement her account 
o f democracy with a particular notion o f representation, namely ‘a group- 
differentiated representation’. This group-differentiated representation primarily 
guarantees that the oppressed and excluded social groups get the resources necessary 
to develop institutional mechanisms that enable them to articulate their own particular
22 Urbinati proposes a model o f proportional representation that satisfies ‘the democratic principles o f  
equal political opportunity’ and offers better control than a majoritarian electoral system (single­
member territorial constituency). The problem o f the majoritarian model is that it focuses on the right 
o f the majority to decide while it does not guarantee that all citizens’ voices will be heard and 
represented. Proportional representation, according to Urbinati, simultaneously secures that all citizens 
are treated equally and that the specific conditions o f the individual citizen are not ignored. The 
majoritarian model is blind to differences while the proportional model is aware o f them. Proportional 
representation takes pluralism and difference to be one o f its main basic assumptions, ‘whereas majori- 
tarianism first recognizes the majority and then tries to deal with the reality o f pluralism through 
“compensatory” treatment.’ Urbinati maintains that proportional representation should be 
complemented by ‘advocacy’. Advocacy is composed o f two elements; ‘the representative’s 
“passionate” link to the electors’ cause and the representative’s relative autonomy o f judgment.’ While 
the first provides representatives with partisan determined beliefs, commitments and positions, the 
second enables deliberation and contestation with other deliberators on these beliefs and thus leaves 
room for transformation and compromise to ultimately reach decisions. Advocacy, Urbinati insists, 
does not aim at getting ‘a copy o f  ourselves’ but seeking ‘to get the best defendant.’ What should be 
represented, therefore, ‘is not people’s identity as such, ’ rather ‘their ideas and claims as citizens who 
suffer, or are liable to suffer, injustice because o f their identity.’ For more on her account see: Nadia 
Urbinati, ‘Representation as Advocacy: A Study o f Democratic Deliberation’, Political Theory, 28:6 
(2000), pp. 758-786.
23 For more on the issue o f the ‘moral distinctiveness’ o f representation see: David Plotke, 
‘Representation is Democracy’, Constellations, 4:1 (1997), pp. 19-34. Moreover, Bernard Manin 
argues that representative government is not merely one type o f  democracy but a distinguished and 
superior form of government. It is desirable for different reasons. For J. Madison, representative 
institutions are attractive not because o f concerns of feasibility and practicality but because they form 
and produce fair, calculated and less passionate /unbiased public decisions. Emmanuel Si6y6s favours a 
representative system because it suites better the circumstances o f modem “commercial societies”. 
Citizens in these societies are primarily concerned with economic production and exchange. 
Consequently, they do not have enough time to continuously involve in public affairs and thus delegate 
people to fulfil this task. What is at work in Si6y6s’ argument is the principle o f division o f labour that 
is important for achieving social progress. See: Bernard Manin, The Principles o f Representative 
Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
24 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 31.
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voices and perspectives. It is this emphasis on empowerment, Young insists, that 
allows her notion o f group-differentiated representation to avoid the assimilative and 
paternalistic forces o f the ‘assimilationist ideal’ championed by a difference-blind 
liberalism. She insists that her notion of notion of group-differentiated representation 
is different from the liberal interest-based pluralism which promotes assimilation and 
views differences as insignificant to politics and from the communitarian notion of 
group-based representation that is trapped in essentialism.25 She asserts that her notion 
o f representation is grounded in deliberation, or what she calls ‘communicative 
democracy’.26 According to this notion, representation is viewed ‘as a differentiated 
relationship among political actors engaged in a process extending over space and 
time.’27 Unlike the liberal interest-based pluralism that narrowly focuses on rational 
pursuit of interests, her notion o f representation requires engaging in a deliberative 
political activity which aims to grasp and consider views and perspectives other than 
one’s own.
Young goes on to argue that her notion o f representation is non-essentialist. 
Inspired by the Derridian concept o f differance, she adopts a form o f representation 
that does not aim at reducing the plurality o f entities into one common essentialist 
identity. Things gain their beings and meanings according to ‘their place in a process 
o f differentiated relationships.’ Unlike other forms of representation where things are 
defined according to their sameness and opposition, in Young’s account4[tjhings are 
similar without being identical, and different without being contrary depending on the 
point of reference and the moment in a process.’ Derrida suggests rethinking the 
‘metaphysics o f presence’ of identity-based representation through the idea of the 
trace. Trace is ‘a movement of temporalization that carries past and future with it.’ In 
other words, it carries ‘traces of the history of relationships that produced it, and its 
current tendencies anticipate future relationships.’28 Thinking of representation in 
terms of differance, Young insists, enables us to avoid essentialism by viewing the
25 For more on this point see: Young, ‘Social Movements and the Politics o f Difference’, in Justice and 
the Politic o f  Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 156-191.
26 Young, ‘Communicating and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in Seyla Benhabib (ed.) 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), pp. 120-135.
27 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 123.
28 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 127.
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representative not as a substitute to the constituents, but as distinct and separated. 
Therefore, representatives are not a copy of their constituents but they defend and 
represent their claims and interests. In other words, the task of representatives is to 
speak for their electorates’ case(s), beliefs, interests and claims.
Though Young recognizes that social groups have similarities and shared 
histories and perspectives, she claims that the intensive modem processes of 
urbanisation and the dominance of market economy, have produced ‘economic 
interdependencies, the physical intermingling of members of differently-identifying 
groups in public places and workplaces, and partial identities cutting across more 
encompassing group identities.’ 29 For Young, therefore, cultural boundaries are 
overlapping and fuzzy. These interdependent, intermingling and overlapping identities, 
Young argues, necessarily render human beings’ lives, interests, beliefs and identities 
complex and multidimensional and diversify and complicate their relations with other 
groups. However, she proposes to focus on three different general modes through 
which a person can be represented, namely interest, opinion and perspective. This 
distinction does not imply that an individual can be represented only in one way 
within these modes but rather she could be represented in various ways within each 
one of them. Young argues that in the context o f excluded and marginalized groups, it 
is the last one, i.e., perspective, that is of a particular significance. For explaining 
what does it mean to represent a perspective ‘provides arguments for the special 
representation o f oppressed or disadvantaged social groups while avoiding the 
problem o f attributing to all members of those groups common opinions or 
interests.’30 Interests, according to Young, are defined ‘as what affects or is important 
to the life prospects o f individuals, or the goals of organizations.’ Opinions, however, 
are those principles, values and priorities that influence and determine people’s ends. 
Unlike opinion that defines and determines people’s judgment and their ends in life, 
interest helps to specify the means for realizing these goals.31 Young argues that 
individuals are differently positioned in social group structures - perspectives. Yet
29 Young, ‘Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic Group Political Conflict’ , in Judith Squires 
(ed.), Principled Positions: Postmodernism and the Rediscovery o f Value (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1993), p. 128.
30 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 134.
31 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 135.
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their identities are not determined and defined by these structures. These structures do 
not have a distinct and clear content with particular features and attributes that render 
all their members to have a common identity. Alternatively, these social structures or 
perspectives provide a frame that ‘consists in a set o f questions, kinds of experience, 
and assumptions with which reasoning begins, rather than the conclusions drawn.’
Unlike those who claim that group-differentiated politics exclusively produces 
fragmentation and tension, Young argues that it ‘offers resources to a communicative 
democratic public that aims to do justice, because differently positioned people have 
different experience, history, and social knowledge derived from that positioning.’ 
Young insists that it is this communicative character, among other things, that 
distinguishes her proposal from liberal interest-based pluralism and communitarian 
essentialist notion o f group representation. The communicative character guarantees 
that the form of politics she advocates is not about promoting pre-determined group 
interests, but about generating public deliberation that potentially will lead to the 
transformation o f people’s opinions and preferences. Here Young relies on the 
possibility of mutual understanding, i.e., the ability of individuals and groups to 
recognize and understand, at least partly, the claims o f the ‘other’.
Several scholars have argued that it is precisely this communicative dimension 
that poses a serious challenge to Young’s attempt to theoretically defend special 
representation for excluded social groups. Although Young recognises the 
significance o f other modes of speech such as rhetoric, testimony and narration in 
addition to rational argument and denies that her account relies on a notion of 
impartiality, the communicative character of the theory that she enthusiastically views 
as leading to transformation in people’s views and preferences towards the claims of 
the ‘other’ as a result o f public deliberation, clearly forces her to appeal to impartiality. 
Indeed, it is quite challenging to imagine a situation where citizens consider and 
recognize the claims of others without appealing to impartial measures and standards. 
The problem with this issue of impartiality is that Young in her writings has been 
consistent in rejecting the liberal appeal to impartiality because it privileges, she 
insists, the interests, claims, views and voices of the powerful and prevents those of
32 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 137.
33 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 136.
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the marginalized and excluded.34 Consequently, scholars such as Judith Squires and 
David Miller have pointed out that Young ends up grounding her theory on 
deliberative premises she herself rejected for being too universalistic and abstract.35
To avoid the problems that emerge from adopting an essentialist notion of 
representation, Young’s proposes a non-essentialist account of ‘relational’ difference 
according to which identities and cultural boundaries are overlapping, hybrid, 
interdependent and intermingling. This relational notion of difference renders her 
form of politics more interest-based than she is willing to admit. Scholars such as 
Chantal Mouffe have argued that Young’s account o f representation comes 
inconveniently close to the liberal model of interest-group pluralism.36 Similarly, 
Judith Squires argues that Young’s model of representation comes too close to a 
‘principal-agent representation’ that is based on groups instead o f individuals. 
Principal-agent representation is a form o f representation where the representative is 
viewed as an agent that represents the interests of her clients and advocates them on 
their behalf. Squires, therefore, shares the views o f other scholars that Young’s model 
inconveniently turns to be similar to the interest-based representation.37 One difficulty 
with her model in relation to historical exclusion and injustice is that its implicit 
interest-based politics could lead to privatising exclusion. Indeed, Young recognizes 
the significance o f history and memory o f exclusion on the formation o f identities and 
operation of politics, but her relational notion of difference reduces politics to 
advocacy of interests which downplays the significance o f collective forces. Moreover, 
the recognition Young’s accords to the significance o f memory and history of 
exclusion in identity formation is insufficient because it overlooks the importance of
34 Young, ‘The Ideal o f Impartiality and the Civic Public’, in Justice and the Politic o f Difference 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 96-121.
35 Judith Squires raises similar criticisms against Young’s proposal o f a modified version o f  
representation. For more see her book Gender in Political Theory (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 1999), 
pp. 211-214. For Miller’s critique o f Young see: David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 2000), chapters 3+4.
36 For more on this point see: Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Dimension o f Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 
1992).
37 Squires, Gender in Political Theory, p. 212. Squires claims that representation can take place in the 
form o f two other types: microcosm and symbolic. While microcosm representation demands that the 
representative shares some o f the features (such as sex, age, class) o f a politically prominent group, 
symbolic representation requires that the representative symbolizes the identity o f a community or a 
group. For more on this see: Squires, Gender in Political Theory, p. 203.
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special claims such as taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing 
historical injustice that often emerge from longstanding history o f exclusion and 
oppression. These claims, it will be argued in the final chapter, are indispensable if we 
aim at achieving an effective accommodation of historical injustices.
Adam James Tebble argues that despite Young’s attempt to introduce some 
significant changes to her account o f the politics of difference in her recent book 
Inclusion and Democracy, her account remains trapped by a serious tension that 
undermines the consistency of her argument.38 This tension, Tebble argues, stems 
from Young’s implicit and hidden dual commitments to liberalism and 
communitarianism. Young simultaneously wants to endorse an anti-essentialist notion 
o f representation that recognizes the multiplicities and interdependencies of 
memberships and identities, and she wants to advocate special representation for 
excluded social groups (with group veto power regarding particular decisions and 
policies39) to include their perspectives and voices without treating these groups as 
bounded and fixed entities. Tebble argues that Young fails to reconcile these two 
commitments. For if we consistently follow and take seriously the commitment to 
view groups as anti-essentialist and acknowledge the significance of the self- 
determination and self-development of individuals, then we necessarily end up 
deserting the demand to prioritise special representation for oppressed social groups.40
To sum up, the attractiveness o f Young’s modified version is that she aspires 
to avoid the problems of essentialism. Additionally, through her emphasis on 
empowerment, i.e., giving the resources to oppressed groups to articulate and express 
their views, perspective and have their voices heard, she hopes to avoid the 
paternalism and cultural imperialism of the assimilationist ideal. In her books Justice 
and the Politics o f  Difference and Inclusion and Democracy, Young insists on 
distinguishing her modified version of representation from the liberal interest-based
38 Adam Tebble points out three significant changes in Young’s account in her book Inclusion and 
Democracy. These three are: her claim to extend the domain o f democratic heterogeneous public to the 
level o f the global; restating the significance o f civil society in her account o f the politics o f difference; 
and her reply to criticisms on her notion o f  social groups. For a full discussion o f these three points and 
a critical analysis o f Young’s work see: Adam James Tebble, ‘What is the Politics of Difference?’, 
Political Theory, 30:2 (2002), pp. 259-281.
39 On the issue o f veto power see: Young, ‘Social Movements and the Politics o f  Difference’, in Justice 
and the Politic o f  Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 184.
40 Tebble, ‘What is the Politics o f Difference?’, pp. 275-277. For Young’s answer to Tebble’s 
criticisms see: Iris Marion Young, ‘Reply to Tebble’, Political Theory, 30:2 (2002), pp. 282-288.
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pluralism and essentialist communitarian notion of representation. She claims that her 
model is significantly different because its focuses on differentiated social groups and 
not autonomous rational individuals and it promotes public deliberation rather than a 
simple pursuing o f interest. However, despite Young’s insistence, the brief analysis of 
her views has proved that her account comes uncomfortably close to the liberal 
interest-group pluralism, is trapped in two conflictual and mutually exclusive 
commitments, relies on a notion impartiality that she herself has consistently 
criticized, and overlooks the significance o f special issues that lie at the core o f 
demands of historical exclusion.
Melissa Williams ’ ‘complete and coherent theory o f  fair representation '
Young’s politics of difference is not the only account that offers a modified 
and integrative notion of representation to accommodate excluded social groups. 
Melissa Williams tries to theoretically justify why fair representation of historically 
excluded social groups requires the presence o f their own members in the legislative 
bodies. Williams states that she tries to advocate a group-based theory o f fair 
representation instead o f the procedural liberal theory o f representation. The 
procedural liberal justification of fair representation, she insists, cannot rationally 
justify and defend the presence of members o f historically excluded social groups in 
the legislative bodies. For, generally, procedural fairness is primarily concerned with 
individuals and committed to sameness and is thus difference-blind. This 
proceduralist view o f fair representation has failed to be sufficiently sensitive to social 
inequalities that stem from social differences. Its commitment to moral autonomy, 
impartiality and egalitarianism (abstract and ahistorical principles) does not allow the 
transformation o f the existing longstanding social inequalities but reproduces them. 
Pure proceduralism,41 according to Williams, neither removes structural inequalities
41 Williams argues that there are two strands o f the proceduralist conception o f  fair representation: ‘one 
person, one vote’ and ‘interest group pluralism.’ While the first emphasizes the formal equality o f all 
citizens manifested in an equal weight of all votes, the second wants to secure an equal opportunity to 
organize and politically mobilize with other citizens around their important interests. The interests that 
enjoy major recognition in the legislative policies are the ones advocated and defended by interest 
groups. In other words, while the first secures formal equality that leads to equal representation, the 
pluralist strand highlights the aggregating o f citizen’s preferences and interests by groups interests and 
yields equitable representation. Both strands, though different, rely on procedures, conditioned by 
treating individuals equally and impartially, to achieve fair outcomes. In both the social identity o f the
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nor achieves substantial increases in the legislative presence o f marginalized groups.42 
Therefore, we need to move beyond a proceduralist conception of fairness to a 
substantive conception of justice to adequately justify group representation. Williams, 
however, does not totally dismiss proceduralism. She mentions three of its advantages. 
First, procedural accounts of fairness enable individuals to reach an agreement upon 
the fairness o f an outcome or policy, ‘even when they disagree substantively about 
what the outcome should be.’43 Second, fair procedures provide clear measures and 
mechanisms to manage ‘complex and iterative social interactions without the need for 
constant intervention.’44 Third, when procedural accounts that are based on formal 
equality are employed they reconfirm the principle of equal respect for individuals.
Notwithstanding its limitations, proceduralism, she admits, plays an essential 
role in defending groups-based fair representation and its three advantages should be 
secured when it is possible. Nevertheless, instead of exclusively focusing on 
procedures, our focus should also be directed towards outcome-oriented standards of 
justice to assess our procedures and modify them when it is required. Therefore, 
Williams’s theory, as she puts it, ‘occupies a middle ground between procedural and 
substantive fairness.’45 In other words, her theory tries to combine procedural and 
substantive principles of justice. She calls this theory, following Charles Beitz, 
complex proceduralism. Unlike imperfect procedural justice which defines an 
independent substantive principle of justice (one principle) and specifies procedures 
that will realize this principle, complex proceduralism recognizes that there could be 
more than one substantive standard of fairness and also there might be a range of 
substantively fair outcomes instead o f one. Moreover, complex proceduralism, unlike 
imperfect procedural justice that is interested in the effectiveness of these procedures 
in realizing the right outcome regardless their content, ‘applies standards o f fairness 
directly to the procedures. More importantly, it favours those procedures that embody
representative is irrelevant to the fairness o f representation and the fairness o f the process and outcome. 
These two strands form what John Rawls refers to as pure proceduralism. Melissa S. Williams, Voice, 
Trusta nd Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings o f Liberal Representation, (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1998).
42 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 20.
43 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 20.
44 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 20.
45 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 21.
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the principles o f equal respect for persons and of individual autonomy over those that 
do not.’46 Recognizing the significance of combining procedural and substantive 
principles is important, but there is a need to specify the relationship between these 
principles. A standard o f legislative presence for members o f historically excluded 
social groups and the adequate procedures required to realize it, determine and define 
the particular relation between the procedural and substantive principles. The required 
electoral procedures for achieving fair representation are subject to change and 
revision especially if  the electoral outcomes reproduce the under-representation of the 
historically disadvantaged social groups. Clearly, Williams links the fairness of 
representation to institutions. Since institutional solutions are proposed to achieve 
certain values and exclude others, it is necessary to check whether they achieve their 
goals or not.
Williams proposes what she calls ‘a complete and coherent theory o f fair 
representation’ for historically excluded social groups that seriously takes into 
account long-lasting social inequalities and exclusions. However, the attempt to 
account for these social inequalities and exclusions, according to her, runs some risks. 
She examines four o f these risks, namely group essentialism, accountability, 
legislative marginalization and balkanization, and aspires to articulate adequate 
responses to each one o f them. First, the claim that fair representation o f excluded 
social groups requires their presence in legislative bodies implies that these groups are 
distinct and share a common identity, interests and opinions. Relying on this kind of 
claim clearly leads to the trap of essentialism that ignores the diversity of views and 
opinions within the same group, the multiplicity o f affiliation and the role of 
individuals’ agency in determining the meaning of their social norms, values and 
features. However, regardless of the different meanings that the members of these 
social groups accord to these norms, values and characteristics, they are still socially 
valuable. For they define the shapes o f important patterns o f social, political and 
economic inequalities. Consequently, group membership plays a major role in 
structuring, determining and restricting the life prospects and choices of the members. 
Williams concludes that what members of these excluded social groups have in 
common is the ‘experience of marginalization and the distinctive perspective on
46 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 21.
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matters of public policy that comes of that experience.’47 Williams admits that the 
experiences and perspectives of members of the same groups are different. Yet she 
argues that their social positions are ‘sufficiently similar that there are good reasons to 
believe that members of marginalized groups, on average, are more likely to represent 
the concerns and interests of citizens from those groups than are nonmembers.’48 A 
representative that lacks an experience of subordination and discrimination, though he 
might be a brilliant speaker and a master of coalition formation, ‘will not be able to 
explain why some policies reinforce the constituency’s experience o f subordination 
while others alleviate it.’49 Williams stresses that the experience o f subordination does 
not only bring expressions of suffering but also leads to an understanding o f the social 
conditions that substantially influence policy making. The experience of oppression, 
she claims, ‘brings not only a knowledge of the sources of inequality but also a power 
of judgement regarding the likely effectiveness of alternative approaches to 
ameliorate that inequality.’50 While non-members need to invest a lot o f efforts to 
gain that understanding, ‘group members are likely to possess it immediately, as an 
outgrowth o f their own experience.’51
The second risk that Williams addresses is the lack o f accountability. She 
argues that the presence of members of excluded social groups in legislative bodies is 
necessary but not sufficient to achieve fair representation. For being a member and 
representative o f an excluded social group does not necessarily mean that you will 
faithfully represent (being responsive to the citizens’ interest) the concerns and 
interests o f your group. The answer to this difficulty, however, is the creation of 
different mechanisms of accountability that secure the loyalty of the representatives to 
their groups/ constituencies. A third problem that arises here is that the mere presence 
of the representatives in the legislative body does not necessarily mean that they will 
have an effective influence on the decision-making process. The presence of 
legislatures could yield policy influence, Williams asserts, if the decision-making
47 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 6.
48 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 6.
49 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 242.
50 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 241.
51 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 242.
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process in the legislative body is based on deliberation among the legislatures rather 
than bargaining.52 Unlike bargaining that views people’s preferences as given and 
fixed prior to political engagement, deliberation recognises the formative impact of 
politics and its institutions on shaping and transforming the representatives’ opinions 
and preferences based on the data, information and reasoning raised and exchanged by 
their colleagues in the debates.
The fourth risk that Williams examines is balkanisation. Against the argument 
that group recognition will necessarily accelerate conflicts and segmentation and thus 
lead to political and social instability and collapse, she argues that a group based 
theory o f fair representation suggests relatively clear conditions and standards to 
distinguish between those who have strong claims for representation and those who 
have weak ones. Defenders o f group rights often view the deep history of 
marginalization o f particular groups as convincing enough to give their claims priority 
over others. Williams argues that history could be one o f the criteria but there is a 
need for more qualifications. She employs the notion o f ‘memory’ to develop these 
criteria. The memory argument relies on understanding the political sociology of 
excluded social groups. She argues that there are two factors that establish a strong 
claim for group representation. These two factors are: history o f subjection and 
common identity. The former refers to groups whose members have been subject to 
continuous and systematic patterns o f structural inequalities. The latter refers to the 
existence o f a common sense o f identity that the members o f the group share. 
Williams differentiates between two sources o f group identity: objective and 
subjective. Objective sources of group identity, she maintains, refer to the existence of 
a long-standing and state-sponsored discrimination against the group and the 
persistence o f this discrimination in contemporary political, economic and social 
structures along lines o f membership in these groups. Subjective sources of identity 
indicate the existence o f a common memory of that discrimination and the belief in 
common political interests in the present. Both of these sources o f group identity are 
necessary to establish a criterion for assessing the strength and weakness o f group
52 For more on the distinction between deliberation and bargaining and their opposition see: Jon Elster, 
‘The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties o f Political Theory’ in J. Elster and H. Aanund (eds), The 
Foundations o f Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-132.
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claims. This criterion arms the group-based theory o f fair representation with an 
effective means to overcome the fear of balkanisation.
Williams argues that representation involves complex processes. This 
complexity stems from the existence o f different ways o f mediating between the 
citizens’ interest and the decision-making bodies. She examines three forms of such 
mediation: ‘the dynamics of legislative decision making, the nature of legislator- 
constituent relations, and the basis for aggregating citizens into representable 
constituencies.’54 The relationship between representative and constituent leads to the 
issue of trust. Citizens, members of excluded social groups in a deeply fragmented 
society, tend not to trust legislators who are not members of their groups. Trust, 
however, is not enough. For legislators could ‘betray’ their constituents. Consequently, 
trust should be complemented by accountability. Accountability, Williams argues, 
‘secures trust for historically marginalized groups by allowing those groups to define 
the constituencies from which representatives are elected.’55 Williams emphasizes the 
need to listen to the distinctive voices, manifested in claims, pleas and calls, o f 
members of historically excluded social groups (Iris Young calls this the strategy of 
‘listening’). She argues that understanding demands o f justice should begin from 
listening and understanding the peculiar points of view and claims, which are not 
necessarily fixed, o f the members of the excluded group and not through imagining a 
hypothetical state o f affairs. For these distinctive voices to influence the decision 
making processes, a deliberative form of politics and not bargaining is required. For 
the former gives enough room for expressing and communicating these voices and 
potentially transforms people’s views and preferences. The issue of ‘voice’ gives 
content to the first line of mediation, namely the dynamics of legislative decision-
53 Williams draws a distinction between ‘marginalized groups’ and ‘voluntarily associations’. She 
identifies four features that distinguish marginalized ascriptive groups from voluntarily associations. 
First, ‘patterns o f social and political inequality are structured along the lines o f group membership’.
Second, ‘membership in these groups is not usually experienced as voluntary’. Third, ‘membership in
these groups is not usually experienced as mutable.’ Finally, ‘generally, negative meanings are 
assigned to group identity by the broader society or the dominant culture.’ These features, if  they are 
possessed over a long time (generations) by a group o f people, form a marginalized group. Williams, 
Voice, Trust and Memory, pp. 15-18.
54 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 8.
55 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 14.
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making.56 The argument of ‘memory’ corresponds to the third form of mediation; 
namely the defining boundaries of constituencies or excluded social groups.
In summary, Williams proposes an appealing notion of representation. This 
notion of representation is a constitutive component of Williams’ integrative account 
o f democratic accommodation which aspires to combine procedural as well as 
substantive principles and to avoid the weaknesses of procedural liberalism and 
identity politics and benefit from their strengths. Moreover, Williams’ notion is 
particularly attractive because of the centrality it accords to history, memory and trust 
in accommodating historical exclusions. Her account, however, is subject to several 
criticisms. For example her insistence on adopting deliberation and viewing it as 
entirely opposed to bargaining leads to the problem of assuming an abstract ideal 
speech situation where the process of deliberation is presented as free o f power 
relations. 57 Moreover, some serious doubts could be raised regarding the 
epistemological privilege she accords to the oppressed in understanding their own 
condition and the harmony she assumes to exist among the procedural and substantive 
principles o f her theory. I will, nevertheless, confine my critique to two main issues 
that pose serious difficulties to her account’s ability to effectively address the 
demands o f historically excluded social groups. More specifically, I will critically 
analyse her claims about the issues of memory and responsibility.
While Williams rightly and convincingly recognizes the importance of the 
‘experience o f marginalization’ in shaping the perspectives of members o f excluded 
social groups on public matters, she downplays the significance of past wrongs in 
their claims o f democratic accommodation. She argues that the members o f the 
privileged groups are not morally more responsible for being advantaged than 
members o f excluded groups for being disadvantaged. If they are responsible for their 
circumstances, they, i.e., members of excluded as well as privileged social groups, 
share equal moral responsibility for causing their own respective disadvantage and 
advantage. Redressing historical exclusion, she insists, should be based on ‘a 
commitment to contemporary equality’ and not on ‘a desire to acknowledge guilt for
56 Williams emphasizes that her conclusions on the role o f “voice” and “trust” in representing groups, 
although similar to other insights of other scholars, depend primarily on sources from the American 
political culture. Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 13
57 This point has been discussed extensively in chapters 2 and 3.
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past wrongs.’ It is precisely this forward-orientation and the assumed symmetry and 
equality between the oppressed and the oppressor that undermine her account of 
accommodation. By invoking the past, historically excluded social groups do not aim 
at achieving revenge, but they want to reveal the causes o f their oppression and the 
role of the hegemonic groups in causing this oppression. While it is reasonable to 
argue that historically excluded social groups do have a certain responsibility for their 
fate, circumstances and choices, it is implausible to view them as an equal source for 
causing and contributing to their misery, poverty and exclusion. Empirical as well as 
historical evidences show that the disadvantage, poverty and marginalization o f 
oppressed social groups are chiefly the result o f a systematic exclusion and a 
disproportionate distribution of resources orchestrated by dominant and hegemonic 
groups. The principal justification for the systematic exclusion and disproportionate 
distribution o f resources is the depiction o f the excluded social groups (their identity, 
culture, practices, values etc.) as inferior. Briefly, the problem of Williams’ account is 
that it is exclusively forward oriented and assumes an equality of responsibility on 
causing historical exclusions and injustices.
While Williams recognizes the role o f collective memory of oppression, she 
unconvincingly accords to it a very minor role in the claims of addressing historical 
exclusion because o f its subjective character. While it is plausible to argue that 
memory has a strong subjective element, it is implausible to downplay the 
significance o f memory to the level Williams suggests. For in many cases, such as the 
Holocaust, the execution of aboriginals in America, and the Armenian genocide, 
memory does not only reflect partial subjective and emotional views and feelings but 
also reflects factious distorted unequal histories, realities and relations o f power where 
it is not hard to identify who is the victim and who is the victimizer. Moreover, I have 
claimed earlier in the thesis that collective memory plays a crucial role in challenging 
the master narrative o f the dominant group and revealing the intimate link between 
historical exclusions and current inequalities. Unlike previous accounts of democratic 
accommodation, Williams’ account of democratic accommodation does seem to take 
into account issues o f memory, history and responsibility in addressing historical 
exclusion. However, her insistence on the symmetry and equality of responsibility 
between the oppressed and the oppressor and the minor subjective role she accords to
58 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory, p. 197.
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collective memory renders her account o f democratic inclusion incomplete. In chapter 
7, it will be argued that it is the politics o f reconciliation that fully captures the issues 
o f memory, asymmetries and responsibility. Therefore, the politics of reconciliation, it 
will be argued, is crucial to accommodate demands of historically excluded social 
groups.
Thus far, I have argued in this part that while Young’s and Williams’ modified 
and integrative versions o f representation seem to be appealing because of their 
attempt to take social inequalities and experiences of marginalization seriously and 
combine procedural as well as substantive political principles, their versions are 
insufficient. For while Young’s account comes too close to the liberal interest-group 
pluralism, is trapped in two conflictual and mutually exclusive commitments, rests on 
a notion o f impartiality that she herself has constantly criticized, and overlooks the 
significance o f core issues that underlie fundamental demands o f historical exclusion, 
Williams’ forward oriented account of democratic accommodation fails to fully 
recognize the role o f past wrongs and the significance o f asymmetries in taking 
responsibilities on causing these past wrongs.
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed and explored the ontological issue o f representation 
which is viewed as one o f the core components of democratic accommodation. The 
chapter has argued that the diverse notions of representation employed by proponents 
of identity politics, post-modern critics o f identity politics, and integrative theorists 
are insufficiently attentive to demands o f historically excluded social groups. More 
specifically, the chapter has argued that proponents of identity politics have primarily 
relied on a descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation when they demand the 
representation o f excluded and disadvantaged groups. This descriptive Aristotelian 
notion has been found problematic because it leads to the promotion o f essentialism, 
fixation, closure, balkanization and homogeneity. To free identity and politics from 
the ‘chains’ o f essentialism, fixation and homogeneity, post-modern theorists such as 
Deleuze and Guattari have developed a non-essentialist and hybrid notion of 
representation. The chapter has found Deleuze and Guattari’s notion o f representation 
unpersuasive. For while they try to avoid the risks o f essentialism, closure, hierarchy
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and homogeneity, they celebrate excessive hybridity and fluidity that undermine the 
very possibility of politics and identity. Moreover, they do not provide guidance on 
how to transfer their views into concrete and practical mechanisms of representation.
Finally, it has been argued that the modified and integrative notions o f Iris 
Marion Young and Melissa Williams are attractive but incomplete. While their 
notions of representation are more appealing than the hitherto discussed ones because 
o f their attempt to take social inequalities, experiences o f marginalization, history and 
memory seriously and combine procedural as well as substantive political principles, 
they remain insufficient. The next chapter will focus on some other integrative 
approaches that seek to negotiate and synthesise elements from deliberation and 
recognition.
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6. INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AND DELIBERATION
Iris Marion Young and Melissa Williams are not the only scholars who have 
suggested integrative theories. Recently, thinkers such as Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla 
Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr have developed integrative theories that propose 
intercultural dialogue and modified versions of deliberation as strengthening the 
adequacy of their theories to effectively accommodate demands of historically 
excluded social groups and bypass the problems that plague deliberative democracy 
and identity politics. This chapter critically assesses the adequacy of intercultural 
dialogue and modified version o f deliberation to accommodate claims of historical 
exclusion. The chapter argues that neither deliberation nor intercultural dialogue 
provide a satisfactory answer to the issues of pluralism and demands of historically 
excluded social groups. For in addition to the often discussed charges against 
deliberation and dialogue, such as privileging certain modes o f speech and purchasing 
consensus at the expense of recognizing diversity, this chapter argues that they also 
fail to properly address at least three main issues that lie at the core of the demands of 
historically excluded social groups; namely, collective memory of exclusion, 
acknowledgement of historical injustices and taking responsibility and offering an 
apology. These three issues emerge from democratic accommodation as involving a 
norm of practical deliberation which itself involves an accommodation to the past.
The present chapter is divided into two parts. The first part briefly reviews 
some unsuccessful modes of intercultural encounters and demonstrates the desirability 
o f non-hierarchical mode of intercultural dialogue. The second part o f the chapter 
focuses on the most accepted and discussed form of intercultural communication, 
namely dialogue. The accounts of intercultural dialogue of some recognition and 
democratic thinkers; such as Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr will 
be analyzed. While Parekh proposes a modified version of the politics o f recognition, 
Benhabib and Dallmayr suggest integrative approaches that attempt to overcome the 
constraints of identity politics and offer more appealing accounts o f democratic 
accommodation. Though these proposals enjoy certain merits, it will be argued that 
they suffer from serious weaknesses that render them unsuccessful. Consequently, a
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more compelling ‘candidate’ should be sought to effectively deal with demands of 
historically excluded social groups.
Part I
Different forms o f  intercultural encounters
In the literature of social and human sciences two flawed forms of cross- 
cultural understanding are usually discussed. These two types are ‘ethnocentrism’ and 
the ‘incorrigibility thesis.’ 1 The ‘incorrigibility thesis’ is a thesis that claims that 
understanding the ‘other’ (agents, cultures, societies) requires the adoption of their 
own point of view. In other words, it involves self-denial and abandonment. 
Conversely, the former type of cross-cultural understanding, i.e. ethnocentrism, is a 
state of self-admiration; kind of narcissism, where the individual views him or herself 
as superior and as an ultimate and exclusive measure for the ‘other.’ The ‘other’ is 
viewed as an inferior and primitive being that needs to be educated, controlled, 
transformed or modernized so that it becomes as similar as possible. There are several 
other modes of inter-cultural engagements and this section addresses some of them. 
These different modes o f cross-cultural encounters range from total domination to 
dialogical interaction. Dialogical interaction is the most attractive mode of 
engagement. These forms of cross-cultural encounters usually overlap and two of 
them or more can be at work in one society. Fred Dallmayr examines some o f these 
forms. Based on his account I will turn to briefly present some o f these forms starting 
from the least attractive and concluding by the most desirable one.
Conquest, it is a mode o f forceful physical incorporation and occupation of 
alien territories and populations. It usually involves total subjugation and control of 
the populations and sometimes attempts to culturally assimilate them. The ‘other’ is 
viewed as an inferior being which needs to be controlled and sometimes educated. 
While in the case o f control and subjugation human difference is recognized, though 
hierarchal, in the case of assimilation or conversion human difference is denied and a 
common core of humanity, often European, is invoked. This leads to the second form 
of cultural engagement; conversion. Conversion is the mode o f cultural assimilation.
1 Charles Taylor, ‘Understanding and Ethnocentricity’ in Philosophy and Human Sciences (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 116-134, p. 125.
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It is a form o f cultural and spiritual colonialism. It involves dissemination of 
particular beliefs and ideas. Conversion does not necessarily entail conquest and 
occupation. It is not only repressive and dominating but it could be liberating as well. 
Many communities have adopted certain religions and beliefs and used them to 
liberate themselves from grievances such as colonialism and poverty. Assimilation 
and Acculturation constitute a form of cultural hegemony and domination. 
Assimilation applies not only externally to foreign population but also domestically to 
excluded and disadvantaged ethnic groups and minorities. While assimilation is 
usually used to refer to policies to be found in Western societies, acculturation is 
invoked to refer to domestic or global interaction between Western societies and non- 
Westem societies. These two forms of cultural hegemony were increased by 
nationalism and the nation states. Conquest, conversion and assimilation and 
acculturation are indefensible modes o f interaction for various explicit reasons. 
Briefly, these forms o f cultural interaction are based on morally unaccepted and 
unbalanced situations o f intolerance, exploitation, domination and the absence of 
reciprocity and equality.
A milder form o f interaction is ‘partial assimilation: cultural borrowing.’ The 
encounters between cultures here are roughly equal and reciprocal. Unlike hegemonic 
and hierarchical modes o f cultural interaction such as conversion and assimilation, in 
partial assimilation cultures partly adopt from each other through borrowing and 
lending certain ingredients while maintaining their distinctiveness -  keeping some 
indigenous characteristics. This form of partial accommodation is based on a certain 
level o f reciprocity and mutuality. Unlike partial assimilation where the interaction 
leads to partial adjustment and adaptation of certain indigenous habits, in ‘liberalism 
and minimal engagement’ the contact does not lead to transformation. Here cultures 
coexist ‘in a mode o f relative indifference.’2 Modem liberalism, particularly its 
procedural variant, ‘has promoted a tolerant juxtaposition o f cultures and life-forms 
predicated on relative mutual disinterest and aloofness.’3 Liberalism recognizes the 
need for general procedural rules that treat everybody equally leaving concrete 
differences to be private issues that are irrelevant to politics. The main risk of
2 Fred R. Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounters (Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 1996), p. 24.
3 Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism, p. 24.
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liberalism and minimal engagement is that it could lead to segregation and 
ghettoization among the different groups that constitute the polity.
According to Dallmayr, ‘dialogical engagement’ is the most appealing and 
normatively desirable form o f intercultural interaction. For this form of interaction is 
committed to ‘dialogue’ and ‘communication’ where a constructive non-dominating 
and non-assimilative relationship between ‘se lf and ‘other’ flourishes. The ‘se lf and 
‘other’ are engaged in a relationship while each one maintains its freedom. Put 
differently, it is a relationship o f a ‘non-unifying love.’4 It is this non-hierarchical 
mode of intercultural interaction that several political theorists have enthusiastically 
invoked hoping to accommodate more effectively the issues o f pluralism and demands 
of historically excluded social groups. The attractiveness o f intercultural dialogues, it 
is often said, stems from their reliance on assumptions o f symmetry, equality, 
reciprocity and respect and their potential to meet challenges o f essentialism and 
closure through the emphasis they place on self-transformation, mutual-understanding 
and openness to cross-cultural links.
Thus far, this part has primarily explored some unpersuasive modes of 
interaction. These unpersuasive modes o f communication are asymmetrical, 
hierarchical and involve domination. It is on the basis of rejecting these hierarchical 
modes o f communication that several political theorists have invoked more appealing 
and egalitarian modes of interaction, namely intercultural dialogue and deliberation, 
to offer effective accounts of democratic accommodation. The next part o f this 
chapter will analyse the attempts of three political theorists who place intercultural 
dialogue or deliberation at the core of their theories. They ultimately hope that 
intercultural dialogue or deliberation strengthens their theories’ abilities to effectively 
accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups. Although their 
approaches are different, it will be argued that none of them provides an entirely 
successful accommodation of historical injustices.
4 Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism, p. 32.
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Part II
Intercultural dialogue in multicultural societies
This part o f the chapter critically examines the notion of dialogue in a 
multicultural society as presented in the approaches o f three different scholars; 
Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. Notwithstanding their 
attractiveness, for different reasons, it will be argued that these approaches fail, in 
different degrees, to provide an effective accommodation o f the claims of historically 
excluded social groups. Parekh’s account of ‘intercultural dialogue’ will be discussed 
first and then I will move to Benhabib’s ‘politics o f complex cultural dialogue’. I will 
conclude the chapter by Dallmayr’s notion of ‘inter-civilizational dialogue.’
Bhikhu Parekh
In his book Rethinking Multiculturalism, Bhikhu Parekh discusses several 
issues such as national identity, the controversy over Rushdie’s book The Satanic 
Verses, monism, polygamy, political equality and intercultural dialogue. In this 
section, however, I will primarily focus on his account of intercultural dialogue. His 
account of intercultural dialogue serves as a form of democratic inclusion which 
solves social and cultural conflicts. I will argue that his account is not appealing to 
accommodate demands o f historically excluded social groups because it clearly 
favours the interests and values o f the established liberal hegemonic groups.
Parekh argues that the liberal assumptions of individualism and neutrality are 
insufficient to effectively engage with the multicultural character o f the contemporary 
societies. Instead Parekh advocates a politics o f recognition that views individuals as 
contextually embedded in particular cultures. Parekh places the issue o f cultural 
pluralism at the centre o f his theory. However, he does not seek to entirely reject 
liberalism but suggests recasting it so it becomes more sensitive to cultural differences. 
Unlike identity politics which favours an essentialist notion o f culture, Parekh defends 
a version of the politics o f recognition which endorses a non-essentialist notion of 
culture. Culture, according to him, is ‘a historically created system o f meaning and
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significance’.5 Parekh refuses to treat culture as a coherent, unified, homogenous and 
fixed entity. He insists that ‘culture is internally varied, speaks in several voices, and 
its range o f interpretive possibility is often indeterminate.’6 However, Parekh rejects 
excessive hybridity and maintains that each culture has some common beliefs and 
practices which provide a sense of belonging to its members and enable distinguishing 
it from other cultures.
Having this notion of culture at the core of his theory, Parekh suggests an 
outline o f an account o f intercultural dialogue. He proposes conducting intercultural 
dialogues between non-liberal minorities and the wider society to settle cultural and 
social conflicts. This intercultural dialogue, he argues, is challenging and demanding 
because it is ‘necessarily multistranded, heterogeneous, and involves arguments o f 
different kinds and levels of generality.’7 The conflicts emerge, he claims, when 
cultural practices and values of minority groups contradict the majority’s ‘operative 
public values.’ He goes on to argue that every society needs a kind o f agreement on 
common values and practices - operative values - that regulate their collective public 
life. These values prevail as a result o f coercion, negotiation and indoctrination. 
Moreover, they are embodied in practices, institutions and norms. They are not 
constant, harmonious and fixed. Rather, they are changeable (subject to circumstances 
and self-understanding), conflicting and contested. They form and shape the moral 
structure o f public life and provide vocabulary for public debate and dialogue. 
Excluded groups continuously challenge these values. Parekh claims that each society 
should review its prevailing operative values. The clash with minorities’ cultural 
practices provides an opportunity for the review and assessment to occur. 8 The 
minorities’ and majority’s practices, values and ways of life are subject to 
reassessment through a process of ‘intercultural evaluation’. Parekh argues that the 
dialogue should be ‘bifocal, centring both on the minority practice and the society’s 
operative public values, both on the minority’s and the wider society’s way of life.’9
5 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000), p. 143.
6 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 144.
7 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 294.
8 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, pp. 269-270
9 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 271.
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Dialogue generates debates and transformation within the minority, the wider society 
and among the two.
Parekh specifies four main principles that guide us once we have a cultural 
clash between minorities and the wider society. These principles are ‘universally valid 
standards of evaluation,’ ‘core common values,’ ‘no harm principle’ and ‘dialogical 
consensus principle.’ He clearly favours the last one. Some scholars have appealed to 
universally valid standards o f evaluation to examine cultural conflicts. These 
standards are universal human rights. The problem with these standards, according to 
Parekh, is that they are often general and limited in their capacity to tackle important 
issues in pluralistic societies. Additionally, it is very hard to have a clear prioritization 
among them and if  there is one it differs from one society to another. Other scholars 
have argued that every society has historically developed core common values (the 
second principle) that lie at its foundation and compose its character. People will 
defend these core values against other’s offending practices. The problem of this 
principle is that it is doubtful to claim that there are core values that all members o f 
society endorse. Sometimes, there are shared core values, such as slavery and racism, 
which are morally unacceptable.
Other scholars have claimed that only practices that cause harm to others will 
be disallowed - the no harm principle. To go further would be viewed as ‘cultural 
imperialism’. The weakness o f this principle is that while it might be easy to define 
and identify physical harm, it is very complicated to reach an agreement on what is 
emotional and moral harm for the agent and the ‘other’. The fourth guiding principle 
is the ‘dialogical consensus principle.’ Parekh argues that given the weaknesses and 
problems of the previous principles ‘the most desirable and indeed the only possible 
course of action is to engage in an open-minded and morally serious dialogue with 
minority spokesmen and act on the resulting consensus.’10 Parekh argues that for 
dialogues and debates on deep moral and ethical issues to be effective, they should not 
remain at the philosophical, universal and abstract level but should be viewed as 
happening in:
a particular society with a particular moral structure, history and
traditions, and its participants are not abstract moral beings but
10 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 266.
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constituted in a certain way. [...] The dialogue cannot therefore be 
open-ended and free-floating and must start with and centre on the 
prevailing values, which provide its vocabulary, structure its context, 
and impose limits on its direction and likely outcome.11
The debates on morally controversial issues between the wider society and its 
minorities might pass through three stages. These stages, Parekh insists, ‘are neither 
successive nor all necessary; they overlap and any one o f them might be skipped.’12 
The first stage is when the wider society rejects a certain minority’s practice because 
it is incompatible with the operative public values. In this case, the minority tries to 
justify its practice through appealing to ‘the cultural authority of the practice and 
argue that it is therefore binding on it.’ The second stage is when the minority’s 
response was not convincing. In this case, the minority’s spokesmen tend to 
emphasize the importance of this unacceptable practice by linking to other significant 
practices that together constitute their own way of life. Briefly, the disapproval of this 
practice, the spokesmen insist, could undermine the sustainability of their way o f life. 
The third stage emerges when the minority’s spokesmen fail to defend the practice by 
referring either to ‘its cultural authority or its community-sustaining role.’13 In this 
case, the spokesmen need to cross their cultural boundaries and appeal to external 
norms and values that the wider society endorses or can potentially be convinced to 
endorse. In case and the wider society does not get persuaded by the values the 
contested practice aspires to achieve, an inconvenient and challenging situation 
emerges. This is particularly true, according to Parekh, because moral contested 
values involve strong beliefs, passions and emotions. The dialogue in this situation, 
Parekh maintains, involves passages o f lack of understanding, intransigence and 
incompatible differences.14 Consequently, in these situations he suggests postponing a 
final decision regarding the contested practice hoping ‘that the passage o f time and the 
fusion o f ideas brought about by formal and informal public discussions will create
11 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 267.
12 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 267.
13 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 272.
14 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 272.
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enough common ground and willingness to facilitate a consensus or at least a 
negotiated compromise in future.’15 Parekh argues that in case the contested issue is 
pressing and there is an urgent need to take a decision, the practice in question should 
be rejected and ‘the operative public values of the wider society should prevail.’16
Parekh argues that he has ‘sketched outlines o f a theory o f intercultural 
evaluation.’17 While he acknowledges that it is only ‘outlines’ of a theory, it seems 
that his outlines are philosophically underdeveloped and insufficiently attentive to 
historical exclusion and injustices. He does not further his examination to develop 
something deeper and more elaborate than his sketchy account. Moreover, it is 
plausible to argue that his principles are not only ineffective for explaining complex 
intercultural dialogues but also clearly tend to favour the wider liberal society’s norms 
and operative values over the ones of excluded social groups. Put it differently, 
Parekh’s account is problematic for it gives superiority to the liberal values and 
legitimises the exclusions these values cause. Shiraz Dossa argues that Parekh’s claim 
that ‘liberal public values and liberal rationality should trump rival ideals and values’ 
indicates ‘a deep ambivalence and incoherence in Parekh’s attitude to 
multiculturalism.’ 18 Additionally, it could be argued that prioritising the wider 
society’s values and norms when an urgent decision is needed to be taken on a 
pressing issue has certain validity while dealing with issues related to relatively new 
immigrant communities, this claim, however, is less defensible when we are talking 
about historical injustices suffered by established and deeply rooted groups such as 
native communities and national minorities. These latter groups raise demands that do
15 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 272.
16 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 272. Parekh points out three reasons that justify the primacy 
o f the operative public values o f the majority. ‘First, they are woven into its institutions and practices 
and cannot be radically revised without causing considerable moral and social disorientation. Second, 
while a society has an obligation to accommodate the minority way o f life, it has no obligation to do so 
at the cost o f its own, especially if  it remains genuinely unconvinced by the minority’s defence o f the 
practice. Third, when the minority consists o f immigrants they need to appreciate that since they are 
unfamiliar with the wider society’s way o f life, they should defer to its judgment in contentious matters. 
They also need its support to counter the resentment their presence generally provokes among some 
sections o f society, and are more likely to secure it, after making their point, they gracefully accept its 
decision.’ p. 273.
17 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 292.
18 Shiraz Dossa, (review essays), ‘Liberal Imperialism? Natives, Muslims, and Others’, Political 
Theory, 30:5 (2002), p. 742. In this article Dossa raises some other valuable criticisms against Parekh’s 
account.
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not only question and challenge the operative values, history and governing principles 
of the dominate society, but also require substantial transformations in the existing 
political and social arrangements and practices. Transforming these political and 
social arrangements and practices is crucially important because they play principal 
role in justifying the oppression o f excluded social groups and ignoring their history 
and memory. Briefly, his account does not offer a serious engagement with 
experiences of historical exclusion and neglects the significance o f some core issues 
that lie at the basis of the demands of historically excluded social minorities. Most 
importantly among these core issues are ones that are concerned with collective 
memory o f exclusion, acknowledgment o f historical injustice and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices.
In summary, it has been argued that Parekh’s appeal to intercultural dialogue 
to strengthen the ability of his account of the politics of recognition to accommodate 
pluralism is ultimately not appealing. This is particularly true when facing demands of 
historical exclusion because, among other things, the notion of dialogue he is so keen 
to defend is underdeveloped, endorses the superiority o f the liberal values, reinforces 
the inferiority of excluded social groups and overlooks core issues such as collective 
memory of exclusion, acknowledgment o f historical grievances and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology. By developing more sophisticated and 
elaborated notions of intercultural dialogue and deliberation, Seyla Benhabib and Fred 
Dallmayr have aspired to offer more appealing accounts o f democratic inclusion than 
the ones that have been proposed by advocates of recognition such as Parekh. 
Primarily inspired by Habermas and Gadamer’s approaches, Benhabib and Dallmayr 
have presented revised notions o f intercultural dialogue and deliberation that, they 
insist, are capable o f effectively accommodating pluralism and demands of historical 
exclusion without collapsing into essentialism, closure and rigid abstractions. The 
next two sections analyse their views respectively.
Seyla Benhabib: the politics o f  complex cultural dialogue
This section explores Seyla Benhabib’s account o f the ‘politics o f complex 
cultural dialogue.’ Benhabib claims that individual autonomy resides at the core of her 
account. She refuses the egalitarian understanding of culture that was introduced and
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defended by social anthropology. She argues that this egalitarian understanding of 
culture is problematic because it rests on ‘faulty epistemic premises’ that view culture 
as a closed and discrete social system of representation and signification. Benhabib 
claims that her politics of complex cultural dialogue is based, among other things, on 
the assumption that cultures are not closed wholes but hybrid, fluid and in a 
continuous interaction and dialogue. Benhabib argues that some contemporary 
multiculturalists, such as Tully, Parekh and Carens, reject these essentializing 
premises too, but her social constructivist approach to cultural differences rejects 
them for different reasons. What distinguishes her rejection o f cultural essentialism 
from these multiculturalists, she insists, ‘is the narrative view o f  actions and culture 
that informs it.’19 Analysing cultures, she believes, should be based on the distinction 
between the points of view or perspective of the ‘social observer’ (outsider) and that 
o f the ‘social agent’ (insider). The outsiders or external social observers, be they 
anthropologists, secret agents, linguists, or consultants, inflict coherence and 
homogeneity on cultures in order to understand or control them. Conversely, from 
within, members o f the culture ‘experience their traditions, stories, rituals and 
symbols, tools, and material living conditions through shared, albeit contested and 
contestable, narrative accounts.’20
She claims that there are two major reasons why culture is presented as 
narratively constituted by contested accounts. The first reason is that ‘human actions 
and relations are formed through a double hermeneutic: We identify what we do 
through an account of what we do.’21 In other words, human actions and interactions 
are recognized and presented as human deeds through accounts that the agents and
others form about their own doings. The second reason is that human actions and
deeds are formed through the person’s evaluative perspective or attitude towards their 
deeds. In other words, these actions are already carrying an element of assessment and 
judgment. To put it in her terms, she claims that ‘there are second-order narratives 
entailing a certain normative attitude towards accounts o f first-order deeds.’ Culture, 
she concludes, ‘is the horizon formed by these evaluative stances, through which the
19 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 5.
20 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 5.
21 Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture, p. 6.
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infinite chain of space-time sequences is demarcated into “good” and “bad”, “holy” 
and “profane”, “pure” and “impure”.’ 22 Cultures, Benhabib insists, ‘are formed 
through binaries because human beings live in an evaluative universe.’23 Benhabib 
rejects the ‘mosaic multiculturalism’ of the politics o f recognition for it views 
multicultural society as coexisting groups with clear determined boundaries. This 
form o f multiculturalism, she argues, is indefensible, neither empirically nor 
normatively. Intercultural justice among groups, according to her, rests on a belief in 
justice and freedom and not on the preservation o f cultures. Benhabib insists that:
We should view human cultures as constant creations, recreations, and 
negotiations o f imaginary boundaries between “we” and the “other(s).’
The “other” is always also within us and is one o f us. A self is a self 
only because it distinguishes itself from a real, or more often than not 
imagined, “other.” Struggles for recognition among individuals and 
groups are really efforts to negate the status of “otherness,” insofar as 
otherness is taken to entail disrespect, domination, and inequality.24
However, Benhabib admits that ‘it is very difficult to accept the “other” as deeply 
different while recognizing his/her fundamental human equality and dignity.’ 
Moreover, she maintains that ‘History as well as society study shows us that any 
minority group in human society may adopt any of a number o f political positions; 
political attitudes cannot be derived from group identities.’25
Benhabib argues that in John Rawls’ political liberalism as well as in Brian 
Barry’s egalitarian liberalism a very little patience is demonstrated to examine the 
relationship between the liberal political principles and the background culture. They 
view the official public sphere (which includes the executive, legislative, and juridical 
institutions and political parties) as the only ‘site of political contestation and of 
opinion and will formation.’ Following Habermas, Benhabib claims that the
22 Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture, p. 7.
23 Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture, p. 7.
24 Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture, p. 8.
25 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 18
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uniqueness of deliberative democracy is in its ‘dual track approach’ to 
multiculturalism. This duality emerges from the recognition of the importance not 
only of the official public sphere but also the significance o f civil society in forming 
political wills and contesting opinions. Put differently, deliberative democracy views 
the unofficial public sphere with its diverse movements as an additional important site 
for political contestation. Political or egalitarian liberalism neglects the importance o f 
this sphere and opts for ‘a juridical calculus of liberal rights’ to address problems of 
multiculturalism.26
Recently, Benhabib claims, several proposals, such as Ayelet Shachar’s 
‘jurisdictional systems’ for different cultural and religious groups, have been 
suggested to deal with pluralism in multicultural societies.27 These proposals, 
Benhabib insists, could be compatible with ‘a universal deliberative democracy 
model’ only if they do not violate the following three normative principles: egalitarian 
reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and freedom of exit and association. Egalitarian 
reciprocity means that members o f cultural, ethnic, linguistic and any other minorities 
must enjoy the same kind of political, civic, economic and cultural rights that the 
majority enjoys. Voluntary self-ascriptive refers to the claim that individuals should 
not be ascribed to cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious groups by virtue of their birth.
26 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, pp. 21, 114, 106.
27 Ayelet Shachar proposes a model o f joint governance that is called ‘transformative accommodation.’ 
This model aspires to be sensitive to demands of non-liberal minorities by allowing them to develop 
their own institutions. Furthermore, it aims to secure fundamental individual rights. In this model, the 
minority group and the state share the authority to decide on the contested social matters. In other 
words, the model is based on the division of jurisdiction between different political actors. This model 
o f ‘transformative accommodation’ recognizes the problem o f power asymmetry between the minority 
and the state and therefore gives priority to the minority group in the ‘initial allocation o f areas of  
authority’. Secondly, this model secures an exit or way out for the members o f the group if they feel 
that practices or certain arrangements systematically discriminate against them. This latter point 
encourages the groups to pursue internal reforms in order to secure that the members keep their alliance 
and membership. This secures the liberal commitment to individual liberties too. Finally, this model 
encourages cooperation, dialogue and transformation in views and opinions between the different 
political actors. This model, however, focuses on the interaction between formal or governmental 
political actors and institutions and the minority’s representatives and ignores other forms o f cultural 
and social interaction at the informal level. Moreover, while this model recognizes the asymmetries in 
power, it does not seem to adequately deal with issues of historical injustices and the relevance o f  
memory in this transformative politics. For the recognition o f power asymmetries is manifested only 
through giving priority to the minority in administrative judicial authorities at the very initial stages, 
while underestimating other important non-formal issues such as historical harms and injustices. 
Briefly, this model primarily offers an institutional solution and therefore ends up adopting traditional 
liberal solutions, namely formal procedural mechanisms. For more on this model see: Ayelet Shachar, 
Multicultural Jurisdictions". Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); Andrea T. Baumeister, ‘Habermas: Discourse and Cultural Diversity’, 
Political Studies, 51:4 (2003), pp. 740-758.
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A wide range o f identification should be allowed. Freedom of exit and association 
means that individuals should have the choice of freely walking out o f their ascriptive 
group and join a new one. Benhabib thinks that the resolution o f multicultural 
dilemmas occurs through processes of will and opinion formation in civil society. 
These resolutions should be compatible with the three above-mentioned normative 
conditions. These three normative conditions are derived from the two principles of 
discourse ethics that Benhabib is so keen to defend. The two principles o f discourse 
ethics are universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity. According to Benhabib, 
universal moral respect ‘requires that we recognize the right of all beings capable o f 
speech and action to be participants in the moral conversation.’28 The principle of 
egalitarian reciprocity demands ‘that within discourses each should have the same 
right to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, and to ask for justifications of the 
presuppositions o f the conversation and the like.’29 In a deliberative democracy model, 
Benhabib asserts, ‘these principles can be realized through a range of legal and 
political arrangements as well as through noninstitutionalized practices and 
associations in civil society.’30
Benhabib argues that what makes deliberative democracy attractive to 
disadvantaged groups is its focus on democratic inclusion. The inclusion is 
demonstrated through the condition that collective democratic decisions are legitimate 
only if  the engagement of all those who are affected is secured. Additionally, she 
argues that:
deliberative democracy promises not only inclusion but empowerment, 
in that the insistence that democratic legitimacy can be attained only 
through the agreement of all affected assures, at the normative level at 
least, that norms cannot be adopted and institutional arrangements 
advocated at the cost of the most disadvantaged and disaffected.31
28 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 107.
29 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 107.
30 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 107.
31 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 134.
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Democratic theorists have raised several concerns regarding the ability of deliberative 
democracy to accommodate deep-rooted ethno-cultural and nationalist conflicts. 
These concerns, Benhabib suggests, can be divided into two kinds; ‘epistemic 
concerns about the cognitive and affective biases of a deliberative consensus model; 
and political and institutional concerns with the limits of deliberative politics.’321 will 
primarily focus on the epistemic concerns because they touch the underlying 
assumptions that lie at the basis of her account o f democratic inclusion. Benhabib 
argues that the epistemic concerns take three forms. First, the claim that the model can 
accommodate incommensurable, diverse and conflicting values and beliefs in a 
multicultural society is unconvincing. Second, the ‘public nature of reason giving’ 
privileges certain forms o f speech, usually rational and disembodied. Third, the 
requirement to attain ‘reasoned agreement’ or consensus is ‘both unrealistic and 
exclusionary.’34 Benhabib challenges these three charges.
Benhabib rejects the claim of radical incommensurability and argues that it is 
indefensible and inconsistent. For if this incommensurability o f views and beliefs 
existed, ‘we would not be able to know it for we would not be able to state in what it 
consisted.’35 Moreover, though she recognizes the differences in the epistemic horizon 
o f experience, she claims that most of the democratic debates are not about strong 
incommensurables ‘but about divergent and convergent beliefs.’ She goes on to argue 
that ‘very often we do not know how deep these divergences are, or how great their 
overlap may be, until we have engaged in conversation.’ 36 Those who defend 
incommensurability often explain its existence due to social positionality. Social
32 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 133.
33 Political and institutional concerns rise, according to Benhabib, because deliberative democracy 
presupposes a unitary political framework which is insufficiently attentive to demands o f power- 
sharing and secession. Benhabib rejects these concerns because she claims that her notion o f  
deliberative democracy accepts certain power sharing arrangements. While she sees no reason to argue 
against secession on deliberative grounds, she warns that secession is morally costly and politically 
inconsistent within the frame o f modem nation-state given the fact that contemporary practices and 
systems o f citizenship are evolving and transcending the narrow political boundaries o f the old nation 
states. Benhabib gives the example o f Europe and the development o f a European citizenship. One 
might argue that this evolving system of citizenship is very specific to Europe and even in Europe itself 
this did not put an end to demands o f secession raised by the Basque in Spain for instance? For more 
on the political and institutional concerns see: Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, pp. 147-177.
34 Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture, p. 135.
35 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 135.
36 Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture, p. 136.
154
positionality is the view that only those who occupy certain positions and live certain 
experiences can relate to them and therefore this leads to incompatibility with others 
that do not occupy or live the same position or experience. She maintains that when 
we closely examine these social positions we end up with identity politics where 
individuals who occupy certain structures are affiliated with particular discrete groups. 
Consequently, this positionality collapses into essentialism. Defenders of social 
positionality do not tell us much about defining and determining the boundaries o f the 
groups. Moreover, Benhabib argues that it is questionable whether there are ideal - 
typical views that can be attributed to these groups. Put differently, she denies the 
existence of ‘holistic structures of consciousness.’ Furthermore, she claims ‘that 
advocates of social positionality themselves operate with the fiction of a unitary 
consciousness’ because ‘they reduce the contentious debates of every human group 
about itself and its identity to a coherent easily delineable narrative.’37
As against the argument that deliberation or the public nature o f reason-giving 
necessarily favours rational disembodied modes of speech, she argues that the 
deliberative democracy model recognizes the diversity and multiplicity of institutions 
and organizations o f opinion-making in the public sphere. These interconnected and 
overlapping institutions and organizations of opinion-making accept not only reason 
giving but also other forms of speech such as greeting and storytelling. Moreover, 
Benhabib refuses the association o f reason with domination and body with liberation 
of the marginalized. She warns against metaphysical binary divisions such as reason 
versus body, and impartiality versus embodiedness. Melissa Williams and others have 
criticized deliberative democracy for its regulative principle of publicity and 
reasonableness. Simply, Williams’ concern is on how reasons will be defined. What 
will be counted as a reason and what not? More specifically, Williams’ major fear is 
about the acceptance of excluded social groups’ reasons as reasons for public political 
deliberation by other citizens.38 Benhabib argues that the answer to this challenge is 
provided through the distinction between the syntax and the semantics of reasons in 
the public sphere. The syntax of reasons, she asserts, ‘would refer to certain structural
37 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 137.
38 For more on Williams’ views see her article: ‘The Uneasy Alliance o f Group Representation and 
Deliberative Democracy’, in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds.) Citizenship in Diverse Societies 
(Oxford: Oxford Universiyty Press, 2000), pp. 124-152.
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features all statements that articulate public reasons would have to possess.’39 She 
goes on to argue that ‘reasons would count as reasons because they could be defended 
as being in the interest o f all considered as equal moral and political beings.’40 In 
other words, the syntax structures o f reasons lead to the adoption o f policies and laws 
that are in the interest of all because they are the result o f public deliberation that 
involves all o f those are affected by them. The semantics of reason refer to the content 
of reason. While the content of the reason might vary, the normative syntax o f public 
justification is one and not many 41
The last epistemic charge that Benhabib tries to answer is the unattainability of 
consensus. Several scholars have viewed Habermas’s criterion o f consensus among 
participants in deliberation as too demanding and implausible.42 Though his theory 
has gone through significant amendments, he still argues that consensus on moral 
norms must be based on ‘identical reasons’ that are able to convince every participant 
in the same way. Benhabib argues that the answer to this charge lies in Habermas’s 
insistence to maintain the distinction between semantic content o f reasons and their 
syntactical structure. While the first recognizes the plurality o f public reasons, the 
second insists on the uniformity o f the normative syntax of public justification; 
namely ‘that they are in the best interest of all considered as free and equal moral 
beings.’43 The insistence on the universality o f the meta level o f public deliberation, 
namely the universality of the normative structure of public justifications; i.e., being 
in the interest of all viewed as equal and free moral agents, has a totalizing character 
and does not seem to meet successfully the challenge of incommensurability (not the 
radical one but the more moderate). Even when parties compromise upon beliefs and 
values it is not always because it is in the interest o f everybody but other
39 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 140.
40 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p. 140.
41 Michael Ranbinder James has made similar distinction. He distinguishes between form al and 
substantial criteria for justification. See Michael Ranbinder James, ‘Tribal Sovereignty and the 
Intercultural Public Sphere’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 25 (1999), pp. 57-96.
42 By invoking Hannah Arendt’s idea o f ‘enlarged thinking,’ Benhabib makes the distinction between 
‘consensus’ and ‘reaching an agreement’ on the ‘general interests’ that all those who are affected could 
endorse. She argues that the aim o f moral conversation is not to achieve consensus ‘but the “anticipated 
communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement.’” See: Seyla 
Benhabib, Situating the Self Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 8-9.
43 Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture, p. 143.
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considerations play a role. These considerations could take the form o f interests and 
strategic planning. This last point, therefore, raises doubts about the rigid distinction 
between the normative and strategic in democratic political deliberation. Benhabib 
admits that democratic deliberation involves ethical, political (strategic) and moral 
reasoning, yet she insists to maintain the distinction between the normative and 
strategic for it provides a useful (methodological) tool to understand the universalising 
power of normative principles. Though this distinction might serve certain 
methodological purposes, it is not convincing. It is not convincing because it ignores 
what have been recognized, i.e. the interrelatedness, overlap and contradictions 
among normative, ethical and strategic components o f democratic deliberation. 
Briefly, recognizing the analytical significance of the distinction at the meta level 
does not provide a convincing answer to the implausibility of the normative consensus 
endorsed by every participant for the same reasons.
While Benhabib’s notion o f culture (culture as narratively constituted by 
contested accounts) seems appealing because it leads her to view culture not as a 
closed discrete whole but as hybrid, fluid and dynamic, it is, however, based on an 
unconvincing and rigid distinction between the perspective of the ‘social observers’ 
who impose unity and coherence and that o f the ‘social agents’ (insiders) who 
‘experience their traditions, stories, rituals and symbols, tools, and material living 
conditions through shared, albeit contested and contestable, narrative accounts.’44 
This distinction is ill qualified and seems to be incompatible, even contradicts, with 
Benhabib’s argument about the blurring and shifting boundaries o f groups’ identities. 
The question that could be raised here is: how do we distinguish between the outsiders 
and the insiders (along religious, linguistic, racial, national, ethnic lines)? Does not 
this lead to essentialism that her account is trying to reject? Where do you draw the 
line of belonging without collapsing into essentialism? Is it not hard to ascertain 
clearly the boundaries and point of view from which the terms o f ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ make sense? Moreover, one might argue that the dichotomy between 
participant and observer is problematic for we can have the possibility o f participant - 
observation. In anthropology this method is a very developed and well-established 
one. It is true that classic anthropology, both social and cultural, mostly viewed 
culture as closed, whole and homogeneous entity, but recently many anthropologists
44 Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture, p. 5.
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have maintained this kind of participant-observation approach and refused to view 
culture as a closed system of beliefs, values and symbols.45
Several other criticisms can be raised against Benhabib’s modified version of 
deliberative democracy in general and her answers to the epistemic concerns in 
particular. However, I will focus my examination on some issues that cast serious 
doubts about the effectiveness of her account of democratic inclusion to accommodate 
historical exclusion. More specifically, I will argue that while she claims that her 
version of deliberative democracy empowers excluded social groups because of its 
condition o f inclusion; i.e., including all of those who are affected by the decisions 
and policies, her account of democratic inclusion is ill qualified primarily because it 
overlooks three main issues that lie at the core of the demands of historically excluded 
social groups; namely, issues such as collective memory of exclusion, 
acknowledgement o f historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an 
apology. These issues are not arbitrarily chosen but emerge from inclusion as 
involving a norm o f practical deliberation which itself involves an accommodation to 
the past.
First, while her notion of the narratively constituted ‘se lf and the recognition 
of the importance o f narrative knowledge as a legitimate source of raising validity 
claims (hand in hand with discursive knowledge)46 seem to implicitly recognize the 
role o f collective memory as a necessary means to articulate and form our life stories, 
it is not implausible to argue that she stops short of explicitly specifying or further 
explaining the significance of ‘memory o f exclusion’ and historical injustices and 
harms in achieving transformation in the status of the excluded. In other words, it is
45 For more on this issue see: James Clifford and George E. Marcus, Writing Culture: The Poetics and 
Politics o f  Ethnography (Berkeley: University o f California, 1986); James Clifford, The Predicament o f  
Culture: Twentieth-century Ethnography, Literature and Art (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1988); Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994), Orientalism 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1995), Power, Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. 
Said Gauri Viswanathan (ed.), (New York : Pantheon Books, 2001), chapters 8-10, ‘Representing the 
Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors’, Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays 
(London: Granta, 2001), pp. 293-316; Eric R. Wolf, Envisioning Power: Ideologies o f  Dominance and 
Crisis (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999), Europe and the People without History 
(Berkeley; California; London: University o f California Press, 1997); David Scott, ‘Criticism and 
Culture: Theory and Post-colonial Claims on Anthropological Disciplinarity’, Critique o f Anthropology, 
12:4 (1992), pp. 371-394, ‘Culture in Political Theory’, Political Theory, 31:1 (2003), pp. 92-115; 
Adam Kuper, Culture: The Anthropologists’ Account (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1999).
46 See Seyla Benhabib, ‘Epistemology o f Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard’ in 
Feminism/ Postmodernism edited by Linda J. Nicholson (New York; London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 
117- 119.
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not enough to claim that the ‘se lf gets thrown into webs o f narratives and it gets to 
know itself through learning to participate as a conversation partner in these narratives. 
More precisely, for the inclusion of the historically excluded social groups to be 
effective, it is not enough to subscribe to the narrativity o f the ‘se lf and view the 
excluded social groups as full equal partners in the decision making process, but also 
to recognize the role o f memory of exclusion in unmasking inequalities and their 
sources and causes. Memory o f exclusion reveals the unbalanced relationships 
between the dominant and the excluded and challenges the invitation of the excluded, 
often under the pretext of equals, to join the existing institutions and structures 
whereas the ultimate aim is transforming these structures (or creating new ones).
The second weakness of her theory is that her account o f deliberation in an 
intercultural context does not seem to well capture the importance of 
‘acknowledgement’ in political interaction. Acknowledgment goes beyond the 
standard o f reciprocity that equalizes between two unequal parties. It demands the 
recognition of asymmetries and unbalanced power relations. In other words, unlike 
the deliberative requirement for reciprocity that usually masks prolonged and 
embedded unbalanced relations o f power and often equalizes the victim with the 
victimizer, acknowledgement seeks to reveal these asymmetries and demands their 
significance not only as dark events of history that need to be commemorated once a 
year but as fundamental issues for political public debate on the existing political and 
social arrangements. Acknowledgment is closely related to the last weakness that is 
often overlooked or underestimated in Benhabib’s account and in the literature of 
deliberation and dialogue; namely taking responsibility and offering an apology.
The willingness o f the hegemonic and oppressing side to take responsibility 
and offer an apology for the injustices and exclusions that have been committed is of a 
great importance to the demands of historically excluded social groups. Taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for injustices and grievances are not an 
invitation to a politics of balm and retribution, but to a politics o f restitution. Taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for causing injustices and harms by the 
oppressing side do not exempt the oppressed side from having a certain level of 
responsibility for its undesirable situation or justifies internal oppression, i.e., 
oppression within the oppressed group itself. Furthermore, taking responsibility and 
offering an apology by the victimizers do not legitimize morally inconsistent and 
unacceptable activities committed by the oppressed against members of the
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oppressing group. The acknowledgment o f injustices and the readiness to take 
responsibility and offer an apology for causing them, lead to the empowerment o f the 
excluded. This empowerment is reflected not only through the will on the side of the 
oppressed to move beyond revenge but also the readiness to enhance their 
participation in the political system. This readiness stems from gaining more faith and 
trust in the political system and from viewing it as an adequate potential platform for 
representing their demands and voices and for achieving effective transformations in 
existing distorted political and social arrangements.
To sum up, Benhabib’s account o f the politics of complex cultural dialogue 
has several merits. It presents an updated version o f deliberative democracy that tries 
to answer serious challenges raised by opponents and advocates o f deliberation. 
However, it has been argued that her revised notion o f deliberative democracy does 
not sufficiently accommodate claims of historical exclusion. More precisely, it has 
been argued that her notion o f cultural dialogue ignores and overlooks the 
significance of memory o f exclusion, acknowledgement o f injustices and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology, claims that are fundamental to historically 
excluded social groups. Benhabib’s approach has not been the only attempt to present 
a revised and integrative account of politics that aims to efficiently accommodate 
demands of historical exclusion without collapsing into essentialism, closure and rigid 
abstractions. Fred Dallmayr, it is argued, seems to have a more developed and 
compelling account o f intercultural dialogue. The following section is devoted to 
explore and analyse his account.
Fred Dallmayr
Fred Dallmayr proposes a theory of inter-civilizational dialogue to meet the 
challenges of pluralism and exclusion. I will argue that Dallmayr’s account of inter- 
civilizational dialogue seems to be appealing when it is examined in the context of 
historical exclusion primarily because it is hospitable to modes o f speech other than 
rational argument, emphasizes the importance o f memory of exclusion in the struggles 
of oppressed social groups, and does not promote consensus. However, his account 
fails to fully accommodate claims of historical exclusion chiefly because it does not 
address the issues of acknowledgement o f historical injustices and taking
160
responsibility and offering an apology for causing them. Dallmayr relies, among other 
things, on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion o f dialogue to develop his theory o f inter- 
civilizational dialogue. Dialogue in his theory is not an abstract individual activity but 
an interactive, concrete and situated practice. Every dialogue, according to Gadamer, 
starts from the sedimented prejudices or background assumptions (historical and 
cultural pre-judgments) o f interlocutors. These pre-judgments should be viewed as 
enabling rather than disabling elements o f journeys to the otherness o f the unfamiliar. 
Dallmayr argues that dialogue, as presented in Gadamer and Buber,47 seems to be 
exclusively ‘human-centered or /ra/w-centered.’ This, he insists, is not satisfactory 
because civility is only one dimension o f the human experience. We must take into 
consideration other dimensions of the human experience.48 He thematizes these 
corollaries under the labels ‘nature’ and ‘the divine.’ Unlike contemporary Western 
philosophy that sees these different dimensions of human experience as clearly and 
rigidly separated (polarized and dichotomous; reason versus non-reason, human 
versus nature, humans versus divine etc; or in the form o f totalizing fusion - Hegel), 
Dallmayr stresses that they are interconnected and related. In other words, unlike the 
binary or totalizing notions of difference found in identity politics, Dallmayr, inspired 
by Martin Heidegger’s notion of ontology; the ontology of Dasein as ‘Being - in - the- 
world’, opts for an alternative notion of difference that recognizes interconnectedness 
across boundaries. What lies at the core of this ontology is the idea of 
‘connectedness;’ ‘everything is connected to everything else and nothing exists in 
isolation.’49 Moreover, against the dominance o f a rational argumentative discourse or 
‘occidental rationalism,’ Dallmayr offers a more flexible mode o f speech. He invokes 
Michael Oakeshott’s ‘conversational speech’ to offer an alternative form of 
conversation,
Dallmayr tries to examine the meanings of the term ‘civilization’ as it appears 
in the Western culture. He establishes the linkage between the term ‘civilization’ and 
‘civility’. In other words, he makes the case for the link between the life of citizens in
47 Martin Buber is also famous for supporting the dialogical aspect o f human experience.
48 Fred R. Dallmayr, Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices (New York: Palgrave, 
2001), p. 3.
49 Hwa Yol Jung, (book review), ‘Doing Philosophy in the Age o f Globalization (“Idquo 
Modernization”)’, Human Studies, 24:4 (2001), p. 338.
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city - polis - and citizenship. He claims that there are two, complementary, terms that 
are closely related to the term civilization. These are nature and divine. In the Western 
tradition they were usually and misleadingly viewed as in opposition to civilization. 
Nature is viewed as limiting the city and divine as transcending and going beyond the 
worldly temporality o f the city. Dallmayr does not prefer to view nature and divine as 
counter terms but constitutive supplements or corollaries to civilization. The 
relationships between civilization and its corollaries are complex and dynamic. In the 
Western tradition, the relationship between civilization and its supplements were often 
characterized as conflictual and oppositional, i.e., dichotomous. Aristotle’s distinction 
between physis and polis got more oppositional connotation with the time especially 
in modem times. In modem social and human sciences binary distinctions between 
‘nature’ and ‘culture’, ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ and ‘states of nature’ and ‘civil state’ 
were strongly drawn. The relationship between civilization and the divine in the West 
was usually viewed as conflictual, though there were episodes o f reconciliation too. 
The distinction between the earthly and heavenly city is an example o f that. Dallmayr 
wants to challenge these distinctions and go beyond them through Gadamer’s 
proposal o f hermeneutical dialogue. In discussing the origins o f the Western 
civilization, Gadmaer refuses to view ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’ as contradictory or 
mutually exclusive but, though tensional, mutually complementary. Western 
civilization, one may argue, ‘has largely evolved in the interstices of the two central 
labels, Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian.’50 Dallmayr claims that ‘modernity’ is a 
third element that is constitutive of the Western culture. Though carrying certain 
elements from the two previous constitutive components, it broke with those 
traditions. Briefly, Dallmayr identifies in the West a ‘civilizing process’ that has been 
operating in the history o f the West. Dallmayr maintains that ‘civilization’ is 
multidimensional, complex and subject to various interpretations and readings.
Dallmayr claims that the rational universal argumentative discourse has 
dominated the Western culture. This form of discourse (scientific and technological) 
clearly favours instrumental reasoning directed towards practical efficiency. Dallmayr 
claims that Habermas proposes communicative reason and rationality as the solution 
for the theoretical quarrels between radical diversity or contextualism and unified
50 Fred R. Dallmayr, ‘A Gadamerian Perspective on Civilizational Dialogue’, Global Dialogue, 3:1 
(2001), p. 69.
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metaphysical holism or universalism. 51 Habermas argues that communicative 
rationality is the best way of reconciling the One and Many. Habermas revisits the 
traditional debate on the One and Many. He examines the Platonic dominance of ‘the 
One as the origin and ground of everything.’ He examines later developments in the 
One and Many as they appear in Kant, Hegel and contemporary philosophers such as 
Richard Rorty. According to Dallmayr, Habermas’ alternative secular-humanist 
approach, concludes “‘that the unity of reason only remains perceptible in the 
plurality o f its voices- as the basic possibility of a contingent-occasional, but 
intelligible passage from one language into another’” 52
Habermas’s approach, according to Dallmayr, has a lot o f merits. Most 
importantly, it recognizes the linguistic turn, i.e., the move from a monological cogito 
to intersubjective communication, and moves from a metaphysical reason (the 
Archimedean privileged point) to a post-metaphysical reason that is situated but also 
can be transcended. Habermas grounds reason and rationality on the concrete, worldly, 
ordinary and trivial human experience. Habermas’s work has been, rightly according 
to Dallmayr, criticized for privileging certain voices and specific modes of speech. 
This type o f criticism we found in the writings of scholars such as Iris Marion Young 
and Lynn Sanders.53
Based on these criticisms o f Habermas’ theory, Dallmayr suggests a more 
flexible mode o f communication. He argues that Michael Oakeshott offers a more 
adequate mode o f speech; namely ‘conversational speech.’ The key term in 
Oakeshott’s theory is ‘conversation.’ Though it might include argument as a mode of 
interaction, conversation is not an argumentative encounter where communicators 
seek to exchange exclusively rational claims; nor is a strategic contest where the
51 Habermas, ‘The Unity o f Reason in the Diversity o f Its Voices’ in Postmetaphysical Thinking: 
Philosophical Essay, William Mark Hohengarten (trans.) (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 115-148.
52 Dallmayr, Dialogue Among Civilizations, p. 37.
53 See for example: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, 
in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-35; Lynn Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’, 
Political Theory, 25:3 (1997), pp. 347-76. Daina Coole raises similar argument too. She argues that a 
‘strategy o f exclusion and marginalization’ is inherent in his argumentative discursive approach 
because it is still based on binary dualism o f reason versus unreason and inside versus outside and 
therefore misses the excess or as she puts the alterity o f the other. Diana Coole, ‘Habermas and the 
Question o f Alterity’, in Maurizio Passerin d’Entreves and Seyla Benhabib (eds.), Habermas and the 
Unfinished Project o f Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 221-244.
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primary goal of the speakers is to win over each other.54 Conversation is a more 
inclusive form of communication because it is open to a wider range of modes of 
speech. Briefly, it hosts people’s hopes, frustrations, beliefs and convictions, 
differences and contestations. Dallmayr calls this form o f communication ‘thick 
conversation’ or ‘thick dialogue.’ It is a conversation o f ‘self-transgressive friendship’. 
Dallmayr goes on to insist that dialogue should not be viewed anymore as an 
interaction between an ego-alter ego. Rather, it should be viewed as ‘an encounter 
between mutually decentred agents involved in a transformative event.’55 Following 
Oakeshott, Dallmayr claims that ultimately ‘conversational encounter is not “an 
enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize”; 
rather, it “is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure.’” This conversational paradigm 
better captures the human experience o f communicative interaction because ‘it 
recognizes the qualities, the diversities, and the proper relationships of human 
utterances.’56 Oakeshott’s ‘conversation’, Dallmayr argues, offers us an alternative 
route to the imposed abstract universalism or the range of self-sealed essentialist 
particularism.
Dallmayr argues that a genuine dialogue necessitates openness to the otherness 
o f the other, i.e., to the strange. In dialogue speakers seek mutual understanding 
through adjusting and articulating their views, claims and ‘prejudices within a 
language that evolves to accommodate and ultimately transform disparate 
understandings into mutually intelligible meanings.’57 Therefore, dialogue necessarily 
involves crossing borders and divides to the unknown and unvisited. In short, cross- 
cultural understanding or dialogue is a reciprocal and transformative experience. 
However, Dallmayr is cautious not to present this cross-cultural dialogue as a 
harmonious and easy mixture of different perspectives. Following the Russian 
dialogist Mikhail Bakhtin, and unlike the totality and closure of the Hegalian
54 Dallmayr, Dialogue Among Civilizations, p. 31.
55 Dallmayr, Dialogue Among Civilizations, p. 45.
56 Dallmayr, Dialogue Among Civilizations, pp. 31-32.
57 Roxanne L. Euben (review essay), ‘Journeys to “The Other Shore”’, Political Theory, 28:3 (2000), p. 
403.
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dialectics, Dallmayr believes in the ‘unfinalizability’ of dialogue.58 Moreover, he is 
aware o f the complexities and multidimensionality that characterize each side o f the 
encounter.59 Unlike Habermas and other thinkers who claim that reflexivity (the 
ability to distance oneself from tradition) and the expansion o f perspectives stem from 
‘Occidental rationalism’, Dallmayr argues that a ‘genuinely cosmopolitan 
philosophical discourse’ emerges from those who are situated at the ‘crossroads... 
between East and West, between polytheism and monotheism, and also between 
tradition and modernity.’ It is through this mediated and negotiated territory, through 
the in-betweeness o f the Western- non-Western, past and future, ‘se lf and ‘other,’ 
and modernity and tradition, that cross cultural dialogue emerges. It is a dialogue that 
moves beyond Orientalism and Occidentalism.60
Dallmayr strongly supports the recognition o f the persistence o f differences 
and multiplicity o f voices in political theory. Based on his views on the inclusiveness 
o f dialogue or conversation, he refuses to view political theory as an exclusively 
Western enterprise. Consequently, he discusses and examines usually unnoticed views 
and voices of thinkers from India, Near East, Africa and South America. It is precisely 
this claim o f inclusiveness that exposes his account to criticism. Not only that 
Dallmayr’s account of the range o f possible cross-cultural encounters is inspired and 
determined by his explicit reliance on hermeneutics and continental philosophy, the 
main criticism against Dallmayr, according to Roxanne Euben, is that he engages with 
few voices and therefore ignores others. In other words, he seems to ignore women’s 
voices, Islamic voices or post-colonial feminist theorists’ voices. It is precisely 
because Dallmayr is committed to cross-cultural dialogue and recognizes the 
multiplicity of voices that he needs to include more voices especially of those who 
disagree with the significance of cross cultural dialogue, worldliness and
58 On Bakhtin’s ‘unfinalizability’ o f dialogue and ‘dialogism’ see: Stephen Hutchings, ‘Ghosts o f the 
Machine: Literature as Translation Mechanism in Post-Soviet Televisual Representations o f Westem- 
ness’, International Journal o f Cultural Studies, 5:3 (2002), pp. 291-315. And Simone Dentih, 
Bakhtinian Thought: An Introductory Reader (London ; New York : Routledge, 1995).
59 Though Dallamyr recognizes this complexity and multidimensionality, he is quite dismissive 
regarding the attempt to move from postmodern recognition of unfixed identities; i.e., hybridity, into an 
“ultrapostmodemism” of radical destabilization that leads to tasteless and characterless 
cosmopolitanism as it appears in the work o f Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze. Briefly, he fears the tendency 
of the latter to ‘cultural relativism and radical alterity (or the absolute otherness o f the other).’ See: 
Jung, ‘Doing Philosophy in the Age o f Globalization’, p. 340.
60 Euben, ‘Journeys to “The Other Shore’” , p. 404.
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hermeneutical projects. Euben argues that if ‘living together in a postcolonial world’ 
forces us to engage in intercultural dialogues then ‘it is crucial to engage those with 
systematic and politically powerful objections to cross cultural engagement itself.’61 
Dallmayr’s reliance on hermeneutics is quite problematic because Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics is too fiisionist. Gadamer views interpretation as a transsubjective event 
(every interpreting subject draws on a background of implicit-holistic assumptions; 
‘linguistic disclosure,’ that are always beyond their control) that ultimately leads to 
‘fusion o f horizons.’ Some scholars have charged Gadamer o f being too consensual or 
fiisionist and overemphasizing transsubjectivity and therefore leaving little space, if 
any, for reflexivity and critical engagement. Hans-Herbert Kogler claims that 
‘Gadamer’s linguistic idealism plays itself out negatively in his harmonistic 
conception of the undisturbed fusion of interpretive horizons within interpretation.’ 
For ‘Instead o f being able to develop a critical hermeneutics that preserves the alterity 
of the other within understanding,’ he ‘is finally forced, because o f his truth-oriented 
linguistic holism, to conceive o f interpretation either as a shared agreement about the 
subject matter or as the disengaged description of contextual factors that “explain” the 
other’s otherness.’62 Nevertheless, Dallmayr refuses this charge and argues that in his 
latter writings, especially his exchange with Derrida, Gadamer clearly distanced 
himself from fusionism in favour of recognizing the inexhaustible alterity o f the other 
in dialogue and the ‘unfinalizability’ o f interpretation 63
Despite these criticisms, Dallmayr’s account o f inter-civilizational dialogue 
seems appealing to accommodate historical exclusion. It is appealing because of 
various reasons. First, his account of cross-cultural dialogue is not consensual. While 
he rejects the Hegelian total synthesis o f different perspectives or a fiisionist 
interpretation of Gadamer and favours a more open and flexible form o f 
communication, he clearly refuses to endorse radical hybridity often celebrated by 
extreme postmodernists. Second, relying on the work of Milan Kundera, Dallmayr, 
emphasizes the importance of memory not as an avenue for escapism and nostalgia
61 Euben, ‘Journeys to “The Other Shore’”, pp. 404-405.
62 Hans-Herbert Kogler, The Power o f Dialogue: Critical Hermeneutic after Gadamer and Foucault 
(trans.) Paul Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 14.
63 See: Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism, pp. 31-32. Also, Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer 
(eds.), Dialgue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter (Albany: State University o f  
New York Press, 1989).
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but as a means to ‘retrieve resources of empowerment and social imagination, 
resources enabling humans, especially the oppressed and marginalized, to “struggle 
against power.’” 64 Put differently, the need to hear the voices o f the excluded and 
oppressed necessarily involves the recognition of the significance o f memory in 
revealing inequalities and injustices. Briefly, Dallmayr supports the view that for 
dialogue to be liberating and transformative it must ‘embrace memory-work: above all, 
by recollecting the asymmetry between oppressor and oppressed.’65 Finally, unlike 
Habermas’ normative deliberation that unconvincingly rules out certain important 
modes of communication or strategic contestation that emphasize interest, 
manipulations and accepts distorted forms o f communication, Dallmayr’s cross- 
cultural dialogue does not only accommodate diversity of beliefs, passions, values, 
frustrations and wishes but also hopes to transform them through the invitation to the 
otherness of the other. Ultimately this invitation aspires to form constructive 
relationships; ones of humanism and friendship that exceeds indiscriminate 
universalism, ethnocentrism, Orientalism or other undesirable forms o f relations.
Though Dallmayr’s account seems more appealing than the other two accounts 
discussed in this chapter, it does not, however, fully capture the demands of 
historically excluded social groups. For it does not clearly address the issues of 
acknowledgement o f historical injustices and taking responsibility and offering an 
apology for causing them. These two elements, it has been argued in the introduction 
of the thesis, are interlinked to collective memory of exclusion and play a crucial role 
in achieving an effective accommodation of historical exclusion. Put differently, they 
are crucial for the reparation and restoration of lasting institutionalised grievances and 
harms. Briefly, Dallmayr’s recognition o f the importance o f memory falls short of 
capturing other core issues that are crucial for effectively tackling demands of 
historically excluded social groups.
To sum up, while Dallmayr’s account o f politics recognizes certain important 
demands of historically excluded social groups, particularly a wide range of different 
modes of speech and the significance o f memory for empowerment and revealing 
inequalities, it does not clearly refer to other constitutive components o f the politics 
required to sufficiently accommodate demands of historical exclusion. These other
64 Dallmayr, Dialogue Among Civilizations, p. 105.
65 Dallmayr, Dialogue Among Civilizations, p. 116.
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constitutive components are acknowledgment of historical injustices and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for causing them. These constitutive 
components are intimately linked to recognizing the role o f memory o f exclusion in 
practical deliberation. Following the failure of the three accounts discussed in this 
chapter to sufficiently accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups, 
the next chapter seeks to offer a more compelling ‘candidate’ that meets these issues.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the integrative approaches of Bhikhu Parekh, 
Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr, have not been entirely successful in fulfilling 
their promise, i.e., to propose effective accounts of democratic inclusion which are 
capable of fully accommodating demands of historically excluded social groups. More 
specifically, the chapter has examined the revised notions o f intercultural dialogue 
and deliberation enthusiastically proposed by Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and 
Fred Dallmayr. It has argued that while each o f these three accounts have several 
different merits, they, nevertheless, in different degrees fail to fully accommodate 
claims o f historical exclusion. It has been argued that their failure, among other things, 
stems from ignoring the significance of collective memory o f exclusion (clearly not in 
the case o f Dallmayr and to less extent in the case of Benhabib), acknowledgment of 
historical injustices and harms and taking responsibility and offering an apology for 
causing these historical injustices and harms.
Thus far the thesis has argued that the egalitarian theories o f deliberative 
democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative 
approaches have not been sufficiently successful in accommodating demands of 
historically excluded social groups. In the following chapter I will argue that it is ‘the 
politics o f reconciliation’ that promises effective solutions to several problems that 
have been disabling the egalitarian deliberative theories of democracy, identity 
politics and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative approaches to accommodate 
fully demands of historically excluded social groups.
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SECTION IV: THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION 
7. THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION
Thus far I have argued in this thesis that the democratic accounts of 
accommodation offered by egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity 
politics and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative approaches are insufficiently 
attentive to demands of historically excluded social groups. Their insufficient 
attentiveness stems primarily, but not exclusively, from overlooking the significance 
o f crucial issues that reside at the basis o f the claims o f historically excluded social 
groups. These crucial issues include: collective memory o f exclusion,
acknowledgment o f historical injustices, taking responsibility and offering an apology 
for causing these historical injustices. This chapter argues that it is the politics of 
reconciliation that promises effective solutions to many o f the problems that plague 
the hitherto discussed accounts o f democratic inclusion when they face demands o f 
historically excluded social groups. The politics of reconciliation accords capital 
significance to confronting the past, acknowledging injustices and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. The emphasis on 
these issues o f memory, acknowledgement, responsibility and apology is important 
because it helps, among other things, to unmask and explain historical injustices and 
their intimate link with present inequalities and bring into public attention the 
specificities of the experiences o f oppression and exclusion and the need to address 
them.
The politics o f reconciliation which will be defended in this chapter is one that 
simultaneously refuses the blindness o f deliberative democracy to history and 
memory and avoids several main risks of identity politics and post-structuralism. The 
politics of reconciliation presented in this chapter does not fully endorse essentialism 
but recognizes the existence o f authoritative traditions that construct communities and 
groups. Moreover, the politics of reconciliation acknowledges the interdependence 
and overlapping of identities, but refuses the excessive level o f fluidity of identities 
that undermines the very possibility of politics. Therefore, the politics of
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reconciliation that is presented here occupies a mid way between essentialism and non 
essentialism. Furthermore, the chapter goes on to argue that it is to the revised notions 
of deliberation and recognition found in the integrative approaches that the politics of 
reconciliation is proposed as a supplement to. In other words, reconciliation needs not 
be viewed as an alternative or competitive notion to these revised notions of 
deliberation and recognition but as a complementary component. Put differently, in 
order to successfully tackle issues pertaining historical injustices we cannot and 
should not embark on deliberation and recognition without guaranteeing a sufficient 
and serious attention to memory, acknowledgement, responsibility and apology.
Additionally, this account of the politics o f reconciliation is distinct because it 
demands social and cultural transformations that require revising cultural and social 
norms, practices and images. Therefore, by demanding social and cultural changes, 
the politics of reconciliation undermines the fixation o f identities often found in 
identity politics. Furthermore, it acknowledges that these social and cultural 
transformations take time and do not occur over night and therefore it rejects the 
excessive fluidity and subversion endorsed by post-structuralist critics o f recognition. 
The politics of reconciliation accords a significant role for narration and story-telling 
that involve interpretations and theretofore it secures a room for contestation rather 
than conformism, homogeneity and consensus. Finally the politics o f reconciliation 
seeks and embraces the solidarity o f international and local organizations and activists 
and therefore extends the struggle beyond the narrow boundaries o f the particular 
national, ethnic, racial or cultural group. This solidarity does not only help the politics 
o f reconciliation to meet the challenge o f essentialism through the participation of 
non-members in the struggle against historical injustices, but also helps the politics of 
reconciliation to refute the charge raised against it as inhibiting dialogue and mutual 
understanding because it allegedly supports monopoly on suffering and views the 
oppressed as epistemically privileged in understanding their own condition. In other 
words, seeking and embracing local and international solidarity disprove the claims of 
those who accuse the politics o f reconciliation as supporting the view that experiences 
of oppression give rise to specific perspectives and feelings that are fully transparent 
and accessible only to the oppressed and cannot be sufficiently shared and understood 
by those who do not live these experiences of oppression.
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part critically examines 
different approaches to reconciliation and argues in favor o f a particular account of
170
the politics of reconciliation which is the most adequate to capture the particularities 
of experiences of oppression and accommodate historical injustices. The politics of 
reconciliation could be accused, among other things, o f promoting essentialism and 
revenge and inhibiting dialogue and mutual understanding. The second part is devoted 
to explore these charges and examine the relationship between reconciliation, 
deliberation and recognition. The third part examines the applicability of the main 
principles of reconciliation to mortal and milder communal and inter-group conflicts.1 
While it is often agreed that reconciliation could be an effective tool to deal with 
mortal conflicts between different nations and communities, this part suggests that the 
notion o f reconciliation and its three main principles are valid and applicable to milder 
conflicts as well. The applicability of these principles will be examined in the context 
of three different types o f group conflicts; political conflicts between national groups; 
social conflicts between social, cultural and racial groups; and finally conflicts 
between indigenous communities and the larger colonial newly established societies. 
The last part briefly outlines institutional and practical questions related to 
reconciliation.
Part I
Interrogating the literature on reconciliation
One of the weaknesses of the literature on reconciliation has been the 
excessive focus on conflict violence, order and stability primarily derived from a 
perspective of International Relations. Recently, some scholars have started 
presenting reconciliation as begging normative questions of pluralism and diversity in 
historically divided societies. This part seeks to critically present some of the main 
views on reconciliation. The debate on reconciliation has intensified after the 
formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. 
Reconciliation is a highly contested concept. Views on reconciliation in divided 
societies are very diverse. These views include perceiving reconciliation as a religious
1 By mortal conflicts I mean ongoing violent conflicts that involve activities such as war, ethnic 
cleansing, occupation and abuses o f human rights and breaching o f treaties. The violent national 
conflicts in Kurdistan, Palestine and Kashmir are typical forms o f mortal conflicts. Milder conflicts are 
less enduring and violent. They do not involve extreme destabilization. They do not involve physical 
violence, war and abusive violation o f fundamental human rights. Demands o f cultural recognition 
such as language, folklore and cultural practice are milder types o f conflicts.
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and confessional enterprise, a juridical and legal tribunal, a secular public discursive 
forum, or a nation building project. Scholars who adopt these views often base their 
approaches on liberal, communitarian, deliberative or agonistic principles. The appeal 
to these philosophical and normative principles has led to different and sometime 
incompatible interpretations and conclusions about the nature and character of 
reconciliation. The politics of reconciliation advocated in this chapter offers a 
different take on historical exclusion and injustices than the discursive, religious, 
juridical, or nation building forms o f politics. Let me turn to critically explore the 
adequacy of some of the main approaches o f reconciliation to effectively 
accommodate claims of historical injustice before moving to present my own take in 
the following section.
Underlying a nation-building project are the ideas o f national integration and 
state-building. In this model of state-building an undifferentiated notion of citizenship 
is viewed as the ultimate vehicle for achieving social harmony, stability and 
legitimacy. Reconciliation in the nation-building model is supposed to integrate the 
excluded in the political community as free and equal citizens that are entitled to the 
same set o f rights enjoyed by members o f the hegemonic groups. One major difficulty 
that emerges from viewing reconciliation through the lenses o f an assimilative nation- 
building project is its principal focus on achieving order and stability rather than 
addressing questions o f justice and exclusion. Another difficulty stems from treating 
oppression as the case of sporadic individuals in which the remedy to it is to grant 
these individuals citizen’s rights in abstraction from their particular experiences and 
history of exclusion. Moreover, the nation-building project presupposes the existence 
of a unified political community whereas what is at stake in many divided societies is 
precisely the very possibility of this community. In some cases historically excluded 
social groups contest the very possibility o f forming a community and demand self- 
determination and secession.2
In the confessional model, or what Gutmann and Thompson calls the 
‘compassionate justification’, reconciliation seeks ‘restorative justice’ which is based 
on the idea of forgiveness. To achieve restorative justice, the victimises should 
recognize the harm they have caused to the victimised and express remorse and in
2 Paul Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South 
Africa’, Australian Journal o f Politics and History, 49:2 (2003), pp. 182-196; Andrew Schaap, 
‘Agonism in Divided Societies’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 32:2 (2006), pp. 255-277.
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turn the victims should grant them forgiveness. The difficulty with this form of 
reconciliation is that it relies on a specific interpretation of a theological, Christian, 
value that is not shared by all Christians and other non-Christian groups who have 
their own comprehensive doctrines.3 Moreover, it is well documented for example 
that in the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa several 
people refused to confess or admit that they have committed wrongs and survivors 
and families o f victims refused to grant forgiveness for what they viewed as 
unforgivable abuses and demanded reparation. Consequently, several scholars have 
concluded that coming to terms with past atrocities, abuses and injustices should not 
occur through confining reconciliation to a ‘Christian ethical economy of sin, guilt, 
confession and redemption,’ but through viewing reconciliation as a from of politics 
which seeks to reveal and address socio-economic, political and cultural patterns of 
domination.4
Scholars such as William J. Long and Peter Brecke have proposed a model of 
‘social forgiveness’ which is based on evolutionary psychology rather than on 
theological grounds. Their model emphasizes the issue o f acknowledging past 
injustice and grievances in terms of ‘truth telling.’ They have suggested three other 
principles. First, the redefinition of the identity of the conflicting sides. This 
redefinition involves self-empowerment and transformation which lead to moving 
beyond victimhood and humanizing the ‘other’ or the enemy. Second, the conflicting 
parties must give up the option of revenge, though it might be justified. Third, an urge 
for public contact and interaction between the conflicting parties hoping to form a 
new relationship that is different from the previous one. Long and Brecke go on to 
argue that emotions and reason are simultaneously engaged in reconciliation and that 
their model o f ‘social forgiveness’ is based on evolutionary psychology which views 
emotions as ‘products o f an evolutionary process: the results o f functional adaptation.’ 
This theory suggests that the mind’s structure has evolved in a way that integrates
3 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, ‘The Moral Foundations o f Truth Commissions’ in Robert I. 
Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (eds.) Truth V. Justice: The Morality o f Truth Commissions (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 29-33.
4 Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa,’ pp. 
192. For a useful discussion on the influence o f Christian elements on the Australian political debate in 
general and on reconciliation with Aboriginal people in particular see: Michael Phillips, ‘Aboriginal 
Reconciliation as Religious Politics: Secularisation in Australia’, Australian Journal o f Political 
Science, 40:1 (2005), pp. 111-124.
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emotion and reason and both deal with social problems.5 The authors admit that there 
have been other attempts, relying not necessarily on psychological cognitive terms, to 
demonstrate the connectedness between reason and emotion. Yet they insist to base 
their claim on evolutionary psychology. They argue that ‘Evolutionary psychology, 
which is informed by evolutionary biology, offers an alternative framework for 
explaining the reconciliation process that connects social theory with the natural 
sciences and attempts to integrate human reasoning with human emotions.’ This 
approach, they insist, ‘begins by assuming that theories of human motivations and 
behaviour must be consistent with the fact that the human mind is an evolved 
structure, a fact consistent with modem biology.’6 They suggest that their claim leads 
to a new understanding of rationality that is broader than the narrow notion in rational 
choice theory. While their theory focuses on important issues concerning historical 
injustice such as acknowledgement and transformation, one o f its main problems, 
however, is that the evolutionary psychology which their theory heavily rests on leads 
to problematic and unconvincing conclusions about the process o f reconciliation. 
Implicit in this evolutionary approach is a notion o f progress that views effective 
reconciliation processes to be a characteristic o f ‘mature’ and ‘civilized’ nations and 
groups. Put differently, this hierarchical and discriminatory approach is problematic 
because it is likely to view excluded and marginalized social groups as ‘uncivilised’ 
and ‘immature’ partners for reconciliatory politics.
Another common approach to reconciliation is the ‘historicist model’ of 
reconciliation, or what is often referred to as ‘juridical model.’ This approach views 
the task of reconciliation as revealing the historical truth about past violence and 
wrongs. Revealing historical truth about past violence and wrongs often occurs 
through the work o f ‘revisionist historians’ who expose denied and ignored violent 
events, activities and atrocities committed against excluded social groups. This ‘new 
history’ undermines the master national narrative and requires revisiting and rewriting 
certain parts o f the national narrative. The debate on this ‘new history’ becomes more 
important when it exceeds the academic circles and turns into a public debate on 
national history, exclusion and oppression. Finding historical truth, according to this 
model, is indispensable for creating common inclusive ground for future social and
5 William J. Long and Peter Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict 
Resolution, (The MIT Press, 2003), pp. ix, x, 27.
6 Long and Brecke, War and Reconciliation, pp. 24-25
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political cooperation. However, one problem that plagues this model is that it views 
historical truth as constant and fixed entity that can be revealed without being 
influenced by the social and cultural contexts in which it has been unmasked. In other 
words, the difficulty is in the claim that historical truth has a single and final 
interpretation.7 Another problem with this model is that the new exposed history 
which reveals denied atrocities, abuses and oppressions often gets displaced and 
reduced by the opponents, usually members o f the hegemonic groups, into a scientific 
controversy on the interpretation o f history and reliable methodologies of historical 
investigations among historians, academics and experts rather than a social issue with 
a great significance to the public and its future.8 For example, in both Israel and 
Australia the views o f the revisionist historians who exposed historical materials that 
questioned the validity o f main tenets o f the national narratives failed to remain on the 
public agenda and were reduced by the hegemonic groups into academic and 
scientific debates and therefore diffused their potential influence on the public.9
Other scholars such as Paul Muldoon and Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson have argued that a discursive approach is the most appealing approach to 
reconciliation. For example Muldoon argues that a discursive approach to 
reconciliation, or what he calls truth-telling, places political deliberation at its core.10 
According to him, reconciliation should be viewed as a conversational forum for 
public deliberation about the past and its links to the present. Public deliberation, 
Muldoon claims, is grounded on two premises, namely ‘reciprocity and openness’. 
According to this understanding of reconciliation, the oppressors and the oppressed
7 Gutmann and Thompson, ‘The Moral Foundations o f Truth Commissions’, pp. 33-35.
8 Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa,’ pp. 
188-191.
9 For more on the Israeli revisionist historians see: Joel Beinin, ‘Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits 
of the New Israeli Histoiy’, Journal o f Palestine Studies, 34:2 (2005), pp. 6-23; Kristen Blomeley, ‘The 
‘New Historians’ and the Origins o f the Arab/Israeli Conflict’, Australian Journal o f  Politicals cience, 
40:1 (2005), pp. 125-139; Norman Finkelstein, ‘Myths, Old and N ew ’, Journal o f Palestine Studies, 
21:1 (1991), pp. 66-89; Nur Masalha, ‘A Critique o f Benny Morris’, Journal o f  Palestine Studies, 21:1 
(1991), pp. 90-97; Benny Morris, ‘Response to Finkelstein and Masalha’, Journal o f Palestine Studies, 
21:1 (1991), pp. 98-114. Fore more on the Australian revisionist historians see: W.E.H. Stanner, After 
the Dreaming: The 1968 Boyer Lectures (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1969); Paul Muldoon, 
‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa,’ Australian 
Journal o f  Politics and History, 49:2 (2003), pp. 182-196; Andrew Schaap, ‘Agonism in Divided 
Societies’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 32:2 (2006), pp. 255-277.
10 Note that I do not examine Gutmann and Thompson’s theory in this chapter because it has been 
extensively explored in chapter 2 of the thesis.
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are expected to embark on a dialogical venture where each one o f them is supposed to 
visit the ‘shores’ o f the ‘other’ and try to understand the experience o f history from 
the perspective o f that ‘other’. Put differently, the conflicting parties are expected to 
be able to exchange roles, i.e., putting themselves in the shoes of each other, in order 
to achieve mutual understanding. For reconciliation to be effective and go ‘beyond a 
mere clash o f opinions,’ participants to conversation need to have the courage to 
reassess their views by being ‘open’ to the perspectives of their adversaries. 
According to this understanding of reconciliation, ‘divided memories’ need not be 
seen as a problem that hinders the construction of unified national identity which can 
be solved through conventional liberal tools of assimilation or secession. Divided 
memories should be viewed as an opportunity for renegotiating the moral foundations 
o f the existing political arrangements based on concerns of justice. This process of 
renegotiation, Muldoon claims, rests on the appreciation o f the experiences o f the 
opponents which leads to understanding and ‘emancipation’. It is understanding and 
emancipation that lead to transforming the moral foundation of the political order. 
Muldoon refers to Habermas’ ‘intersubjective praxis o f argumentation’ as a tool 
which could legitimise these changes in the moral foundation.11
It is precisely this enthusiastic appeal to procedures of political deliberation 
that poses some problems to Muldoon’s account. He argues that these procedures of 
political deliberation are ‘expressly outlined or clearly implied in a good deal of the 
literature on reconciliation and do not require further elaboration here.’12 The problem 
here is that procedures o f political deliberation indeed require further elaboration. For 
the premises that underlie these procedures o f political deliberation in Muldoon’s 
account, i.e., openness and reciprocity, demand that participants in conversation use 
argumentative mode o f speech (‘intersubjective praxis o f argumentation’) and appeal 
to an ideal of ‘reasonableness’ in order to achieve mutual understanding. Like the 
egalitarian theories o f deliberative democracy, Muldoon’s discursive approach is 
subject to the charge that what counts as reasonable claims and legitimate modes of 
speech are likely to correspond and reflect the norms and values o f the powerful and 
downplay or ignore the norms and values o f the oppressed and excluded.
11 Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa’, 
pp. 195-196.
12 Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa’, p. 
195.
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Muldoon, however, is careful not to overlook the asymmetry in the 
relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor and argues that it is the 
members of the powerful groups who are first expected to look at things differently. 
He goes on to argue that while in order to avoid the reproduction of the patterns of 
domination we should maintain an initial suspicion towards the views o f the dominant, 
we must view both parties to conversation as equally ‘willing to undertake an 
imaginative entry into another worldview -  both must accept the obligation of 
democratic reciprocity’.13 Muldoon is right to place more burden on the side o f the 
oppressor to review their perspectives but this is not enough to address historical 
injustices. What is required for an effective process o f reconciliation is not only an 
initial suspicion but also recognizing the established and embedded asymmetries and 
inequalities in material as well as symbolic resources and the responsibility of the 
oppressors on causing these asymmetries and inequalities. This is why recognizing 
memory is not enough and it has to be accompanied, among other things, by the issues 
of acknowledgement, taking responsibility and offering an apology. Briefly, a 
deliberative approach to reconciliation is not sufficient to fully account to historical 
exclusion. It needs to be supplemented by a politics of reconciliation that clearly 
insists on the asymmetries between the oppressor and the oppressed and underscores 
the centrality of the issues of acknowledgement, responsibility and apology.
Other scholars such as Andrew Schaap have adopted an agonistic approach to 
reconciliation. Schaap relies on Carl Schmitt’s and Hannah Arendt’s ideas to develop 
his notion of reconciliation. According to Schaap, reconciliation is a political 
enterprise that seeks to transform a relation o f enmity into one o f civic friendship. 
Unlike those who presuppose a moral community that needs to be restored or a notion 
o f reasonableness that the conflicting parties need to appeal to, an agonistic approach 
to reconciliation claims that a common political community and a notion of 
reasonableness are the result of political deliberation and contestations which 
inevitably involve power relations. Schaap’s account is seemingly appealing because 
o f its emphasis on the operation of power relation in politics and identity formation 
and the persistence of conflict and disagreement in politics. However, his account is 
problematic because, among other things, it endorses hybrid and fluid notions o f 
culture and identity that lead to abstractions from the concrete experiences o f
13 Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa’, p. 
194.
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exclusion, fails to offer practical proposals to cash out the agonistic ideas, and 
considerably downplays the significance o f authoritative and distinctive cultural 
traditions on forming collectivities and cultural boundaries.14
The appropriate form  o f  the politics o f  reconciliation
Thus far I have explored several main approaches to reconciliation and 
demonstrated their inadequacies. Moreover, the previous chapter has examined the 
revised notions of intercultural dialogue and deliberation enthusiastically proposed by 
Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr to effectively accommodate 
historical exclusion suffered by social groups. These notions, it has been argued, 
enjoy a number of different merits but suffer from various serious weaknesses. More 
precisely, the previous chapter has argued that these accounts o f deliberation and 
intercultural dialogue are not satisfactory because they tend to overlook the 
significance of fundamental issues that underlie the claims o f historically excluded 
social groups. These issues include: collective memory o f exclusion, acknowledgment 
of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing 
these injustices.
This section of the chapter argues that these three crucial issues and several 
other relevant ones are better captured by a particular account of the politics of 
reconciliation. The argument advanced here is that since this account o f the politics of 
reconciliation adequately encompasses these three principles it becomes a crucial 
element in addressing demands o f historically excluded social groups. Put differently, 
the inclusion of the three core issues of memory, acknowledgement and responsibility 
and apology, endow it with the ability to be sufficiently attentive to the specificities of 
the defining experiences of historical oppression and exclusion.
Let me now start characterizing the form of the politics o f reconciliation that is 
most adequate to effectively accommodate historical exclusion and oppression. 
Unlike those who tend to individualise and psychologise the process o f reconciliation
14 Andrew Schaap, ‘Agonism in Divided Societies’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 32:2 (2006), pp. 
255-277; For more on other agonistic accounts o f reconciliation see: Aletta J. Norval, The 
Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse (New York: Verso, 1996); Colin Perrin and Scott Veitch, ‘The 
Promise o f  Reconciliation’ Law, Text, Culture, 4:1 (1998), pp. 225-232; Jacques Derrida, On 
Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London: Routledge, 2001).
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in the sense of reducing it into an interpersonal process or an intrapsychic process, the 
analysis here views it as an inter-group process that is embedded in power relations.15 
Longstanding common experiences o f oppression give rise to a set o f special claims 
and demands that go beyond the mere recognition of culture and identity and the 
postulation o f abstract egalitarian principles of deliberation and justice. Most 
importantly among these demands are: collective memory o f exclusion, 
acknowledgement of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an 
apology for causing these injustices. These three demands emerge and require special 
treatment because o f the significance of the past in achieving democratic 
accommodation through unmasking and explaining historical injustices and their 
intimate connection with present inequalities. I will start by discussing and explaining 
the centrality of the three, often, overlooked principles o f memory of exclusion, 
acknowledgment and responsibility and apology to the politics o f reconciliation and 
then I will move, in the next part, to examine other constitutive characteristics of 
reconciliation16 that will be derived from refuting often raised charges against 
reconciliation.
Firstly, the politics of reconciliation that this thesis favours is one that 
recognizes the significance of collective memory and history of exclusion. Collective 
memory and history of exclusion are important, according to this account of 
reconciliation, because they often serve as invaluable sources for undermining and 
confronting the dominant views, stories, narratives and past and present political 
arrangements and practices. These dominant views, stories, narratives and political 
arrangements tend to downplay or deny historical injustices and harms. In other words, 
collective memory and history o f exclusion operate as counter narratives to the 
hegemonic institutionalized and often celebrated account o f national history. The
15 For more on this point see: Rouhana, Nadim N., ‘Identity and Power in the Reconciliation o f  
National Conflict’, in Alice H. Eagly, Reuben M. Baron and V. Lee Hamilton (eds.), The Social 
Psychology o f  Group Identity and Social Conflict: Theory, Application, and Practice (Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), p. 174.
16 See for example: Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), Dilemmas o f Reconciliation: Cases and 
Concepts (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), p.3. They emphasize the issue o f  
acknowledging past injustices and harms. Eric Yamamoto and Susan Serrano argue that reconciliation 
necessarily involves what they call ‘the four R’s’: recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and 
reparations for victims. For more see: Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan K. Serrano, ‘Healing Racial 
Wounds? The Final Report of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ , in Roy L. 
Brooks (ed.), When Sorry Isn 7 Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations fo r Human 
Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 492-500. See: William J. Long and Peter 
Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution, (The MIT Press, 2003).
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significance of these counter narratives is to bring to public attention voices, stories, 
inequalities that either have been silenced or denied. The national account of history 
either denies or downplays the occurrence of past harms and portrays the dominant 
group as irresponsible for causing these harms. Several scholars have emphasized the 
role of collective memory as challenging and countering the hegemonic national 
accounts of history. Thomas McCarthy has pointed out that a distorted account of the 
history of slavery and its consequences on African Americans has considerably 
contributed to the refusal of the broader white American society and its establishment 
to recognize the historical injustices of slavery, to take responsibility for causing them 
and for linking them to present racial exclusions.17 In his analysis o f the case of 
reconciliation in South Africa and Australia, Paul Muldoon points out the significance 
o f what he calls, following Heribert Adam, ‘divided memory’ in casting doubts and 
undermining the national narrative and moral foundations of its political order.18 
Burke Hendrix has argued that the mainstream celebrated American national 
narratives downplay or deny the historical injustices and harms of slavery, racial 
segregation and the massive expropriation o f Native lands. While focusing on the land 
claims o f Native Americans, Hendrix has argued that memories and narratives of 
Native Americans that lend support to their land claims have challenged the 
mainstream American national narratives and demanded their revision and 
reformulation so they acknowledge the historical injustices committed against Native 
Americans.19 Historically excluded social groups are often suspicious o f the universal 
formal discourse o f legal equality that tends to underestimate or disqualify, and in 
many cases deny, their stories and memories o f oppression and exclusion. The politics 
o f reconciliation provides a more hospitable platform for these memories and stories
17 See: Thomas McCarthy, ‘ Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in the USA: On the Politics o f Memory o f  
Slavery’, Political Theory, 30:5 (2002), pp. 623-648; ‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the 
Morality and Politics o f Reparations for Slavery’, Political Theory, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772.
18 Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa’, 
pp. 182-196.
19 Burke Hendrix argues that both groups need to revise their memories in a process o f reconciliation. 
However, she insists that the revision has to occur mostly on the side o f those who are not Natives. For 
more on her views regarding the significance o f memories in Native American land claims see: Burke 
A, Hendrix, ‘Memory in Native American Land Claims’, Political Theory, 33:6 (2005), pp. 763-785. 
For more on the role o f memory see also: Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, Lewis A. Coser 
(ed. and trans.) (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1992); The Collective Memory, Francis J. Ditter, 
Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); and Milton Takei, ‘Collective 
Memory as the Key to National and Ethnic Identity: The Case o f Cambodia’, Nationalism & Ethnic 
Politics, 4:3 (1998), pp. 59-78.
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to be expressed and voiced.20 In previous chapters I have argued that egalitarian 
theories of deliberative democracy are problematic because, among other things, their 
abstract procedures and rules either tend to ignore or downplay the specific and 
defining experiences o f the oppressed social groups by abstracting and subjecting 
them to generic and universal concepts of justice and rights.21
However, voicing these memories and stories o f exclusion is crucial but not 
sufficient because they also need to be acknowledged. This leads us to the second 
principle of reconciliation, namely acknowledgment. Reconciliation necessarily 
involves acknowledging these historical injustices and sufferings and seeks to repair 
them. As long as these past injustices are denied or portrayed as accidental historical 
incidents and not as an integral part o f the national narratives, the achievement of 
democratic accommodation is hardly attainable, if at all, from the perspective of the 
historically oppressed social groups. Hendrix has argued that unless past wrongs 
against their ancestors are acknowledged as an integral part o f the United States 
history, it will be very hard for Native Americans to trust the broader society and its 
institutions and identify with them.22 Thomas McCarthy has advocated a similar 
argument in the case of African Americans and the history o f slavery and 
segregation.23
20 It should be emphasized here that I am not implying that reconciliation is always inclusive. 
Sometimes the mandate o f the reconciliatory bodies is narrow and specifies certain types o f atrocities 
and injustices that should be addressed and therefore excludes other crucial types o f injustices. The 
denial and exclusion o f these injustices lead to a distorted form of reconciliation. In Argentina for 
example, reconciliation processes addressed only the disappearances and killings leaving a 
considerable number o f cases o f torture and political detention unaddressed.
21 In his analysis o f the paradoxes that are invested in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa, Emilios Christodoulidis argues that law or justice inevitably require classification and 
categorization that necessarily lead to abstractions and reductions and therefore fail to grasp the 
complexities, contingencies and particularities o f  persons and events. Conversely, reconciliation is 
sensitive to these particularities, complexities and contingencies because it embraces flexibility, 
plasticity and reflexivity. Christodoulidis argues that the Truth and reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa is trapped in a paradox that stems from being simultaneously a public confessional forum and a 
legal juridical tribunal. He contends that law and reconciliation or justice and mercy are incompatible. 
For while law requires the reductions o f risk, reconciliation necessarily demands openness, risk, and 
reflexivity. See: Emilios A. Christodoulidis, “ Truth and Reconciliation’ as Risks’ Social and Legal 
Studies, 9:2(2000), pp. 188-190.
22 Hendrix, ‘Memory in Native American Land Claims’, pp. 775.
23 McCarthy, '’Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in the USA: On the Politics o f Memory o f Slavery’, 
Political Theory, 30:5 (2002), pp. 635-636. The issue o f  acknowledging past injustices and harms is 
also discussed in: Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), Dilemmas o f Reconciliation: Cases and  
Concepts (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003); and William J. Long and Peter 
Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution, (The MIT Press, 2003).
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The demand of acknowledgement is intimately linked to third principle of 
reconciliation, i.e., taking responsibility and offering an apology. Reconciliation does 
not only require the acknowledgment of historical injustices and grievances but also 
expects the oppressor(s) and dominators to take responsibility for causing these 
injustices and offer public apology. Taking responsibility and offering an apology are 
o f great significance not only because of moral reasons of admitting wrongs but also 
due to practical concerns such as redistribution of material resources and holding 
alleged criminals accountable. Additionally, taking responsibility and offering an 
apology for past injustices go beyond distributive changes and entail activities such as 
the creation of national symbols, public holiday, museums, memorials and introducing 
new curriculum in the education system to commemorate these past injustices.24 The 
task o f these activities is not to romanticise and perpetuate guilt or victimhood. Rather, 
they are significant because of their social and pedagogical influence. That is, they are 
important because they help citizens to differently understand their history and its 
connection to the current distorted political, social and economic inequalities. 
Furthermore, they help members o f stigmatized and excluded social groups to reclaim, 
re-describe or transform their self-understanding and self-image.25 Lately many liberal 
politicians, such as the prime minister of Britain Tony Blair and the prime minister of 
Japan Junichiro Koizumi, have offered public apologies for the injustices and 
grievances that were committed by their countries in Asia and Africa. These apologies 
are ineffective for they often take spurious responsibility that fails to understand the 
claims of the previously oppressed peoples and does not involve real transformations
24 In the literature there is a distinction between two general forms o f reparation. The first is called 
compensatory and often directed toward individuals and the second form is called rehabilitative and 
directed towards groups. These reparations can be either monetary or non-monetary. Examples o f non­
monetary reparations are amnesty, apology, affirmative actions and services such as health and 
education. Non-monetary reparations ‘can be more effective than cash in responding to the victims’ 
individual or collective current needs.’ See: Roy L. Brooks, ‘The Age o f Apology’, in Brooks, Roy L., 
(ed.), When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations fo r  Human Rights 
(New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 3-11.
25 For more on taking responsibility and offering an apology and their material and symbolic 
consequences see: Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan K. Serrano, ‘Healing Racial Wounds? The Final 
Report o f South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ , in Roy L. Brooks (ed.), When Sorry 
Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations fo r Human Rights (New York: New  
York University Press, 1999), pp. 492-500; McCarthy, ‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the 
Morality and Politics o f Reparations for Slavery’, pp. 765-766; Balfour, ‘Reparations After Identity 
Politics’, p. 790; and Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after 
Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).
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and serious compensations and reparations.26 Briefly, in many cases of historical 
exclusion acknowledging and taking responsibility and offering an apology are 
incomplete if they remain either symbolic or exclusively take the form of material 
compensation.
The question of responsibility becomes even more complicated when the 
perpetrators are not alive and belong to a previous historical period or when the 
society is composed from successive and culturally diverse waves o f immigration. Yet 
while it is quite plausible not to charge current generations of the injustices committed 
by their ancestors, it is not unreasonable to see them politically (not personally)27 
responsible because they are beneficiaries of the resources and gains of the historical 
injustices committed by their ancestors.28 Additionally, the current situation and 
circumstances o f several excluded social groups have explicit and causal link to past 
injustices. For example, it is plausible to argue that the current socioeconomic 
situation o f the African Americans is related to their history o f slavery.29 Furthermore, 
some scholars argue that some psychological fears of previously oppressed and 
persecuted generations pass to current generations ‘through emotional ties and 
identities.’30 To sum up, for the politics of reconciliation to achieve an effective
26 For more on apology see: Roy L. Brooks (ed.), When Sorry Isn ’t Enough: The Controversy over 
Apologies and Reparations fo r Human Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1999); For a 
useful discussion on apology as a social, dyadic (involves two parties offended and offender) and 
relational concept and practice and its different modes see: Nicholas Tavuchis , Mea Culpa: A 
Sociology o f Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991).
27 Following Hannah Arendt several scholars have convincingly distinguished between personal 
responsibility and political responsibility. The latter is distinct from the former in being both vicarious 
and involuntary. Andrew Schaap argues that political responsibility is ‘vicarious because a citizen may 
be held liable for things he or she did not do and it is involuntary because it results from his or her 
(typically not chosen) membership o f a political community’. Andrew Schaap, ‘Guilty Subjects and 
Political Responsibility: Arendt, Jaspers and the Resonance o f the ‘German Question’ in Politics of 
Reconciliation’, Political Studies, 49:4 (2001), pp. 749-766.
28 Janna Thompson insists that the responsibility o f members o f a nation necessarily includes accepting 
responsibility over the actions o f their ancestors. Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility fo r  the Past: 
Reparation and Historical Injustice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
29 For more on this point see: McCarthy, ‘ Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in the USA: On the Politics o f  
Memory o f Slavery’, p. 636; ‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics o f  
Reparations for Slavery’, pp. 757-758; Balfour, ‘Reparations After Identity Politics’, p. 790; and 
Hendrix, ‘Memory in Native American Land Claims’, p. 775.
30 For more on these claims o f responsibility see: Roy L. Brooks (ed.), When Sorry Isn't Enough: The 
Controversy over Apologies and Reparations fo r Human Rights (New York: New York University 
Press, 1999), pp. 8, 417-421; Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia 
and the New South Africa,’ Australian Journal o f Politics and History, 49:2 (2003), pp. 191, 193-194;
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accommodation of historical injustice it should fully capture these three fundamental 
issues that lie at the core of demands of historical exclusion.
Part II
Additional characteristics and main charges against the politics o f  reconciliation
Thus far, it has been argued that the most adequate form of the politics of 
reconciliation is one that places significant emphasis on confronting the past, 
acknowledging injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for 
causing these injustices. The emphasis on these issues is important because it helps to 
bring into public attention the specificities of the experiences o f oppression and the 
present political and social inequalities and the need to transform them. The politics of 
reconciliation, it is often believed, promotes essentialism, views members of 
oppressed social groups as epistemically privileged in understanding their own 
condition, supports a politics of revenge that romanticizes the past, and presupposes 
consensus and unity among the members o f the excluded social group. In the 
following paragraphs, I aim to present some additional characteristics of the politics 
o f reconciliation and demonstrate how it refutes most o f these challenges. Put 
differently, these characteristics, I will argue, considerably enhance the ability o f the 
politics of reconciliation to efficiently accommodate demands o f historically excluded 
social groups.
The version of the politics of reconciliation defended in this thesis is one that 
simultaneously refuses the blindness of deliberative democracy to history and avoids 
several main risks of ‘identity politics’ and post-structuralism. Unlike egalitarian 
theories of deliberation that adopt a ‘strategy of avoidance;’ i.e., a strategy that 
relegates fundamental characters of gender, ethnicity, national belonging and other 
cultural characteristics to the background o f politics, the politics o f reconciliation 
shares with the politics of recognition the claim that these characteristics need to be 
taken seriously. Put differently, the politics of reconciliation refers to these 
characteristics as fundamental components to politics and its agents, i.e., individuals. 
The politics of reconciliation refuses to cast individuals as abstracted and
and McCarthy, ‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics o f Reparation for 
Slavery’, Political Theory, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772.
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decontextualized entities that live out of time and history. Rather, it clearly favours a 
notion o f selfhood that views individuals as embedded beings in history, society, 
culture and tradition. The experiences o f exclusion and oppression are likely to 
enhance the feelings o f connectedness to particular systems of beliefs and norms.
However, the account of reconciliation I defend here is one that does not fully 
endorse the essentialism found in identity politics in which oppressed social groups 
are viewed as possessing a fixed and unified identities. Rather, it recognizes the 
existence o f authoritative traditions that enable a communal character. Seemingly the 
politics o f reconciliation entails an essentialist notion o f culture because it requires 
processes that involve discrete and delineated conflicting sides. It is not implausible, 
however, to claim that in addition to its sensitivity to particularities and complexities 
of oppression, the politics of reconciliation demands transformations that could 
bypass the challenge o f essentialism. The transformative character of reconciliation 
requires the redefinition of the relationships between the ‘se lf and the ‘other’ in a 
more constructive manner that obscures, to certain extent, the previous rigid 
boundaries o f ‘us’ and ‘them’ which have led to rejection, exclusion and violence. 
While this power of transformation points out towards a certain flexibility in identity 
and culture, it is far from endorsing a hybrid and fluid notion o f culture, a notion that 
is usually endorsed by post-structuralist critics o f identity politics. Indeed, the politics 
of reconciliation acknowledges that social and cultural transformations take time and 
do not occur fast. Briefly, the politics of reconciliation that is presented here strikes a 
very fine balance because it occupies a mid point between essentialism and non 
essentialism. Moreover, while the integrative approaches make the most progress 
towards offering a form of democratic inclusion that is more attentive to historical 
injustices, their accounts remain insufficient because either they overlook 
fundamental principles of reconciliation such as responsibility and apology or when 
they recognize the role of memory they insist on the symmetry and equality of 
memory and history between the victim and the oppressor.
The politics of reconciliation recognizes that passionate modes o f speech such 
as testimony and story-telling are fully legitimate modes o f communication and 
expression.31 However, this does not entail the rejection of rational argument. In other
31 John Bomeman focuses on reconciliation processes after extreme violent conflicts such as ethnic 
cleansing and argues in favour o f the primacy o f the practice o f listening or witnessing. This activity o f  
listening or witnessing is a constitutive tool for healing after a violent conflict. Witnessing, Bomeman
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words, contrary to various models, such as the egalitarian models o f deliberation, 
where emotions are usually divorced from rationality and viewed as external or 
irrelevant to deliberative processes of problem solving, the politics o f reconciliation 
insists on the significance of emotions together with reasons to conflict resolution. 
Reconciliation does not only involve rational calculation but also deep and intensive 
emotional responses. By according a significant role for narration and story-telling 
which are likely to involve diverse interpretations, the politics of reconciliation 
secures room for contestations rather than conformism and homogeneity. This leads 
us to the charge o f consensus against reconciliation.
Contrary to scholars such as David Crocker who views the politics of 
reconciliation as leading to harmony and consensus or conversely to minimal 
workable coexistence, the politics of reconciliation defended here neither aims at 
minimal coexistence nor consensus. Rather, it aspires to sustainable coexistence. The 
politics of reconciliation is not necessarily consensual because invoking historical 
narratives and memory of exclusion secures contestations and conflicts. In other 
words, according to this understanding o f reconciliation the past is not viewed as a 
fixed factual entity but as a realm o f experience that gives rise to different and 
conflicting interpretations, narratives and memories. Some o f these interpretations, 
narratives, and memories will be settled and some o f them will remain contested. 
Therefore, reconciliation provides a platform for voicing, discussing and confronting 
deeply contested and controversial political issues in a context in which their denial or 
avoidance is likely to lead to an ineffective and unstable political system. In 
discussing the goal o f reconciling former enemies, David Crocker distinguishes 
between three meanings o f reconciliation ‘ranging from “thinner” to “thicker” 
conceptions.’ The first meaning is a mere modus vivendi; minimal coexistence 
between former enemies who comply with agreed procedures and laws instead of 
violence. This form is called ‘simple coexistence.’ The second meaning requires more 
engagement in public affairs and the show of respect to fellow citizens. In other words, 
though the parties still disagree, they are expected to do more than just ‘live together 
non-violently.’ This form of reconciliation is called by Mark J. Osiel ‘liberal social
insists, is different from confessing in several ways. While confessing that aims to achieve forgiveness, 
focuses on the perpetrator and is often imposed, witnessing focuses on the victim and is voluntary. The 
ultimate aim of witnessing or listening is truth telling that creates an opportunity for new experiences 
and horizons and changes social situations. Bomeman, ‘Reconciliation after Ethnic Cleansing: 
Listening, Retribution, Affiliation’, Public Culture, 14:2 (2002), pp. 281-304.
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solidarity’ and by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson ‘democratic reciprocity.’32 A 
thicker conception of reconciliation is the one that lies at the core of truth 
commissions like the ones in Chile and in South Africa. In this more robust form of 
reconciliation, the attempt is to go through reconciliatory processes that involve 
‘forgiveness, mercy (rather than justice), a shared comprehensive vision, mutual 
healing, or harmony.’33 This latter form of reconciliation, Crocker maintains, is more 
challenging to defend. As he puts it: ‘Given the depth o f hostility between past 
opponents and objections to coercing mutuality or contrition, these thicker 
conceptions of reconciliation are more difficult to defend than the thinner notions.’34 
While the author is right to imply that the first two models; modus vivendi and 
‘democratic reciprocity,’ are primarily about managing conflicts, he is wrong in 
presenting them as milder forms of reconciliation. For reconciliation, as its main 
hitherto discussed principles have indicated, is not about minimal agreed procedures 
o f maintaining a relatively peaceful situation, but it aspires to attain a more 
transformative optimistic and substantial form of politics. Put differently, unlike 
conflict resolution and management, the case of modus vivendi and ‘democratic 
reciprocity,’ that seek to achieve compromises and agreements on minimal principles 
and procedures that reflect the existing distorting power relations between the 
conflicting groups, reconciliation necessarily requires deeper transformations and 
reparations that profoundly undermine the existing ‘balance’ o f power and 
distribution of resources.35
Reconciliation has a very particular transformative power. Though it cannot 
guarantee a complete healing,36 reconciliation necessarily requires both the promotion
32 David A. Crocker, ‘Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework’, in Carol A.L. Prager 
and Trudy Govier (eds.), Dilemmas o f Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts (Waterloo Ont.: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2003), p. 54.
33 Crocker, ‘Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework’, p. 54.
34 Crocker, ‘Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework’, p. 55.
35 Nadim Rouhana draws a very useful distinction between three different processes: conflict settlement, 
conflict resolution and reconciliation. For more on this distinction see: Rouhana, Nadim N., ‘Identity 
and Power in the Reconciliation o f National Conflict’, in Alice H. Eagly, Reuben M. Baron and V. Lee 
Hamilton (eds.), The Social Psychology o f Group Identity and Social Conflict: Theory, Application, 
and Practice (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), pp. 174-176.
36 In some cases providing testimonies about suffering and oppression invoke repressed and denied 
feelings, pains and memories that might worsen the situation o f the victims. Other victims are not 
willing to meet their oppressors because they feel that confronting them will expose them to dangers
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of existing and the creation of new, mechanisms of healing to address psychological, 
emotional and social problems. Prolonged subjection to oppressive social and political 
regimes and various types o f exclusion and rejection lead human beings to suffer 
emotionally, psychologically and socially. This suffering could take various forms 
such as injury, pain, shame, low self-esteem, anger depression, guilt, despair and what 
is known in psychology as ‘post-traumatic stress disorder.’ Healing could take 
different forms and faces such as creating memorials and monuments for the killed 
people, naming public places in the honour of victims, conducting religious and 
spiritual activities, forming solidarity groups and using artistic modes to express 
suffering and oppression.37 While dealing with these emotional and psychological 
disorders requires a cognitive recognition and change, healing the political exclusions 
and rejection should be translated into institutional changes that correspond to a new 
agenda of resources allocation. This is particularly important because while 
psychological support and healing are crucial for the victims, reconciliation has to 
influence and enhance their material and social conditions. The healing powers of 
reconciliation, therefore, indicate the transformative potential implicit in it. For former 
antagonists change their own views or at least tend to rethink them. Reconciliation 
aspires to overcome rooted mistrust and antagonism between historically conflicting 
social groups. It involves a stage o f transition and transformation for something new. 
Regardless their character and deepness, reconciliatory events entail a liminal stage. It 
is a stage o f transition and in-betweenness that involves disorientation and 
displacement and therefore allows space for reflexivity and criticism. This reflexivity 
could lead to different outcomes in their nature and strength. Eventually, these 
outcomes are not characterized by exhaustive and conclusive integration between the 
former adversaries, rather an enhanced new negotiated setting of coexistence is 
created. While this new setting recognizes contestations and the persistence of 
conflicts, it does not aim to achieve minimal simple coexistence but one that is 
sustainable.
and deteriorate their psychological and emotional situation. This is particularly true when the 
perpetrators are not persecuted.
37 For more on these healing methods and others see: See Daan Bronkhorst, Truth Commissions and 
Transitional Justice: A Short Guide fo r Users (Amnesty International Dutch Section, 2003), pp. 24-25.
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Finally, it is often said that the politics of reconciliation inhibits mutual 
understanding and dialogue because it assigns an epistemic privilege to the excluded 
in understanding their own experiences and conditions. This accusation is not 
persuasive because the politics o f reconciliation advocated here is one that seeks and 
embraces the solidarity of international and local organizations and activists and 
therefore extends the struggle beyond the narrow boundaries of the particular 
excluded social group.38 This solidarity does not only help the politics of 
reconciliation refute the charge raised against it as inhibiting dialogue and mutual 
understanding because it supposedly views the oppressed as epistemically privileged 
in understanding their own conditions, but also helps it to meet the challenge o f 
essentialism through welcoming the participation of non-members in the struggle 
against exclusion and oppression. In other words, seeking and embracing local and 
international solidarity undermine the claims of those who accuse the politics of 
reconciliation as promoting essentialism and supporting the view that experiences o f 
exclusion give rise to particular perspectives and feelings that are fully transparent 
and accessible only to the oppressed and can hardly be grasped by those who do not 
live these experiences o f exclusion.
The relationship between the politics o f  reconciliation, deliberation and recognition.
Thus far, I have defended the politics of reconciliation against certain potential 
challenges and explored various characteristics that demonstrate the attractiveness of 
reconciliation to accommodate the demands of historically excluded social groups. 
The diverse characteristics of reconciliation together with its accommodation o f the 
three core issues of memory, acknowledgement and responsibility and apology, 
endow it (i.e., reconciliation) with the ability to be sensitive and sufficiently capture 
the specificities of the experiences and claims of historical oppression and exclusion. 
A fundamental question that emerges here, however, regards the relationship between 
the politics of reconciliation, deliberation and recognition. Does the politics of 
reconciliation entail surrendering deliberation and recognition? Are these concepts
38 Martha Biondi stresses the importance o f a transnational and national solidarity with the African 
Americans’ reparations movement. See her article: ‘The Rise o f Reparations movement’, Radical 
History Review, 87 (2003), p. 15.
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incompatible or complementary ones? This section argues that reconciliation, 
deliberation and recognition are compatible. That is, when dealing with historical 
injustices and aiming to settle them, the politics of reconciliation is a crucial 
supplement to deliberation and recognition. In other words, in historically divided 
societies the politics o f reconciliation is inevitable to sufficiently accommodate the 
demands o f historically excluded social groups.
Unlike scholars such as Emilios Christodoulidis and Andrew Schaap who, 
though they hold slightly different views, propose reconciliation as a substitute to 
ordinary politics in divided pluralistic societies, I argue that reconciliation is not a 
comprehensive frame for the operation of politics but a supplement to deliberation 
and recognition.39 Put differently, I argue that in order to successfully accommodate 
demands and experiences o f historical exclusion and oppression, we cannot and 
should not embark on deliberation and recognition without guaranteeing the operation 
o f the politics of reconciliation. Several scholars such as Emilios Christodoulidis have 
viewed reconciliation as a future oriented notion (in the sense that it is forward- 
looking) that offers a complete and exhaustive frame for the operation of politics in 
divided societies. These views are unconvincing not only because they downplay the 
significance o f the past in present politics and reduce it to symbolic accessories, but 
also because reconciliation tends to lack a regulative procedural character that is 
required to move forward into ordinary political decision-making. Reconciliation is 
primarily a backward oriented concept that recognizes memory of exclusion and 
asymmetries in power relations. Deliberation is primarily a forward oriented concept 
that provides regulative procedures for taking decisions. Consequently, reconciliation 
and deliberation fulfil different and complementary tasks. While the principal task of 
reconciliation is to insist on the significance o f the historical dimension in claims of 
historically excluded social groups, the main task o f deliberation is to provide 
regulative principles that govern political deliberation and decision-making. However,
39 Though these scholars have some differences in their views, they all favour an agonistic form of  
politics. Besides their failure to translate their views and ideas into practical detailed accounts on how 
reconciliation operates, they implicitly end up, unwillingly, adopting what they strongly reject, i.e., 
impartiality. The demand that reconciliation transforms people’s views through mutual understanding 
inevitably requires the appeal to a notion o f impartiality. It is this impartiality that they accuse 
liberalism and deliberative democracy o f promoting. Moreover, their agonistic approaches favour 
hybrid and fluid notions o f identity and culture that lead to a form o f individualism that does not only 
fail to recognize the existence o f authoritative and distinctive cultural traditions and boundaries, but 
also yields extreme abstractions from context. Additionally, these agonistic approaches to politics tend 
to over-exaggerate the indecisiveness, instability and fluidity o f politics.
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the politics of reconciliation is not compatible with any notion of deliberation. Rather 
it favours deliberation as presented in the integrative approaches. That is, deliberation 
which is hospitable to modes o f speech other than rational argumentation. Put it 
differently, a thicker notion of deliberation which views modes o f speech, such as 
story-telling, testimonies and greetings, as legitimate modes of political deliberation. 
Briefly, unlike those who view reconciliation as offering a complete frame for the 
operation o f politics after confronting past atrocities and wrongs, its significance does 
not lie in its future oriented tendency because it lacks regulative principles that 
deliberation or theories of justice and recognition provide. Rather, its importance lies 
in its insistence on making the past relevant to the present and capturing the 
particularities and specificities of the experiences o f exclusion and oppression.40
The politics o f reconciliation shares with the politics o f recognition the 
fundamental centrality it assigns to experiences of exclusion in politics. In other 
words, the politics o f reconciliation endorses the bias that the politics o f recognition 
shows towards demands o f excluded social groups. However, it goes beyond the 
politics of recognition in its emphasis on the significance o f the historical dimension 
in cases of longstanding oppression and injustices. This historical dimension, it has 
been shown, gives rise to a set o f specific claims that require a special treatment that 
is most adequately captured by a politics o f reconciliation. The politics of 
reconciliation, therefore, operates as a medium for revealing and debating hitherto 
denied or repressed historical injustices that are intimately linked to present 
inequalities. In itself the politics of reconciliation does not offer a comprehensive 
frame for the operation of politics in historically divided societies but it is a crucial 
supplement.
The significance of reconciliation to deadly and long-standing conflicts 
between groups, states and communities such as genocide, forced migration or
40 The claim that reconciliation embraces the specificities o f experiences o f exclusion and oppression 
and is sensitive to issues o f context and situatedness is close to some views advocated by the feminist 
standpoint theory. However, it should be emphasized that the politics o f reconciliation is not a 
standpoint theory. One main difference is that the politics o f reconciliation rejects the claim o f  the 
standpoint theory that insists that members o f excluded social groups have a ‘privileged’ understanding 
of their experiences o f  oppression and exclusion. For more on the standpoint theory see: Nancy 
Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power: towards a feminist historical materialism (NewYork: Longman, 
1983); Sandra Harding, ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: what is ‘strong objectivity’?’, in Linda 
Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (eds.), Feminist Epistemologies (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 49-82; 
Liz Stanley and Sue Wise, Breaking Out Again: Feminist Ontology and Epistemology (London: 
Routledge, 1993); and Sandra Harding and Merill B. Hintikka (eds.), Discovering Reality: Feminist 
Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy o f  Science (Dordrecht: 
Reidel, 1983).
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expropriation and slavery, is quite established in the literature. However, the claim 
that reconciliation is also applicable to milder social political conflicts is not a 
straightforward one and needs to be demonstrated. In other words, does reconciliation 
have any relevance to the claims of excluded social groups such as immigrants, 
religious and ethnic groups, and homosexual and lesbian communities? To which 
extent does reconciliation solve the problems o f these groups? The following part tries 
to tackle these and other questions by examining primarily the applicability o f the 
three principles of reconciliation (i.e., collective memory o f exclusion, 
acknowledgment of historical injustices and finally taking responsibility and offering 
an apology for causing these injustices) to different types o f group conflicts ranging 
from mortal to milder non-mortal forms o f conflict.
Part III
The applicability o f  the three principles
This part examines the applicability of primarily three principles of 
reconciliation, namely, collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical 
wrongs and grievances, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing 
them, to three different types of group or communal violent and non-violent conflicts. 
These conflicts are: national conflicts between contesting national and political 
groups; social, cultural and racial conflicts; and finally conflicts between indigenous 
communities and colonial societies.41 The purpose o f this part is to demonstrate the 
operation o f these principles in extreme lasting conflicts as well as in milder ones42
41 It is very plausible that the classifications and distinctions I present here are reductive and overlook 
subtle and substantial differences. Yet my aim here is not to offer an exhaustive list o f  group conflicts 
classified along different lines such as ethnicity, nationality, gender, life-style etc., but to show the 
applicability o f reconciliation to different communal conflicts. Several scholars make different 
classifications. For example, in his discussion o f the issue o f social unity in liberal democracies, Will 
Kymlicka draws a distinction between immigrant communities and national minorities. He 
distinguishes between two types o f diversity; ‘polyethnic’ diversity and multinational diversity. The 
former is the result o f voluntary immigration and the latter is the result o f  ‘involuntary corporation of  
previously self governing societies.’ He argues that unlike the demands o f immigrant communities, that 
are usually demands o f inclusion and full citizenship, the demands o f national minorities pose serious 
challenges to the social cohesion and stability o f liberal democracies. For more on this see: Will 
Kymlicka, ‘Social Unity in a Liberal State’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 13:1 (1996) especially pp. 
106-115.
42 Violent conflicts are those ones that involve physical violence and abuses such as killing, torturing, 
raping, and destroying property and infrastructure. Spite, contempt and psychological harms are
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Showing the operation of these principles in different types of group conflicts 
ultimately serves to strengthen the argument advanced in this chapter about the 
significance o f reconciliation to historically divided and pluralistic societies. I shall 
first examine the applicability o f these principles to national conflicts, then move to 
social conflicts and end by considering conflicts between native communities and 
colonial societies. While the aim is to demonstrate the operation o f these principles in 
different types of communal and inter-group conflicts, it should be emphasized that 
there is a kind o f hierarchy or priority in the relevance of reconciliation in these types 
of conflicts. More specifically, in national conflicts where there is a strong case of 
historical exclusion, the politics of reconciliation is urgent, in conflicts between 
indigenous and colonial societies it is quite pressing, and in the case of social conflicts 
it is less pressing.
Conflicts between national political communities
How do the three principles of reconciliation, (memory, acknowledgment and 
responsibility and apology), apply to national political conflicts? The conflicts in 
these cases are usually between two conflicting political communities. The main 
driving force of the conflict is the national belonging or identities o f the contesting 
parties. The conflicting sides are usually concentrated in bordering territories, 
sometimes overlapping and intersected. The claims o f the conflicting groups are often 
articulated in the form of the right to national self-determination. The right to national 
self-determination takes different forms ranging from autonomy, self-government up 
to total secession. Secession, therefore, could be a plausible result o f reconciliation. 
Yet, it has to be economically and politically viable and morally convincing.43 In 
these types of group conflicts, regardless the kind of solution achieved, the three
included in the milder or non-violent conflicts all the while acknowledging that these forms o f  
oppression might nevertheless feel very serious to the immediate victims, my point is to categorise 
types o f conflict and not to belittle the suffering o f any victims.
43 For different justifications to secession and other related themes see: Beran Harry, ‘The place of 
secession in liberal democratic theory’, in Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory (eds.), Nations, Cultures and 
Markets (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994); Percy P. Lehning (ed.), Theories o f Secession (London; New  
York: Routledge, 1998); and Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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principles of reconciliation are straightforwardly applicable. If  the solution is 
separation then it means the three principles apply and separation needs to be 
endorsed by the conflicting parties. If other forms of arrangements, such as federation 
and confederation, were achieved then the three principles are still essential and 
preliminary for sustaining the solutions reached. The examples of Quebec in Canada, 
apartheid South Africa, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the conflict in Sudan between the 
central government and the rebels in the South, might be revealing here. Although the 
content, result and nature o f reconciliation might be different in each of these cases, 
the three principles are directly applicable.
Let us briefly explore some examples. If we take the principle of collective 
memory, we can identify constructed histories, traditions and cultures that lead to 
discrete boundaries of ‘imagined communities.’44 Collective memory is essential in 
the construction of a collective sense of identity, it is no accident that all car number 
plates in the province of Quebec carry the motto ‘I will remember’. 45 Lasting 
oppression and exclusion profoundly contribute to the formation of a very strong 
sense o f collective memory and identity. For example, the displacement o f the 
Palestinians from their lands in 1948, their struggle to get recognized as a nation, and 
their subjection to a continuous Israeli occupation have strongly contributed to the 
formation of their collective identity and memory 46 The construction of a collective 
memory among certain, not all, Jewish communities in Europe was the result of 
European anti-Semitism and persecution, the Holocaust, and the growth of Zionist 
movements and it is to protect this memory that ‘Holocaust denial’ is criminalised. 
Whatever harm is involved in Holocaust denial must be explained in terms of 
historical memories in shaping a group’s current identity. The emergence o f the 
Zionist movement (it had different factions and schools o f thought), conjured up
44 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
45 On the role o f collective memory in forming collective identities see: Milton Takei, ‘Collective 
Memory as the Key to National and Ethnic Identity: The Case o f Cambodia’, Nationalism & Ethnic 
Politics 4:3 (1998), pp. 59-78; Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, Lewis A. Coser (ed. and 
trans.) (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992); The Collective Memory, Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and 
Vida Yazdi Ditter (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1980).
46 For a useful discussion on the construction o f Palestinian collective memory and national identity 
see: Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Genesis ofM odern National Consciousness (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997).
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motives, images from the Bible, secularized them and put them in the service of 
constructing a modem national Jewish identity.
As for the principle of acknowledging historical injustices and harms, the 
Palestinians claim that for a lasting just peace to be achieved, the state of Israel has to 
first recognize the historical injustices that have been caused to them by the 
establishment of the state of Israel on the ruins of their lands, villages and cities. The 
claim, however, does not stop here, Palestinians do not only demand mere recognition 
o f these grievances in terms o f monetary reparations, but also expect the state o f Israel 
to take responsibility for causing these injustices and for it to offer an 
acknowledgement and apology. Several groups that have experienced relatively 
similar conditions have viewed these demands, i.e., three principles, as preliminary 
conditions for achieving sustainable coexistence and peace. The example of 
reconciliation between Germans and several European Jewish communities that are 
scattered in many parts of the world today is another example where these principles 
are applicable and the case is not necessarily state focused. It is reasonable to argue 
that the same principles are at work in the claims of the Armenian people demanding 
the recognition of their genocide caused by the Ottoman Empire, and the continued 
denial of an Armenian holocaust by the Turks that sustains part o f Armenian national 
identity today. India, Pakistan and many other countries in Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and the Middle East are demanding an acknowledgment from Britain, France, 
Spain and other previous colonizing imperial powers about the historical exploitation 
and injustices that were caused, taking responsibility and offering public apology for 
causing them. Different forms o f assistance (economic, developmental, military, 
humanitarian, medical etc.) and commemorating the harms and injustices through 
ceremonies, memorials, and museums are crucial supplements to apology, but they 
cannot be substitutes -  the two must go side by side.
Hitherto, I have tried to show the relevance of main principles of 
reconciliation to enduring national conflicts. The significance o f main principles of 
reconciliation to enduring national conflicts seems to be clear and straightforward. 
However, demonstrating the applicability of these principles to milder conflicts, such 
as multicultural social and cultural conflicts, seems to be more challenging.
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Social, cultural and racial group conflicts
Social and cultural conflicts involve social groups such as immigrant 
communities, either from relatively poor neighbouring countries or previous colonies, 
which voluntarily came to the host countries as a cheap labour force or to search for 
better life opportunities.47 Though these communities tend to live in the same 
neighbourhoods, for various reasons, at the national level they are dispersed in the 
sense that they are not concentrated in one area with territorial continuity. These 
communities tend to suffer from discrimination and exclusion based on their ethnicity, 
race and social class. Their demands and claims are often articulated in the form of 
achieving better living conditions and the ability to preserve their cultures and 
traditions. They do not have territorial claims or national aspirations but could ask for 
forms of cultural autonomy, respect o f their norms and practices, and demand 
affirmative actions and policies to enhance their conditions and opportunities.48 Some 
o f the groups that fall under this category are viewed as relatively new arrivals and are 
not historically rooted in the host country. This latter point poses some challenges to 
the validity of the three principles because the line o f history seems to play a crucial 
role in justifying the operation o f the politics o f reconciliation. Under this category 
fall certain excluded social groups, such as women, homosexuals and lesbians and the 
working class, who are not necessarily immigrants and still suffer from serious 
degrees of exclusion and discrimination. These groups are disadvantaged because of 
their social belonging, i.e., class or gender, religion etc. The social groups that are 
discussed here can be divided roughly into two types; immigrants or racial groups and 
social groups based on life style (homosexual, lesbian) and gender (women).
Let us try to exemplify the operation of the three principles in a few cases that 
fall under the first type. If  we take the case of the African Americans in the U.S. and 
apply the first principle, i.e., collective memory o f exclusion, then the issue o f a 
collective memory of exclusion is central to their case for recognition. For these 
communities, dispersed in many states in US.., had a prolonged history of slavery,
47 Economic immigration is not entirely voluntary because many people are forced to leave their 
countries to escape severe economic conditions and search for better ones.
48 Notice Kymlicka’s distinction, in: Will Kymlicka, ‘Social Unity in a Liberal State’, Social 
Philosophy and Policy, 13:1 (1996) especially pp. 106-115.
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exclusion and discrimination. While the extreme case o f slavery does not exist 
anymore these communities are still subject to discriminatory, exclusionist and racist 
policies that are imbedded in society and institutions. Their collective memory of 
exclusion has a clear presence in the literature, music, art and social movements o f the 
African-American communities. While the American establishment has taken few 
steps to acknowledge (second principle) the history o f slavery, and the harms and 
injustices caused to the African American communities and the stigma that still 
attaches to them as a former enslaved people, there is more work to be done at the 
level of taking responsibility (third principle) over causing these exclusions and 
injustices, offering apology, commemorating and anchoring these exclusions in the 
public life and official history of the U.S., and actively engaging in providing 
affirmative and inclusive policies to remedy them.49
More challenging cases for the applicability of the three principles would be in 
milder conflicts such as the case o f relatively new immigrant communities that have 
willingly arrived in hosting countries primarily for purposes o f work. If we take for 
example the case o f the Indian, Bangladeshi or Pakistani communities in the U.K., 
they are relatively new arrivals and one could argue that these communities do not 
have a strong sense o f collective memory of exclusion as assimilation is often strong 
in some groups (the Indian community is more assimilated than the Bangladeshi or 
Pakistani communities). That said, one could point to the apparent breach of promise 
to former colonised peoples, who were brought into the community when needed, 
during time of war or time of labour shortages, but who find their welcome and 
inclusion withdrawn once they have settled. The alienation felt by many second 
generation South Asian immigrants is partly explained by this fact -  they are no 
longer always welcomed, but they have no ‘homeland’ to return to as they are British. 
Furthermore, one can argue that these communities have been suffering from different 
forms of exclusion, discrimination and Islamophobia (this last one influences more 
the Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities) and we can point to a sense of collective 
memory of exclusion that exists and is now being reinforced. Taking responsibility in 
the case of immigrants who come to host countries of their own free will and
49 For a useful discussion on the case o f slavery and African Americans see fro example: McCarthy,
‘ Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in the USA: On the Politics o f Memory o f Slavery’, Political Theory, 
30:5 (2002), pp. 635-636; ‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics o f  
Reparation for Slavery’, Political Theory, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772: and Roy L. Brooks (ed.), When 
Sorry Isn't Enough: T he Controversy over Apologies and Reparations fo r  Human Rights (New York: 
New York University Press, 1999), particularly part 7, pp. 395-438.
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following the request o f the host countries to fill a shortage in the labour force is 
different than taking historical responsibility for causing injustices like in the case of 
the African Americans in the States. These new arrivals were mostly invited as a 
cheap labour. Most o f these immigrants turned to be citizens after a few years. After 
being established in the host country, they brought their families and the young 
generation established new families. These communities have naturally grown with 
second and third generations of children. It is quite often claimed that the citizenship 
o f the members of these groups is flawed, subject to confirmation and needs more 
qualifications from the larger society and its institutions. Since they are new arrivals 
and some of their social norms and cultural practices are different from the dominant 
norms and practices, they are often viewed as not, if at all, belonging to the nation.
Similar claims are often invoked in Germany against its Turkish and Kurdish 
origin residents and in France against its North African origins residents. These 
communities, in the U.K. as well as in Germany and France, live under unequal 
conditions compared to the rest o f the society. The causes of these living standards are 
mostly, but not only, due to unfair treatment, discrimination and marginalization. The 
state and larger society are obliged to move beyond the usually invoked discourse of 
legal equality, acknowledge these social inequalities, mistreatments and 
discriminations. Once these people become citizens, the state and the larger society 
have a clear and direct responsibility for their conditions and treatments. Therefore, 
the state and the civil society do carry responsibility over the marginalization and 
exclusion o f these communities. This form of responsibility is more subtle and milder 
than the one that results from longstanding exclusion and marginalization suffered by 
social groups such as African Americans nevertheless it has an important historical 
dimension that needs to be addressed in any attempt to overcome it.
The application of the three principles in cases of excluded social groups that 
are subject to marginalization and misrecognition, due to their gender and sexuality 
for example, seems to pose further challenges to the applicability o f the principles of 
reconciliation. If  we take the homosexual and lesbian communities we can talk about 
a thinner notion of collective memory o f exclusion because o f the fluidity of the 
structure of these social groups. Moreover, these members cross groups’ boundaries in 
the sense that they belong to other types o f groups that might also suffer from 
exclusion because o f other reasons such as their religious affiliation, ethnicity or race. 
However, we can clearly talk about a sense o f collectivity. For in many places in
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contemporary modem Western societies we find homosexual or lesbian bars, 
literature, fashion, art etc. It is quite established that homosexuals were, and in many 
places are still, subject to persecution, exclusion and discrimination. Yet the problems 
o f numbers (size) and the inter-groups character do not contribute to the formation of 
a strong sense of collective memory of exclusion. As for the principle of 
acknowledging mistreatments, injustices and exclusions, it is plausible to expect from 
the larger society and its institutions to recognize the unjustified mistreatment and 
misrecognition o f homosexuals. Moreover, the society and its institution should take 
principal responsibility (third principle) for causing these mistreatments and 
exclusions, offer an apology and adopt inclusive policies that clearly work to remedy 
the injustices, sufferings and misrecognitions that have this crucial historical 
dimension. More specifically, it is plausible to argue that in the case of homophobia 
the process of reconciliation must take place between the institutions that have 
bolstered the legal and social discrimination, such as the church, and the excluded 
groups. In this case it is primarily the church which is supposed to apologize and take 
responsibility. Recent events in the Anglican communion have touched on claims by 
Gay and Lesbian Christians to be acknowledged by the wider community as victims 
of coercive marginalisation and misrepresentation. The issue of apology and 
acknowledgement in this case is more for the institution of the Church than for wider 
political institutions such as the State, but it does show how even in civil society the 
issue o f reconciliation can form an important part in overcoming exclusion and 
injustice. In the case o f the gay and lesbian communities, restoration is unlikely to 
take the form of material compensations such as money property etc. For their 
suffering is mostly emotional, psychological and social. Therefore, it is likely that 
their restoration claims will be non-monetary in the sense they demand the respect of 
their honour and identities and the introduction o f new laws that remedy their 
exclusion but it could equally involve the public acknowledgement by the state of 
practices such as forced cures for homosexuality that formed part of the punishment 
o f homosexual offences until de-criminalisation in the 1960s.50
50 Daan Bronkhorst draws out a useful distinction between compensation, restitution, restoration, and 
reparation. Compensation refers to material forms o f repair for things that cannot be regained. 
Examples include death and lost opportunity. Restitution refers to giving back lost property. 
Restoration refers to restoration o f honour, dignity, identities and names. Reparation refers to the non­
monetary things such as services o f education, health, and the introduction o f new laws in favour o f the 
victims. See Daan Bronkhorst, Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice: A Short Guide fo r  Users 
(Amnesty International Dutch Section, 2003), p. 26.
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Though the previous examples have shown that the validity o f principles of 
reconciliation in milder group conflicts is not as straightforward and pressing as in the 
case of longstanding violent conflicts, examining a few types o f milder conflicts has 
indicated that it is very plausible to argue that the principles o f reconciliation can 
operate in these types of conflicts within civil society as well. In the following 
paragraphs I will briefly examine the applicability o f reconciliation to a particular 
type of conflicts, namely, conflicts between indigenous communities and colonial 
settler societies.
Conflicts between indigenous communities and colonial societies
In the case o f conflicts between native communities and colonial societies the 
three principles seem to clearly apply. The case here is that colonial power(s), mostly 
Europeans, allowed and encouraged, or sometimes forced, some o f their inhabitants to 
settle in the occupied foreign territories where they later established colonies and 
states at the expense of the indigenous local population. These indigenous populations 
were mostly executed and those of them who have survived have been subject to 
enduring mistreatment, discrimination, exclusion and persecution. Their rights, 
traditions and histories were denied and in the best case were ignored. The American 
Indians and the indigenous populations of Canada and Australia are examples that fall 
under this category.51 Now I will turn to showing the applicability o f each o f the three 
principles in the case of indigenous communities. As for the first principle, i.e., 
collective memory of exclusion, the state or the dominant group views the natives as 
distinctive groups with a particular inferior tradition and culture. These groups tend to 
have a very strong sense of collective memory o f exclusion because o f their 
continuous subjection to discrimination, exclusion and oppression. Many o f these 
native communities in different parts of the world have been subject to long-lasting
51 For a good discussion on the case o f native Americans see: Roy L. Brooks (ed.), When Sorry Isn 7 
Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations fo r Human Rights (New York: New York 
University Press, 1999), particularly part 5, pp. 233-304; Burke A. Hendrix, ‘Memory in Native 
American Land Claims’, Political Theory, 33:6 (2005), pp. 763-785. On reconciliation in Australia see: 
Michael Phillips, ‘Aboriginal Reconciliation as Religious Politics: Secularisation in Australia’, 
Australian Journal o f Political Science, 40:1 (2005), pp. 111-124; and Paul Muldoon, ‘Reconciliation 
and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa,’ Australian Journal o f  Politics 
and History, 49:2 (2003), pp. 182-196.
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denial o f rights. Their memories and identities are usually maintained through 
ceremonies, rituals, daily practices, story telling, oral history and the arts. The second 
principle is acknowledging historical injustices and the suffering they have caused. 
This suffering included severe forms of violence such as genocide and large-scale 
massacres. The dominant groups should recognize that these native communities have 
suffered from enduring and long-standing grievances. The second principle is crucial 
but not sufficient. For the dominant groups are expected to take direct responsibility 
for causing these sufferings and grievances. The larger society should recognize that 
their state has been established at the ruins of the culture, lands and houses of the 
native populations. Taking responsibility does not require only the willingness to 
restore and remedy these injustices and grievances through redistribution of resources, 
compensation, etc., but also what should accompany this willingness is a deliberate 
public apology. This public apology should not take the form of a passing one time 
announcement but must be anchored as an important historic event in the school’s 
curriculum and annually remembered as public holiday to give few examples.
Thus far, my aim has been to demonstrate the operation o f three principles of 
the politics o f reconciliation, namely, memory, acknowledgment and responsibility 
and apology, in three different types of group conflicts. It has been shown that these 
principles are applicable in the three different communal conflicts. However, there is 
a kind o f hierarchy or priority in the urgency of their relevance. Put differently, while 
in the case of national conflicts their relevance is urgent and quite straightforward and 
in conflicts between indigenous and colonial societies it is quite pressing, their 
relevance is less pressing in the case of social conflicts. Showing the applicability of 
the principles of reconciliation to mortal as well as milder conflicts contributes to 
strengthening the crucial significance of the politics of reconciliation to historically 
divided and multicultural societies.
Part IV
Institutional questions
This part briefly outlines institutional and practical questions related to 
reconciliation. In other words, in this part I will briefly tackle how we can cash out 
reconciliation in practical political context. How can we implement the principles of
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reconciliation in historically divided and pluralistic societies? Which types of 
institutions should we form in order to implement the principles of reconciliation? 
Though addressing these questions requires a substantial and detailed discussion that 
is beyond the scope o f this thesis, in the following paragraph I will discuss some 
institutional features while keeping in mind that these features do not represent an 
exhaustive list. Moreover, different mechanisms and designs can be devised to 
implement the principles of reconciliation. These different mechanisms and designs 
depend on the nature o f injustices committed and the concrete conditions and context 
o f oppression.
One o f the potential avenues to institutionally implement reconciliatory 
processes is the formation o f special bodies for this purpose. These bodies take the 
form of special committees or commissions. Several countries such as Argentina, 
Chile, South Africa and Germany, have established ‘truth commissions’ to deal with 
historical injustices and abuses of human rights. Let me briefly introduce some o f the 
constitutive general features of these bodies. The features include the mandate, 
authority, budget, purpose, composition and duration. The special committees or 
commissions o f truth and reconciliation are often contemporary formal and 
governmental bodies (but can be informal and non-governmental too). Their 
formation is the result o f a parliamentary decision, a presidential order or a peace 
agreement between conflicting parties. They are set up to investigate patterns of 
exclusion, oppression and injustices. Their mandate is quite specific in the sense that 
they are authorized to investigate specific types of abuses and violations that were 
committed during a particular period o f time. The members o f these bodies, the 
number usually ranges between 10-20 persons, are often reliable and respected public 
figures such as academics, religious leaders, international experts and human right 
activists. These bodies are expected to come out with a comprehensive report which 
often includes binding recommendations for concrete polices including compensation 
and restorative actions, institutional reforms, developmental programs and 
prosecution of perpetrators. Sometimes the recommendations of these commissions 
include the creation of a permanent institution that monitors discrimination, exclusion, 
segregation, racism and other violations o f human rights.52
52 For more on these features and others see: See Daan Bronkhorst, Truth Commissions and 
Transitional Justice: A Short Guide fo r  Users (Amnesty International Dutch Section, 2003), pp. 11-12. 
Also David Crocker outlines a general normative framework for reconciliatory processes that gives a
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the politics o f reconciliation promises an effective 
accommodation to the demands of historically excluded social groups. More precisely, 
it has argued that the politics o f reconciliation successfully encompasses three 
fundamental, often overlooked, issues which lie at the core o f demands of historical 
exclusion and offers appealing answers to several accusations that are raised against it. 
The politics o f reconciliation, it has been argued, proposes an effective 
accommodation of the demands of historically excluded social groups because its 
main principles and characteristics enable serious engagement with the specificities of 
experiences of historical exclusion and oppression.
More specifically, this chapter has suggested a fourfold argument. First, it has 
been demonstrated that the politics of reconciliation captures more adequately the 
issues o f collective memory o f exclusion, acknowledgement o f historical injustices 
and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. Second, 
the politics of reconciliation, it has been argued, offers convincing answers to several 
charges, such as essentialism and consensus, that are often levelled against it. Third, 
reconciliation should not be viewed as an alternative concept to deliberation and 
recognition but as a supplement to them. Fourth, the principles o f reconciliation are 
applicable to milder or non-mortal conflicts as well as to mortal conflicts although 
their relevance is more urgent in the latter type. Part I o f the chapter has advanced the 
first claim o f the argument. After interrogating the existing literature on reconciliation, 
it has suggested that in light o f the failure of integrative approaches (chapters 5 and 6) 
to sufficiently address the issues o f collective memory o f exclusion, acknowledgment 
o f historical injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing 
these injustices, issues of a great significance to historically excluded social groups, it 
has proposed the politics of reconciliation as the most adequate ‘candidate’ to tackle 
these issues. Part II o f the chapter has advanced the second and third claims o f the 
argument. It has argued that the politics of reconciliation needs not promote
significant institutional component to reconciliation. For more see: David A. Crocker, ‘Reckoning with 
Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework’, in Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), Dilemmas o f  
Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), pp. 39- 
63.
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essentialism, consensus and politics of revenge. The politics of reconciliation 
advocated in this chapter has refuted all o f these charges. Furthermore, it has argued 
that reconciliation, deliberation and recognition are not competitive concepts but 
complementary ones. Put it differently, in order to attain an effective accommodation 
of claims of historical injustices suffered by social groups, the politics of 
reconciliation is an inevitable supplement to deliberation and recognition. 
Reconciliation is often viewed as an effective remedy to enduring violent (war, killing 
etc.) conflicts. Part III of the chapter, however, has suggested that reconciliatory 
processes are not solely applicable to mortal deadly conflicts, but also to milder 
conflicts that characterize contemporary modem multicultural societies. The last part 
has briefly outlined institutional and practical questions related to reconciliation.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has sought to follow certain contemporary attempts to recast 
liberalism and democracy in order to accommodate demands o f historically excluded 
social groups. In particular, this thesis has provided a critical examination of four 
approaches to democratic inclusion. These approaches are: egalitarian theories of 
deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics (regarded as 
two different and contradictory -  but related approaches), and integrative approaches. 
The thesis has presented each approach as a successively more effective way of 
addressing democratic exclusion. Each theory has been measured against the demands 
o f accommodating the claims o f groups that have suffered some form of historical 
exclusion and injustice. The thesis has explained the significance of the demands of 
historical injustices in relation to these approaches and concluded that theories of 
deliberation and recognition require supplementation by ‘a politics of reconciliation’. 
The incompleteness of egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics 
and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative approaches stems primarily from their 
failure to demonstrate a satisfactory attentiveness to core issues that underlie demands 
of historical exclusion. Most importantly among these issues are: collective memory 
of exclusion, acknowledgement o f historical injustices, and taking responsibility and 
offering an apology for causing these injustices. These three issues emerge and 
require special treatment that goes beyond the mere recognition o f culture and identity 
and the postulation o f abstract egalitarian principles of deliberation and justice; this is 
especially significant because of the importance o f the past in achieving democratic 
accommodation through unmasking and explaining historical injustices and their 
intimate link with present inequalities.
I have argued that in order to achieve an effective accommodation of historical 
exclusion and injustice, certain understandings o f deliberative democracy and the 
politics o f recognition need to be complemented by ‘a politics o f reconciliation.’ The 
politics o f reconciliation is fundamentally crucial for the task o f accommodating 
demands of historically excluded social groups primarily because o f its emphasis on 
confronting the past, acknowledging injustices, taking responsibility and offering an 
apology for causing these injustices and embracing the concrete and specific
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experiences of historical oppression and exclusion. The distinctiveness of 
reconciliation stems from its serious engagement with the specificities and 
particularities of real and concrete experiences of historical oppression and exclusion.
Subsequently, it has been argued that reconciliation is indispensable for 
effectively tackling demands of historically excluded social groups. However, 
reconciliation, recognition and deliberation are not rival concepts but complementary 
ones. They are complementary in the sense that reconciliation is not and should not be 
viewed as a conclusive and exhaustive alternative, but rather a crucial requirement to 
appropriately accommodate demands of historical exclusion and injustice. If the 
politics of recognition fails to give significant recognition to memory of exclusion, 
historical injustice and harm and the need to accept responsibility, it fails to offer 
genuine recognition. It is for this reason that recognition and reconciliation are 
inseparable if the former is to be a genuinely ‘political’ project. Reconciliation does 
not dispense with the insights of the social ontology of the politics o f recognition, but 
it shows that social ontology does not in and of itself guarantee an appropriate 
political agenda. Moreover, it has been argued that reconciliation is not an exhaustive 
and conclusive frame for politics because it is primarily a backward-looking notion 
that lacks a regulative character. Deliberation is primarily a forward oriented concept 
that provides regulative procedures for taking decisions. Therefore, reconciliation and 
deliberation fulfil different and complementary functions. While the primary task of 
reconciliation is to insist on the significance of the historical dimension in claims of 
historical injustice, the principal task of deliberation is to provide regulative principles 
that govern political deliberation and decision-making.
In demonstrating the crucial necessity of complementing deliberation and 
recognition with reconciliation to satisfactorily accommodate claims o f social groups 
that have suffered some form o f historical oppression and injustice, I began by 
exploring, in chapter 2, the adequacy o f the egalitarian theories o f deliberative 
democracy of Rawls, Habermas and Gutmann and Thompson to accommodate the 
claims o f historically excluded social groups. The chapter has found these deliberative 
theories wanting. More particularly, it has argued that these theories, despite their 
subtle and substantial differences, are insufficiently attentive to claims of historical 
exclusion and injustice. Rawls’ notions o f politics and public reason, it has been 
argued, give rise to several problems that make the task o f accommodating historical 
injustices very difficult. Rawls’ notions exacerbate problems of cultural imperialism,
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denying the role of history and memory in politics, privileging elitist rational forms of 
communication, and excessive legalism. Gutmann and Thompson’s theory of 
deliberative democracy, it has been demonstrated, suffers from several problems that 
undermine its ability to effectively accommodate claims o f historical exclusion. These 
problems can be summed up as follows: ignoring the role o f identities in generating 
political conflicts, postulating the mutual acceptance prior to the process of 
reconciliation, and the operation of the idea o f reasonableness as a mechanism of 
exclusion. Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy, it has been argued, is also 
inadequate primarily because it: relies on excessive proceduralism and legalism, 
favours rational and disembodied modes of speech, brackets power relations from 
moral reasoning and determining ‘reasonableness’, and gives primacy to the state as 
the ultimate frame for political authority; this theory, therefore, fails to capture the 
claims o f historically excluded social groups which undermine the notion of statehood 
by their demand to separate or secede.
The inadequacies o f Rawls’, Habermas’, and Gutmann and Thompson’ 
theories o f deliberative democracy to appropriately accommodate demands of 
historically excluded social groups stem primarily from their failure to engage 
seriously with context, cultural embeddedness, identity and concrete experiences of 
exclusion and oppression. Consequently, this failure has led to a turn away from 
simple deliberation to a ‘politics o f recognition’ which is based on a thicker notion of 
social ontology. In chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 I turned my focus to questions of social 
ontology that are undervalued by deliberative democracy and seem to underlie the 
claims of historically excluded social groups. The key ontological components that 
were discussed are self, culture, representation, and intercultural dialogue. The turn to 
a different social ontology than the one underlying deliberative democracy is what is 
offered by ‘the politics o f recognition’ and ‘integrative theories of democratic 
inclusion’.
Chapter 3 has examined Rawls’ atomistic and Habermas’ intersubjective 
notions of the self. Relying chiefly on communitarian criticisms, the chapter has 
argued that Rawls’ and Habermas’ notions of selfhood both significantly underplay 
the importance of culture, context and history in the process o f identity formation for 
the sake o f determining the governing principles and procedures o f social justice and 
legitimacy. In other words, they both tend to view culture and history as insignificant 
to politics; namely, they see it as insignificant to achieve freedom, equality and social
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justice. The chapter has argued that it is precisely this denial of the significance of 
history and culture to identity and politics which makes their theories insufficiently 
attentive to claims o f historical injustices raised by historically excluded social groups. 
The communitarian critique has contributed considerably to the rise o f a particular 
form o f the politics of recognition, namely ‘identity politics’, which emphasizes 
embeddedness, situatedness and cultural distinctiveness and difference.
Chapter 4 has focused on ‘identity politics’ and its weaknesses. More precisely, 
it has discussed Charles Taylor’s ‘politics of recognition’ and Judith Butler’s 
criticisms of identity politics. Taylor has criticized the atomism and blindness to 
difference that lie at the core o f dominant contemporary versions of liberalism. He has 
proposed to replace a difference-blind liberalism with ‘the politics o f recognition’. 
Taylor grounds his account of politics on a dialogical notion o f selfhood that accords 
significant roles to identity, culture and difference. The chapter has argued that while 
Taylor’s demand to give due recognition to excluded and oppressed social groups is 
an important progress that goes beyond the liberal notion o f tolerance that underlie 
Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories, his notion o f recognition seems to rely on an 
essentialist conception o f culture which poses serious challenges to his account of 
democratic accommodation. Furthermore, the chapter has argued that while Butler’s 
views pose some significant challenges to identity politics by revealing the 
oppositional logic that lies at its core and the important role power relations play in 
identity formation, her post-structuralist model of identity is not persuasive because, 
among other things, it postulates an experimental and hybrid self that is expected to 
continuously transcend and transform its limits and boundaries. This agonistic self 
looks like the liberal self in that it is detached from cultural and political contexts.
Chapter 5 has explored the ontological issue o f representation which is viewed 
as one of the core components of democratic accommodation. The chapter has argued 
that the diverse notions of representation employed by proponents of identity politics, 
post-modern critics o f identity politics, and integrative theorists are insufficiently 
attentive to demands of historically excluded social groups. More specifically, the 
chapter has argued that proponents o f identity politics have primarily relied on a 
descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation when they demand the representation 
of excluded social groups. This descriptive Aristotelian notion, it has been argued, is 
problematic because it leads to the promotion o f essentialism, fixation, closure, 
balkanization and homogeneity. To free identity and politics from the ‘chains’ of
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essentialism, fixation and homogeneity, post-modern theorists such as Deleuze and 
Guattari have developed a non-essentialist and hybrid notion of representation. The 
chapter has claimed that Deleuze and Guattari’s notion o f representation is 
unpersuasive because while they try to avoid the risks o f essentialism, closure, 
hierarchy and homogeneity, they celebrate excessive hybridity and fluidity that 
undermines the very possibility of politics and identity. Moreover, they do not provide 
guidance on how to transfer their views into concrete and practical mechanisms of 
representation. The dispute between those who view group representation as a 
positive tool to achieve inclusion and those who view it as a negative instrument that 
essentialises identities and reproduces existing hierarchies, has given rise to 
integrative approaches that aim to combine components from both sides and offer 
more elaborate notions of representation. The chapter has argued that the modified 
and integrative notions o f representation proposed by scholars such as Iris Marion 
Young and Melissa Williams are attractive but incomplete. It has argued that while 
their notions o f representation are more appealing than the hitherto discussed ones 
because of their attempt to take social inequalities, experiences o f exclusion, history 
and memory seriously and combine procedural as well as substantive political 
principles, they remain insufficient.
Chapter 6 has focused on the integrative approaches of Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla 
Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. It went on to argue that these approaches have not been 
entirely successful in fulfilling their promise to propose effective accounts of 
democratic inclusion which are capable of fully accommodating demands of 
historically excluded social groups. More precisely, the chapter has examined the 
revised notions o f intercultural dialogue and deliberation enthusiastically proposed by 
Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. It has argued that while each of 
these three accounts has several different merits, each fails to fully accommodate 
claims o f historical exclusion. Their failure, it has been argued, stems primarily from 
ignoring the significance of collective memory o f exclusion (clearly not in the case of 
Dallmayr and to a lesser extent in the case of Benhabib), acknowledgment of 
historical injustices and harms, taking responsibility and offering an apology for 
causing these historical injustices and harms.
Thus far, the discussion has been about the inadequacies o f egalitarian theories 
o f deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics and 
integrative approaches to appropriately accommodate demands o f historical exclusion
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and oppression. Their inadequacies stem primarily, but not exclusively, from 
overlooking the significance of crucial issues that reside at the basis of the claims of 
historically excluded social groups. These crucial issues include: collective memory 
o f exclusion, acknowledgment of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and 
offering an apology for causing these historical injustices.
Chapter 7 introduced the notion of reconciliation that is often discussed in 
International Relations and conflict resolution literatures. The chapter argued that it is 
‘the politics of reconciliation’ that promises an effective accommodation to the 
demands of historically excluded social groups. More precisely, it has argued that the 
politics of reconciliation successfully encompasses the three overlooked issues that lie 
at the core of demands of historical exclusion and offers appealing answers to several 
accusations that are raised against it. The politics of reconciliation, it has been argued, 
proposes an effective accommodation to demands of historically excluded social 
groups because its main principles and characteristics enable serious engagement with 
the specificities o f experiences of historical exclusion and oppression. More 
specifically, this chapter has suggested a fourfold argument. First, it has demonstrated 
that the politics of reconciliation captures more adequately the issues of collective 
memory of exclusion, acknowledgement o f historical injustices, and taking 
responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. Second, the 
politics of reconciliation, it has been claimed, offers convincing answers to several 
charges, such as essentialism and consensus, which are often levelled against it. Third, 
reconciliation needs not be viewed as an alternative concept to deliberation and 
recognition but as a supplement to them. Fourth, the principles o f reconciliation, it has 
been demonstrated, are applicable to milder as well as to mortal conflicts although 
their relevance is more urgent in the latter type.
The originality of this thesis lies in providing a supplement and therefore 
transforming the politics of recognition and deliberative democracy and their ability to 
address political problems of excluded social groups. This thesis has not aimed to 
replace deliberation and recognition with new substitutes but has sought to offer a 
new interpretation of these theories and supplement them with reconciliation. Briefly, 
the thesis has offered a new interpretation to familiar issues in different disciplines 
and the novel task has been to bring them together. The application o f the ethic of 
reconciliation, from International Relations and conflict resolution, to the politics of 
recognition and deliberation makes a significant contribution to the field and the
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opening of a new research agenda for normative theories o f democratic inclusion. 
This new research agenda could open new avenues for further research that is more 
optimistic about the purpose of politics and its potential to improve citizens’ lives, 
especially those who are underprivileged and excluded in modem pluralistic and 
divided societies. Moreover, it is worth examining what other implications the politics 
o f reconciliation has on attempts to design more inclusive political systems.
Drawing on this Ph.D. thesis, one potential research avenue would be to 
explore further what the politics of reconciliation involves and develop a better 
understanding of the demands o f historically excluded social groups in historically 
divided and pluralistic societies. This research avenue aspires to examine further the 
operation of the principles of reconciliation in specific types of conflicts in 
contemporary pluralistic societies. More specifically, it aims to explore indigenous 
traditions o f dispute resolution. These indigenous traditions of conflict resolutions 
primarily deal with social disputes over land, family affairs etc. It is not implausible, 
however, to argue that these indigenous traditions could be extended (or at least could 
be inspiring and instructive) to deal with political and social disputes within and 
among different communities in contemporary pluralistic and divided societies. The 
proposed research avenue does not only aspire to explore the compatibility of 
indigenous traditions of dispute resolution with contemporary conceptions of 
procedural justice and deliberation, but also aims at offering guidelines in designing 
institutions and practical frameworks that engender the compatibility of these 
indigenous traditions with the modem procedures of justice and deliberation. This 
type of research is likely to combine normative analysis as well as empirical surveys 
to critically examine these indigenous mechanisms and their ability to settle political 
and moral disputes in contemporary pluralistic and divided societies. The indigenous 
tradition o f conflict resolution within the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel and the 
native Canadian tradition of conflict resolution could serve as possible case studies 
and it is to these traditions I hope to turn in subsequent research.
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